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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is a study of the relationship between violence 
and writing, and it takes as its focus the post-1976 nove~s of 
An~~ ~!in~~Eanging from Rumours of Rain to An Act of Terror. 
- '/·rC::,..-1 
Its chief argument is that Brink's work undoes the oppo~ition 
between· 'violence and writing, both in its thematic content '~nd in 
( ~ I ' 
the self-reflexively foregrounded dynamics of its utterance. 
While Brink's novels suggest th;t violence impedes writing 
inasmuch as it traumatises the speaking subject, it is no less 
the case that they present the subsequent resurgence of writing 
as an act of violence directed against forces constraining the 
subject to silence. For Brink, violence negates w_ri t_in$, yet it 
~ 
also informs it. 
Chapter 1 develops these themes by arguing that violence 
--~-- _ ____....... .. 
incapacitates the subject of knowledge, and it argues this by 
outlining three metaphorical systems by which the subject's 
impairment may be represented. The chapter suggests that through 
writing, the subject re-engages in an gggn which he had missed in 
other contexts. In particular, by suffering death in th~~ 
signifier, he re-enacts and comprehends traumatic events which 
had eluded his conceptual grasp. Chapter 1 concludes by claiming 
that an analogy exists between the statements Brink produces in 
his writing about the distinction between viole~~ perpetrated by 
hegemony and by those who resist domination, and the problems of 
utterance which his texts bring to the fore. As far as this 
distinction is concerned/ Brink maintains that certain forms of 
violence_perpetuate a co~posi~e_silence in which the oppressed is 
dehum§.I?-~sed, the oppressor is self-alienated, and the prosJ?_~c~_.of 
their common meeting-place is. dispelled. 
These three silences are analys~d respectively ln Chapter 2, 
- - ----
while Chap~r- ~ examines an opposing form of violence which, 
according to Brink, shatters each of the silences. In this 
category of violence/ the oppressed assert their autonomy, call 
the oppressor to account by inducing in him a guilty 
consciousness-of-self, and project a metanarrative movement 
towards a national agora. 
I discuss these contending forms of violence in terms of 
Hegel's notion of the_ s~~uggl.!:_for re_g._og[lition_and the ... dialectic 
of the master and slave. Given the analogy between between the 
level of statement (what is said) and the level of utterance (the 
saying of the said) r the struggle for recognition can be 
' ,..., 
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discerned in both levels. What is at stake in either case is the 
re-assertion of subjecthood. 
In addition to its focus on Hegel, the dissertation draws on 
Alexandre Kojeve's interpretation of the Hegelian struggle· for 
prestige, Jean-Paul Sartre and Immanuel Levinas's conceptions of 
the self-Other relation, and Derrida's reading of Levinas. The 
dissertation also meditates on the thought of Maurice Blanchot, 
Jacques Lacan, Elaine Scarry, Roland Barthes, and Louis 
Althusser, and makes extensive theoretical use of Dori Laub and 
Shoshana Felman's relflections on witnessing. 
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FOR PATRICIA 
& 
FOR MY FATHER 
'Father, it was ever the vision of yourself, 
so often mournfully appearing to me, which 
compelled me to make my way to the threshold 
of this world' 
'The Visit to the Underworld', 
Virgil's The Aeneid 
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PREFACE 
The day after Chris Bani's funeral, Andre Brink wrote a newspaper 
article in which he confessed that the assassination of the 
former chief-of-staff of the guerilla army umKhonto we Sizwe and 
secretary-general of the South African Communist Party had led 
him into 'the temptation of despair' (Dove, 11). In the upheaval 
following Bani's murder, the political negotiations taking place 
at the time were in peril, as, after signs that they had fallen 
tentatively into abeyance, long-standing class and racial 
antagonisms re-asserted themselves. Mortified by the prospect of 
seeing his ideal of a non-racial democracy come to naught at a 
moment when t~} seemed so close to realization, Brink proclaimed 
that a 'dark wave' seemed to have flooded South Africa and 'the 
space of experience' seemed to have been -invaded by an 
incomprehensible clamour of rage, Pctin and fear' (11) ._For all 
its uproar, this uproar concealed a profound 'historical silence' 
(11) derived from the social divisions ingrained by the policy of 
apartheid. In the deluge, faculties of comprehension and reasoned 
assessment are unable to grasp a bewildering, unmanageable 
succession of events and impressions; and in this twilight of the 
faculties of reason, as Brink says elsewhere, it is as tpough 
'the sun has set, the light has gone out' (States, 130). For the 
benighted land's inhabitants, all engrossed in the isolating 
delirium of 'rage, pain and fear', such darkness is a condition 
in which one is 'deprived of one's own shadow' (States, 130), of 
the foil or counterpart who puts one's presence into relief and 
exposes the nature of one's actions through an interplay of 
opposition and partnership. This absence of communication between 
self and Other, an absence in which each flounders in cognitive 
blindness, constitutes the 'historical silence' to which Brink 
refers: the silence of the tomb. 
As the article on Bani, 'The dove in the grave' (1993), 
intimates by its title, Brink is quick to draw various ironies 
into his text, the chief of them being that a white dove, 
liberated in the course of the funeral, chose not to take to the 
air, but ominously fluttered down into the grave instead, as if 
suggesting how the hopes for national reconciliation it was 
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supposed to signify were fated to be swallowed up by death. The 
second 6f the ironies is the fact that Hani was murdered on an 
Easter weekend. Bani's assassination and its aftermath thus comes 
to represent, for Brink, the 'darkness between crucifixion and 
resurrection' (Dove, 11), an unpredictable and volatile period of 
arrestation within an otherwise securely-ordered narrative 
stucture which threatens to subsume the country's denizens (as it 
did with the signifying dove) into the same grave which claimed 
Chris Hani. The citizenry would thus languish in a vast, restless 
crypt, deadened to one another, deadened by despair, and dead to 
hope of a resplendent meeting-place beyond the crypt's walls. 
But while in one reading the essay's title stresses that the 
dove is unable to fly, because trapped in the grave, in another 
I 
reading the title suggests that the grave contains possibilities 
for its own transcendence: inscribing the assassination and 
funeral in a text of omens and portents, Brink notes promisingly 
that a soldier of umKhonto we Sizwe retrieved the dove to set it 
aflight. If the title alludes to this incident, at another level, 
naming the essay itself, it implies that what Brink has written 
is likewise 'a dove in the grave' and participates in the title's 
ambivalent meanings. Enthralled by the grave, contemplating the 
death, not only of a single person but possibly of an ideal 
condition of communal existence as well, Brink is tempted by 
despair, by a fatigued and resigned disposition towards 
inactivity and silence. The dove fallsi writing stops. Yet, given 
the title's shifting nuances (and the essay's overall thrust from 
despair to a renewal of hope), the resurgence of writing is akin 
to the flight of the dove from the grave. It is a writing issuing 
forth from a captivation by deadness, a missive despatched from 
within the crypt to discover a way out of the clamorous, darkened 
enclosure towards the illum~nated openness of a futural national 
topos. 
The question is, How does writing escape the grave? How does 
Brink overcome his disablement as a writer by the violent tableau 
he so disconsolately beholds? And if (as we shall see) his novels 
tend similarly to open on a situation in which a writer, or more 
broadly, a speaking subject, declares himself numbed, deadened 
and unable to write thanks to the traumatic impact violence has 
v 
had on him, one may ask, too, What constitutes the state of 
deadness, or numbness, and what is writing? If deadness implies 
the silence of the grave, how does writing break (out of) it? One 
may sketch a provisional answer to these questions by asking, 
What prompts Brink to write his essay so soon after Rani's 
funeral? 'I am writing a mere day after Rani's funeral' (Dove,ll) 
he says. What spurs on Brink's promptitude of response, all the 
more impressive for having been accomplished in the face of a 
debilitating 'temptation of despair' (Dove, 11)? 
Clearly, one answer is that he perceives it to be his duty 
both as a citizen and a writer not to vacillate before 
intervening in the worsening crisis. A duty to contribute to the 
instatement of a post-apartheid or~er necessitates a swift 
intervention lest the prospects for attaining such a polity be 
wrecked irreversibly; and the form Brink's intervention assumes 
is that of a eulogy for Chris Rani. In this funerary oration, 
Brink reads Rani's death -- aptly enough, considering that the 
latter was murdered on an Easter weekend -- into the Christian 
narrative paradigm of crucifixion and resurrection, and while 
Rani is mythographically inscribed as Christ, the country's 
unrest is likewise situated· as an intermediate period in an 
encompassing narrative advancing, however uncertainly, towards a 
glorious denouement. The effect of this mythicising construction 
is, of course, to suggest the impermanence of the individual's 
death and of the seemingly-intractable conflicts besetting the 
country; but, in addition, it imputes a sense of necessity to 
personal and collective sufferings, as if, rather than being the 
product of sudden, random allotments of misery, these were 
moments serving a purpose in an occulted rational (or at least 
meaningfully coherent) order, prelimary stages necessary for the 
attainment of some higher, as-yet obscure, good. Rani's death is 
thus implicitly -- and consolingly -- conceived as a sacrificial 
offering fostering the emergence of the future society. According 
to this reasoning, his death loses its quality of scandalous 
absurdity, and comes to serve a purpose as a sacrifice for a 
greater end; with the realization of this goal, his life is 
resurrected and preserved in the social body to which he had 
entrusted it. 
vi 
To place Rani's death in'such a metanarrative is thereby to 
imply that it carries meaning; death becomes a site from which 
meaning can be extracted. Indeed, meaning must be salvaged from , 
it, in order to safeguard it from being 'the meanest all deaths, 
with no more significance than cutting off a head of cabbage or 
swallowing a mouthful of water' (Hegel, 1977, 360). For Brink, it 
is incumbent on the writer to produce meaning from death, to save 
the dead from vanishing from the view of the living: they must be 
liberated from their graves, set into flight. Very simply, this 
means that one must learn from Rani's death and affirm the ideals 
for which he sacrificed himself. By doing so, his demise will 
serve a purpose by becoming an instructive site productive of 
meaning for others, and he will fise from the grave by 
participating in the discourse of the living. 
I 
::-.: 
If Brink places Rani's fate in a metanarrative development 
' from ~rucifixion to resurrection, a metanarrative which gives 
that fate a certain necessity as a stepping-stone to a higher 
wisdom and prevents it from disappearing into pointlessness, this 
transition from crucifixion to resurrection must be effected by 
the writer's decision to salvage meaning from death and propagate 
its lessons. Confronted by the absurdity of the death, Brink's 
logic seems to be as follows. Rani must be rescued from a 
shocking, absurd death; his death must be made part of a system 
of rational coherence, a contribution to it; as such, he dies 
(sacrifices himself) in order that the system evolve; or more 
pointedly, his death is an occasion from which others may learn 
the lessons they need if they are to bring the system to its 
eventual realization; and since Rani is unable to speak, someone , 
else must take responsibility for articulating these lessons; by 
disseminating them, this special agency -- the writer -- both 
facilitates the emergence of the system and returns the deceased 
to the vitality of discourse. Such is the heroic duty which 
inspires Brink's promptness in addressing Rani's assassination: 
that of a eulogist taking the dead into his custodial care and 
bearing witness among the living to their exemplary aspirations. 
Disturbed by the 'mindless violence' (Dove, 11) which 
claimed Rani's life and spread in the ensuing pan~demonium, Brink 
is particularly intent on stressing the extent to which Rani's 
vii 
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own practice of violence differed from 'mindless violence'. As we 
shall see, a distinction between different kinds of violence is 
not confined to the eulogy of the umKhonto we Sizwe chief-of-
staff and Shakespeare-enthusiast, but informs Brink's 
characterisation in his fiction of the violence exercised (on the 
one hand) by an hegemonic formation trying to enforce its 
hierarchies of domination and subjugation, and (on the other) by 
those who resist hegemony in the name of political emancipation. 
So, in contrast to the assassin's 'mindless violence' ( 11) 1 
ostensibly intended to subvert the negotiation of a political 
settlement and impede national reconciliation/ Brink celebrates 
Hani as the model of one who had as a practioner of violence 
succeeded in combining 'the word/ the mind and the nobler 
achievements of the human spirit' (11). While he had made 'word' 
and 'sword' mutually reinforcing/ the agents of 'mindless 
violence' recklessly return these polarities to 'their initial 
positions of antagonism, mutual exclusion and otherness' (11) 
with respect to each otheri their violence/ being purely 
destructive 1 excludes all hope of any socially constructive 
outcome. 
It will become evident to the reader of An Act of Terror, 
----~-
Brink's most extended analysis of the distinction between 
violence opposing word to sword, and violence reconciling them, 
- ~-- - -·- ~ - - - ---.......__ 
that this ls-no facile contrast, no straightfoward or settled 
~- -·--·- --·-
antithesisj rather it is a troubled one/ formulated with an 
awareness of the measures which are sometimes prescribed by 
extreme situations and the insoluble ethico-moral dilemmas 
attendant on them. Yet however precarious the opposition is/ and 
however much he feels the need to buttress it with various 
qualifications and precautions, Brink presses ahead with it .. One 
of the central features of 'mindless violence' I as he sees it 1 is 
that while fomenting 'clamour'/ it nevertheless entrenches an 
'historical silence' (11) between oppressor and oppressed. Once 
again/ Brink's association of violence and silence is not unique 
to the essay on Hani. Elsewhere, he links hegemonic rule to 'a 
silence of confusion and incomprehension' (ADWS, 305), while a 
gun battle makes one of the characters in An Act of Terror aware 
that what she fears about violence 'is not the noise of shots and 
viii 
explosions and screams and shouts, not the din that accompanies 
and surrounds it, but the silence that lurks deep inside it ... 
[silence which] is inhuman because it is beyond language' (621). 
In 'The dove ln the grave' it appears that this silence has three 
components. Alluding to Sartre (who in turn refers to Hegel's 
famous analysis of the relations between master and slave), Brink 
asserts that the 'historical silence' at 'the heart of the 
present clamour' consists in 'the dehumanisation of the 
oppressed' and 'the alienation of the oppressor' i ln this 
juxtaposition a third silence arises, from the suppression of 'an 
unstoppable groundswell towards understanding' (11) . Obliterating I 
possibilities for interpersonal discourse and the reciprocity of \ 
speech, standing 'beyond language' (Act, 621), violence 
institutes a tripartite silence between self and Other a 
silence founded, ln Brink's account, on varying degrees of 
awareness or~isavowal of mortality, for he argues that while the 
oppressed 'knows too much' about its mortality, the oppressor 
'knows too little' (11) . 
Nonetheless, Brink points to an opposing form of violence 
which, for him, combines sword and word, and facilitates 
discursive exchange instead of impairing it. His presentation of 
the violence of political resistance stresses precisely the point 
'-• - - -·--- -- ·-
that the violence of the oppressed, waged in response to the 
-~---- --
violence of hegemonic rule, is a resumption of a dialogue between 
them. VioleT1ce~ in other words, broaches the silence of violencei 
and no longer standing in opposition to the definitive human 
attribute of speech, violence comes to typify speech itself and 
so to 'define[ ... ] our humanity' (Act, 426) In a significant 
passage in An Act of Terror (Brink reproduces it almost verbatim 
in 'An act of violence' i 1991, 37), Landman asks, 'What can be 
more violent than a question?' 
She [Lisa] spoke about questionsi never stops speaking 
about them. Her very existence is a question mark. Her 
questions about violence -- any question, all questions 
determine our limits, define the periphery of what 
is admissable, of what has so far been thinkable. And 
it is our search for answers to these questions which 
prompt us to transcend limits. This is the core of the 
violence which defines our humanity (426) . 
If a question (a discursive addressing of an-other) epitomises 
ix 
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violence, then violence is conceived as an act of questioning. 
Where the oppressed had been silenced, through their violence 
they address a question to the oppressor, that is, they recover 
their autonomous voices, in defiance of the oppressor's efforts 
to silence them; and where the oppressor had been trapped in a 
self -alienated silence, he is brought to an awareness of the 
limitations and injustice of the conceptions he had entertained 
about the Other. In short, he receives word of the prospective 
death of his world, a situation he had denied, while the 
oppressed surmount their paralysing overconsciousness of 
mortality by risking their lives in a struggle so as to regain 
the power of discursive self-assertion; this struggle unleashes 
the silenced 'groundswell towards u~derstanding' (Dove, 11) , 
inaugurating (in Brink's apocalyptic imagery) a teleological 
metanarrative movement to· a national agora or public forum in 
., 
which speakers can be recognised and heard by others whom they 
reciprocally recognise and hear. For Brink, the violence of 
political resistance thus shatters each of the three silences 
imposed by hegemonic violence. 
As a eulogist, custodian, and witness to the dead, Brink 
promulgates the lessons of Rani's exemplary practice of violence 
amidst a distressing prevalence of 'mindless violence' (Dove, 
11) . In so doing, he exhorts his fellow citizens to model 
themselves on Rani's conduct, which is to say he seeks to cajole 
a refractory reality into fitting into the categories and terms 
of his discriminatory project concerning violence. His 
exhortations are therefore guided by a wish: a wish that an 
'incomprehensible clamour' ( 11) would resolve itself into the 
intelligibility and conceptual clarity of an interpretive, and 
interpretable, order. Like Nelson Mandela' s plan to 'harness 
young energies' and 'recapture the imagination of the young' by 
announcing 'a programme of continuing "rolling mass action"' 
(11), he attempts to channel these same disruptive energies into 
a socially useful and controllable framework. In other words, by 
raising Hani from the dead through the propagation of his good 
example, Brink tries to raise himself from the dead; by urging 
the country to accede to a set of distinctions, he tries to 
maintain cognitive mastery over events in the face of threats to 
X 
that position of mastery. Brink's efforts to 'make sense' of 
troubling occurrences are not only exercises in epistemological 
resourcefulness and the management of objects of knowledge, but 
are attempts to re-constitute himself as a subject of knowledge, 
or, more plainly, to reassert himself .as a masterful subject in 
circumstances which traumatically unmaster him. 
Given that the civil disorder Brink describes lS one which 
endangers each and every inhabitant of the country, that nobody 
is exempt from this all-inclusive menace which threatens, like a 
stellar black hole, to plunge an entire nation into a mass grave, 
his speed in responding to the crisis by resurrecting Hani and 
liberating the dove from the grave (by re-affirming the soldier's 
aspirations for peace) indicates the panic -- the terror -- of 
one who is mortally endangered and endeavours to stay alive by 
the re-assertion of mastery over hostile otherness. 
Ironically, resisting death, struggling against it, involves 
not a retreat from it but a struggle with death-bearing forces, 
and thus a movement into even gre~ter dahger. Brink must 
intervene in the conflict and become an active participant in it; 
he must himself become a perpetrator of violence, interrogating 
and opposing the tendency towards 'mindless violence' by means of 
a polemical address; he must counter the violence paralysing and 
silencing him with a violence of his own; he must put himself at 
·risk in an agon if he is eventually to put himself out of risk. 
And if, confronted by violence which reduces him to shocked 
and despairing silence, Brink struggles against it so that his 
act of writing is an act directed against a counterforce negating ~~ 
speech, an act implicated in violence as violence waged against 
violence, then is it not the case that the violence approaching 
him from outside himself is a displaced and projected image of 
the violence capable of emanating from within himself? To write 
against violence is to inwardise exteriority; it is to convert 
the obliterating, negating, and explosive force approaching from 
the outside into a potential available to the subject in his acts 
of self-assertion. 'I wonder whether you will ever understand 
that this was the reason for it, the explanation for my 
involvement?' Thomas Landman, protagonist of An Act of Terror, 
notes of the bomb he detonates: 'I had to be present, I had to be 
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there' (122). Landman wants to be 'present' to and self-identical 
with the blast, described as a collective scream' and a 
timeless shofar resounding over the crumbling walls of Jericho' 
(31). He wishes to be identical with this 'scream' shattering the 
imprisoning walls of hegemonic structure i what he wishes, in 
short, is to be the explosion, to be that explosive utterance. 
If this act of saying, or utterance, is implicated in a 
struggle for mastery, and is therefore amenable to being analysed 
in terms of Hegel's famous notion of the struggle for 
recognition, what Brink says concerning the violence practised by 
Hani and other resistance fighters lends itself to a similar 
analysis. In other words, the dominant preoccupations found in 
Brink's narratives namely, those ,concerned with political 
violence, the struggle for pure prestige, and the dialectic of 
master and slave -- can be regarded as shedding light on the 
dynamics involved in the act of narrating, or articulating, these 
narratives. In Chapter 1, I examine the idea that violence 
traumatizes and silences the subject, and take States of 
Emergency as a point of departure for exploring issues of 
narratorial paralysis in Brink's post-1976 novels (ranging from 
Rumours of Rain to An Act of Terror). Self-reflexively 
foregrounding the process at work in its narration, States of 
Emergency shows how an apparently mutually exclusive opposition 
between violence and writing (in which the former disables the 
latter) is undone when writing replicates violence within itself. 
Writing simulates or re-enacts the violence which the narrating 
subject failed to comprehend in the outside world, a simulation 
premised on the notion that the author dies in the Other's 
semiotic codes. 
What is crucially at issue in Chapter 1 lS the claim that 
while violence negates writing, it is also the case 
paradoxically enough -- that it is violence which informs the 
resurgence of writing. Chapter 2 is an elaboration of the 
contention that violence imposes silence on both oppressor and 
oppressed. Its analysis of silence proceeds from observations 
Brink makes in 'The dove in the grave' concerning the oppressor's 
ignorance of death, the oppressed's impairing knowledge of 
mortality, and the consequent suppression of a 'groundswell 
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towards understanding' (11). Starting with these observations, 
Chapter 2 develops a philosophical excursus on silence, 
concentrating on Jean-Paul Sartre and Xmmanuel Levinas's 
conceptions of the self-Other relationship (a theoretical focus 
which includes an examination of Derrida's critique of Levinas) 
and on Dori Laub and Shoshana Felman's claims about the link 
between the act of witnessing and the supposition of an 
addressable Other capable of hearing one's testimony rather than 
relegating it to silence. In contrast to Chapter 2, Chapter 3 
discusses precisely the shattering of silence, and it is here 
that the Hegelian motifs of the dissertation come most strongly 
to the fore. In particular, the struggle to write is viewed in 
relation to the struggle for recognition as described by Hegel 
and his influential intepreter, Alexandre Kojeve, who argues that 
desire involves a transgressive, explosive negation of delimited 
modes of being impressed on the subject by the institutions of 
mastery. While the first segment of the chapter investigates the 
play of forces at work in the act of saying, or narrating, the 
second part amplifies the ideas raised in the course of this 
investigation by attending to what is said -- by attending, that 
is, to the thematic pre-occupations bf Brink's narratives with 
violence waged in the name of political emancipation. 
* 
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1. 'TOO NUMB TO ACHIEVE ANYTHING' 
'These masterful images because complete 
Grew in pure mind, but out of what began? 
A mound of refuse or the sweepings of a street, 
Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can, 
Old iron, old bones, old rags, that raving slut 
Who keeps the till. Now that my ladder's gone, 
I must lie down where all the ladders start, 
In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart' 
-- W. B. Yeats 1 
I. Disintegration 
(i) Climbing the ladder: inhibition and enablement 
What inhibits writing, and what liberates it? For the industrious 
---
Andre Brink the short reply in both cases could well be: the 
terror inspired by violence. 
If-Bririk-can overcome the trauma caused by an act-of terror 
and convert it into an elaborate disquisition on violence like An 
Act of Terror, then a strange reversal has taken place in which 
the violence debilitating his writing has been laboured on and 
changed into nothing less than writing's motive force. He has 
shifted from 'maiming to meaning' (Breytenbach, 1984, 240), but 
by way of the construction of meaning, he nevertheless shifts 
back to meditate on 'maiming'. In this shuttle-movement of 
departure and return, the wound which stifles discourse and from 
which discourse has to distance itself if it is to endure, is 
revisited as a resource which can energise rather than vitiate 
discourse. So, as an army is said to move on its stomach, Brink's 
narratives are nourished and sustained by violence in their 
progression towards a terminal cataclysm. They feed on violence, 
inwardising and ruminating on atrocities which at first --
imperil the writer and obstruct the advance of narration. His 
novels are replete with prefigurations of apocalyptic 
devastation, as well as accounts'of murders in police detention, 
bloody slave rebellions, armed struggle, states of emergency, 
revolt and repression, sadomasochistic behaviour, and episodes in 
which his characters passively induce destructive effects among 
their fellows as though they were exercising demonic powers; 
threaded through the grisly tableau are speculations on the 
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conversion of loss into gain, revivification, utopia, communality 
and love. Yet bearing in mind that this voluminous writing about 
violence is (as hypothesized) the outcome of a process in which 
violence's silencing of discourse is supplanted by violence's 
energising of discourse, the itinerary of the process can be 
pursued in reverse order, allowing one to follow his writing back 
into the silence from which it emerges. By descending the ladder 
down to 'the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart', one may be in 
a better position to observe how the writer go~s about ascending 
from his moribund underworld to produce 'masterful images'. In so 
doing one may find possible answers to the opening question: how 
can terror be changed from being a cause of paralysis to being a 
resource of literary productivity, pr more simply, how can 
violence be made to enable writing instead of disabling it? 
What the latter tactic implies is that the writing which 
generates statements about violence as a topic can be resituated 
as a response to the problems of utterance posed by violence as 
a mortal threat. That is to say, Brink's writings about violence 
can be conceptualised as writings about writing, and as indirect 
reflections on acts of writing j eopardised by and finally 
transcendent over acts of terror. In general terms, then, how 
do acts of terror impact on acts of writing? Following a line of 
thought developed by Sartre and continued by Levinas, Blanchot 
and Scarry, one may regard endangerment as a threat to not only 
the subject's physical integrity but to his psychical 
functioning. The subject cannot 'make sense' of experience since 
endangerment distresses his capacity to posit himself as the 
basis of certitude upon which his mental world can be cognitively 
structured and set in a meaningful order. Likewise for Brink, at 
first blush violence is not assimilated by the interpretive 
categories of a self-possessed subject as it dispossesses his 
faculties. Violence makes itself known as a dissolution of 
knowledge, as an anxiety undoing the masterful subject's ability 
for power. Without a subject of knowledge, violence cannot be 
deiiml ted as an object for a subject. It cannot be grasped as 
o. theme -for - expositicln,---comprehe~ded as an encounter for 
n"arrativizatiori, or-brought int-~~el-~;i~n with the subject as a 
speculum in which he can recover his identity: it- is unintegrated 
--------- ·- --------
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in the subject's schemas, and its advent is marked by an 
in.capaci-ty -to write or to speak-.- Overwhelmed by atrocity, the 
subject is stupefied, powerless, violated, despairing and 
apathetic -- a spectrum of affective enervation and cognitive 
atrophy which shades into acquiescence, insensibility, a detached 
sense of invulnerability/ and blunted indifference, the apparent 
frigidity of which conceals- a deeper r~ge at his thwarted self-
assert ion. In a word, the subject is: numb ...... ., (~''-''---"..'lie a ''• 
Yet in Brink's novels acts of terror do not eclipse acts of 
writing. His novels testify to the reversal by which ~he terror 
stifling writing gl"l'(f is surmounted and-put to work in literary 
production/ while by the same token.they enact the processes-by 
which a numbed authorial subject brea}<s through his numbing by 
confronting terror and recuperating it as· precisely the 
generative source and telos of_ his writing_. How m:Lght one .. set 
about the task of explaining exactly how this reversal takes 
effect in Brink's work? One heuristic opening is the following: 
if discourse on violence arises from a silence instigated ~ 
violence/ then discourse may be found to contain implicit 
references to the very dynamics by which it managed to posit 
itself; the statement about violence may be regarded as 
recapitulating in its thematic content the travails of its own 
utterance. Indeed/ Brink's fictions often reflect on their 
conditions of enunciation by charting the passage from a 
narrator's initial disablement to a corpus monumental in scope 
and ambition as well as in its function as a funerary edifice 
consecrating the dead. Thanks to their frequent self-reflexivity/ 
the novels draw attention away from an exclusive contemplation of 
the propositional content of statements so as to stress the l 
vicissitudes of enunciation involved 1n producing these \ 
statements in the first place. Textual self-reflexivity ~ 
consequently underscores that what is at stake in the act by 
which these statements are uttered is discourse itself; it 
stresses that discourse is dogged every step of the way by the 
danger of an entropic lapse into aphasia. A rider to this is that 
the statements uttered under such circumstances 1 especially 
observations concerning the broadly political relations governl.I'l:_g 
discursive exchange in situations of interpersonal conflict dr 
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~eciprocity, comprise an oblique commentary on the practice of 
writing, for what is written retains a troubled sense of how it 
emerged from a context of ·violence by overcoming the silence 
associated with violence, a -'silence that is inhuman b~cause ·it 
lS beyond language' (Act, 621). 
Elaborating on these claims about self-reflexivity, one may/ 
note that it is a striking feature of .Brink's novels that they\ 
frequently open on a scene of trauma in which the narrator bears_) 
witness to the death of a stranger (States), a distant fr~end 
(ADWS) , victims of a past uprising (CoV), or a nameless 
entanglement of unfortunates (RR). Significantly, the narrator's 
attestations about the violence before him is coupled with an 
admission that he is cognitively and f~nctionally incapacitated. 
'I've always felt that something must have escaped me, a 
submarine something .(RR, .... 11J.,~.-MynhardL ... (once a~._,_ asp.iranL-:--· ______ _ 
writer) laments as he attempts to rationalise his destructive 
role in the collapse of his major personal relatibnships~- while 
-the narrator of A Dry White Season- (a self-confessed hack) 
remarks that Ben du Toit 's murder 'challenged everything I'd 
always thought or felt about him' (9), exposing the inadequacy of 
his knowledge. He is baffled by the death, not only in the sense 
that he does not have all the facts at his disposal, or that he 
lacks the information which could be annexed to an existing 
system of knowledge and so explain the riddle i he is also 
perturbed by a memento mori disempowering him as a subject of 
knowledge and altering the complexion of his familiar world in a 
way that is insidious and yet decisive. Importantly, this 
visitation by otherness coincides with a crisis in his writing 
career, evinced by an impasse in his ability to produce, and by 
his discontent with the social relations bound up with his status 
as a popular author. Recalling the '(w]eariness' and 'inertia' 
(RR, 12) which afflict Mynhardt, he decribes the crisis as a 
'vast apathy which has been paralysing me for months' (ADWS, 11). 
It is as though the 'arid present landscape' of his writer's 
block, the 'dry white season' of apartheid, and his bewilderment 
at Ben's death; are intimately interrelated. 
(ii) Prolepsis 
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But if Brink's fictions are typically inaugurated by 
allusions to the deleterious effects of violence and death on 
wri ti'ng and cognition, allusions which point to the aphasic 
underside of the ensuing discourse~ it is States of Emergenc~ 
which explores most emphatically the problems of attempting to 
write under conditions of quandary and abjection. This text will 
thus serve as a useful point of departure for elucidating how 1n 
broad terms Brink changes terror from an impediment to an 
empowering force in his writing. Touching on other of Brink's 
novels to amplify my arguments, I shall describe in detail 
various models accounting for the ·subject's impairment, and 
subsequently indicate how they may be combined in order to 
characterise the numbed condition;- cAf~er having thus set up· the· \ ~ · 
first part of my thesis about the subject's furr~tional inhibition ~" 
by violence, I shall go on to show how this numbness is broached 
in States/ highlighting itsc·-thematic and--performative reversal 
and overcrossing of apparently . ·antithetical domains c of 
experience. In the course of doing so, I will group these 
reversals under the rhetorical figure of apophasis and discuss 
certain post-structuralist notions of writing and intertextuality 
(the relevance of which will become evident again in Chapter 2). 
Having elaborated on my contention that Brink's writings about 
violence can be regarded a§_wri.tings_apout the problems of 
------------ ---· ·-
writing, I snall_then_address_his_artic~e on Chris Hani's murder, 
-- -- ~- - - -. - __ ..........-- - - - . 
'The dove in the grave' , using it as a springboard into the 
~ f;llowing chapters in which I look at the thematic statements he 
makes about the relationship between violence, language and 
desire.· In keeping with my claim that Brink's pronouncements 
about violence -- commentaries always on the verge of lapsing 
into the aphasia with which the novels begin -- retell the story 
of their own passage from an initial .!2YIDhed-s-i-1·enGe, I shall 
consider his statements about language and violence as harbouring 
valuable insights into the means by which writing may come to 
flourish. As I shall explain, these statements are concerned with 
the commerce between the Same and the Other, and the way that the 
Other's violent self-assertion brings news to the Same of its 
mortality, thereby making the Same conscious of itself; in other 
words, if the traumatizing otb,erneqs-of~v.io~ence-at-first puts 
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the Same into cognitive crisis, Brink responds to this 
predicament by recuperating interpretive collapse as a 
preliminary stage in an ethical interrogation of the Same by thE; 
Other's violence, an interrogation in which the Same guiltily 
acknowledges its responsibility for the Other's acts. The terror 
striking at the Same from the outside, that is to say, is 
inwardised and recognised by the Same as stemming from within 
itself. In a similar way, the narrating subject must recognise 
himself in the terror which appears to stand outside himself, and 
engage with this terror as the principle of his own desire. The 
process necessitates that boundaries between opposing categories 
-- inside/outside, Same/Other, writing/violence -- be crossed. 
States of Emergency gives an object l~sson in showing how these 
chiasmic reversals operate, reversals which (as I have contended) 
are foregrounded to varyingr degrees:·~ of?, prominence-;: in-:; most-·· -of=- --
Brink's fiction. 
(iii) Janus 
With its title punning on emergency rule, the emergence of 
writing, and the merging of these antagonistic domains, States of 
Emergency thus announces its febrile preoccupation with the 
problem of how writing can be made possible under circumstances 
which vitiate all discourse, while suggesting, conversely, that 
the statements it makes about violence bear the trace of its 
prior engagement with the incapacitation of utterance by 
violence. Janus-faced, States of Emergency is the site of an 
intersection between 'violence' and 'writing'. On the one hand, 
'violence', apparently separate from and antithetical to 
'writing', crosses over from its 'own' extra-linguistic space to 
inform 'writing' . On the other, 'writing' tries to distance 
itself from 'violence' but crosses back into it to absorb and 
replicate 'violence' in its structures. This crossover between 
the text's space and 'the violence of "the world"' (AVFL, 34) 
implies that States is enunciated from an unstable position on 
the verge of speechlessness a position neither too 
irremediably situated in the zone of violence to be struck 
entirely mute, nor too far out of danger to let experience of the 
State of Emergency be comprehended in deceptively fluent 
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discourses that are forgetful of its horror. While the 
intersection between violence and writing may well be turned to 
productive ends, initially their proximity is felt as an 
attrition of speech. 
In the tradition of Scheherazade, whose narratives in The 
Arabian Nights defer the moment when she is due to be executed, 
the authorial personage narrating States (a version of Brink) 
consequently writes in desp~ration, seeking to postpone his 
undoing in the disaster through an activity in which he can 
exercise at least some degree of control over events, and by 
means of which he can hold onto a provisional _identity as a 
speaker. 'Perhaps the making of notes has become compulsive in 
itself,' he says: 'I have no_ choice b~t to continue ... because 
all around me, if I were to stop, there would be only that other 
inextricable weaving of a land in flames' (104). To reiterate an 
earlier formulation, his writ·irig'·is O.ogged every· step of the way--
by the danger of an en tropic lapse into aphasia. Yet Brink 
actively incorporates the nemesis of aphasia into his text. 
Driven by the same impulse Balzac expressed in his remark that 'I 
put myself at the exact point where knowledge touches on madness, 
and I refuse to put up any safety rail' (in Felman, 1985, 115), 
B~places himself at the point where 'writing~_js-flx~iE_ep~bY 
'v'iolence' and refuses to keep a self-prot=e~,tJ.y;_e_ba:r:r.ier_b.e_t~ween 
them. By connecting the desire and the imperative to write with 
-- ·--
their antithesis, he locates himself in States at 
intersection where wri ti_ng·_ t"'eters on ruination. 
the risky 
While the 
\ ~' . 
it would appear, strives to delay execution by narrator, 
sustaining his discourse, the repeated allusions to his turbulent 
context suggest, not so much an unreflective will to life, as a 
vertiginous fascination with the precariousness of his life-
sustaining discourse -- a fascination in which he knows himself 
to be alive inasmuch as he is in danger of dying, inasmuch as he 
risks death. 
The text hence proceeds as a thematic and formal elaboration 
of the tensions between violence and writing by staging the 
interpenetration of heterogeneous realms normally opposed to each 
other. A rever~on literary theory will be disrupted by appalling 
news from the black townships, or a disquisition on romance will 
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rub shoulders with a journalistic report on atrocities committed 
under. emergency rule; the solitude of lovers will be despoiled by 
a reminder 'of everything happening out there ln those 
burning smoking streets, 'invisible· from inside , this· ordered 
comfortable room, but no less there for all that, a small fierce 
stab in the mind 1 (75). Likewise in A Dry White Season, zones of 
experience relegated to a 'totally different world 1 (56) round 
back on suburban normality,· which is predicated on their 
expulsion. Unable to carry out his teaching chores or make love 
to his wife, Ben du Toit is troubled.by·the thought that 'while 
we r re here talking in this room r , the cleaner at his school, 
detained by security police, lS 'standing under a bare bulb, his 
feet on bricks and a weight tied ~o his balls r (56) . The 
juxtaposition of conflicting 'orders of simultaneous experience 1 
(Steiner, 1967, 181) 2 underc:uts _-the, composure· ·and -·self '"'assurance-:--- ... -
the subject needs so as to function as a social agent by 
ceaselessly reminding him of the impropriety of his aesthetic 
pursuits in a world where others suffer and where he, too, is 
vulnerable. 
Multiplying relentlessly, these uncanny proximities serve to 
sharpen awareness of the aporias from which writing struggles to 
emerge: each is 'a small fierce stab in the mind 1 (States, 75). 
The result is that States makes its own disablement the 
insistent focus of its fascination by means of 'weavingr together 
('text r is etymologically akin to 'textile r), in a tattered 
fabric, disparate regions which militate against each other. As 
such, the text plays constructive forces off against corruptive 
ones to yield a series of 'small fierce stab [s] in the mind r 
(75). These 'stabs 1 intensify the subject 1 s sense of his 
disintegration under the impact of violence -- they constitute a 
self-mutilation which mimes the lacerating effects of the 
Emergency. 
(iv) Tongue-tied 
Subtitled 'Notes towards a love storyr (1), States of 
Emergency is an account of work in progress. With its montage of 
discourses intercalating diverse textual media -- ranging from 
excerpts from a (fictitious) novel and diary written by a 
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stranger named Jane Ferguson, to reports by a resident on 
conditions in besieged townships, to accounts of discussions w~th_ 
Ferguson's uncle, to citations from scholarly books and 
meditations on the craft :: of:_' .. .1i terary:·:· .. narrati ve~·,'.: to · drafts·c:: _ \ · 
experimenting with the love story the narrator wishes to write, 
to footnoted references to Brink's earlier work -- States of 
Emergency self-reflexively foregrounds the practices of fiction-
making in order to dramatise the way in which the narrator writes 
himself out of the quandary into which the civil unrest has 
plunged him. However, the novel has raised a good deal of 
controversy in South Africa, related~argely to BrinkJs personal 
life, but linked in part to the perception ~hat its postmodernist 
-----·-- -- - ---- ---
aesthetic amounts to _ an_ inj~diciou73, if not exploitative, 
--. - ·- --- --------
response to the severities of the Stat_e of· Emergency imposed on 
..........____ - -- -· - -----
South Africa for most of the -r98os·. Contemporary literary 
academia is divided in its ·apprais'al of textual discontinuity and 
self-referentiality. While apologists or champions of the latter 
customarily dwell on the potential of self-conscious 
fictionalisation to indicate the artificiality of hegemonic norms 
and so dispel mystifications concerning their apparent naturally-
given immutability (a strand of thought indebted to Shklovsky's 
early formalist thought on literature as defamiliarisation of 
habitual perception, as well as to Benjamin and Brecht's ideas on 
the political value of an anti-illusionist artistic practice 
displaying its own constructedness) 3 , a contending faction 
d h · d · ll · fc _j ' · bl l · enounces w at lt regar s as socla y lrresponsl e nave -gazlng 
blithely complicit with ideologic~l forms engendered by an 
\ .... ~ ' 
imperial ising late capitalism. 4t'<' ·' ! ,, · ; 
Given the absence of any visible demystificatory intention 
on Brink's part, must one perforce concede the validity of the 
second argument in the case of States of Emergency? From the 
latter viewpoint, formal introversion gives narcissistic pleasure 
in which the writer sustains himself by openly delighting in his 
own creative powers; even worse, in a move that seems to invite 
a rebuke similar to Adorno's much-quoted aphorism that 'to write 
----
lyric poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric ~(_19]7_,_188) , real-life 
sufferi_n_g __ is glos-s-ed- over -a~made into the occasion for 
aesthetic enjoyment and financial enrichment. While we shall 
9 
return later to the character of the profiteer in Brink's work, 
three points should be noted in Brink's defence. First, 
alternative aesthetic strategies are themselves not exempt from 
Adorno's indictment, for ·his reproach embraces ·art in ·· its · 
entirety, not one literary form in-particular; indeed, States is 
a re-art~c~1ation of key_~Jements~of Ado~~o~~_pr~~~ematic: how\ 
can one fm;ge ahead w~t_h the writing of lyric poetry ~- in 
--- - --- --- ·- -
Brink Is case I a love story -- while people n~a:--rby-- are. "befng 
------ -~- - -- - - ~ ._. 
killed? Second, the inward turn of self-conscious form need not 
------imply an indifference to worldly.- affairs.- Instead,· by opening'' up' 
a space of experimentation free froin external ·constraints or -
exigencies, one may be cultivating the means, otherwise impaired, 
precisely by which such external copcerns may be addressed. 
Third, the decentred form of States testifies to the 
destabilising effects of violence·,-' More -~specifically, . the. novel! s_.:. 
reflections on its aesthetic procedures, its brooding on the 
difficulties of articulation, arise precisely as a result of the 
narrator's wish to respond to the Emergency and suffer its perils 
within the space of his writing, rather than ignore them. It is 
exactly the narrator's sense of political duty which first 
impells him towards the Emergency and so leads him into the 
articulatory impasse in which the necessity to speak is thwarted 
by the impossibility of speaking, an impasse in which that of 
which he can speak (a romance, for instance, or lyrical poetry) 
is not that of which he feels he ought to speak only. 
Let us examine these claims in more detail. Asking -whether 
any art now has a right to exist' in the wake of the Holocaust, 
Adorno declares that the situation of art -is one of paradox, not 
merely the problem of how to react to it' (1977, 188) . 
Irrespective of the measures he or she might adopt, the writer's 
dilemma is inescapable: to write is to slight the dead, either by 
ignoring the hideousness of their fate or by turning it into an 
object of aesthetic contemplation. Nevertheless, suffering -also 
demands the continued existence of art while it prohibits it' 
(188): to refrain from writing is thus to abjure the moral 
imperative to speak. But once again, to write about horror is 
insidiously to give it an aesthetic dimension and thus to 
palliate the horror: one cannot write about that of which one 
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must write nevertheless, and one can write only by means of a 
certain avoidance. A writing aware of this double-bind is tongue-
tied, wavering between an all-too-fluent discourse and a 
scrupulous si_~ence that is not· far, though, from submission to a 
world 'which permanently puts a pistol to men's heads' (180). For 
the narrator of States of Emergency, Adorno's_catch-22 touches 
d~~ectly on the tension between speech and aphasia. The desire to 
writeoa love ·story implies 'betrayal towards the great current of 
l;listory sweeping past' the narrator ( 5) , __ and produces speech 
guiltily silent on the suffering of his fellows. Yet casting 
~-·--·~,_ 
facile lyricism aside to do one's duty and face up to the 
turmoil, one finds a pistol at one's head reducing one, in a 
seizure of cognitive malfunctioning, to silence that is itself 
I 
guiltily tantamount to acquiescence in brutality. To write is to 
write a love story a betrayal. But- to attempt to write--about 
the Emergency is to fall silent another betrayal. How then to 
reconcile the desire to write with the duty to confront what 
obstructs writing? How to make 'the thing you want to do coincide 
with what you've got to do' (Act, 86)? How to change the duty to 
confront terror into something one wants to do, into something 
inextricably related to the nature of··desire? How to inform duty 
with the vertiginous fascination referred to earlier? How, that 
is, to turn the speech-impeding danger to which duty leads him 
into a precariousness that desire wants to undergo? Or, more 
plainly, as the narrator asks in a discussion of literary-
political commitment, 'How does one cope with a period like the 
one we have been living through in the past year or so ... ?' 
(States, 5). 
In order to 'cope' with traumatic events and satisfy the 
obligations of political duty, the narrator must write about 
violence and make it the object of a discourse formulated by 
himself as a subject of knowledge. To put it simply, he must 
'make sense' of the surrounding upheaval. However, two 
difficulties present themselves. They can be said to define the 
ways in which violence debilitates writing. First, for the 
observer, violence does not appear pre-given as an object of 
knowledge. Second, violence (as I have suggested from the outset) 
endangers and undermines the subject of knowledge, leaving him 
11 
numb and speechless -- or, to anticipate the three predominant 
- ~-- ~ 
systems of metaphors which are often empl?y::_?__~~-E_resent the 
subject 1 S abasement, he is overloaded with stimuli, blinded and 
:~~~~s~_a.- r~::lf~~) '~ ''" - . 
In the case of the first difficulty, text tries to address 
context, but the narrator is disempowered by statistics listing 
the casualties of the ·State of Emergency. ~Almost two thousand 
killed, countless thousands wounded; ... well over ten thousand 
people in detention; torture; burning tyres and charred 
bodies 1 (5). Although an agglomeration of fragments is available 
to the narrator, the succession o~-noun phrases suggests that 
these impressions have yet to be organised into a coherent syntax 
or interpretive system. Context, in oth~r words, is not available 
to the subject as a settled category of knowledge which his 
discourse will subsequently. reflect or re-present, but will have 
to be mediated by sense-making activity. This---is to -invoke a·- -
philosophical and literary critical postulate so familiar as to 
border on the self-evident: ever since powers of world-creation 
were transferred from divine to human agency, whether this agency 
was seen as being vested 1n either social collectivities or 
individual consciousness, humankind has been regarded not as 
passive recipients of a reality pre-encoded with signification, 
but as the active shapers of worlds rendered meaningful in and as 
their own varying images; in its insistence on the logically 
unmotivated but labile, conventionally determined relationship 
between linguistic signifiers and signifieds, post-Saussurean 
linguistics in its turn has developed this motif, emphasising 
that language is not a medium for transparently reflecting a pre-
given reality but has a constitutive, world-creating function, 
such that ~reality 1 is defined within ~ flux of socio-discursive 
constructions, while context needs to be worked over by the text 
in order to acquire an intelligible significance. As Mynhardt 1 S 
father explains, an ~act is not something clear and defined and 
tangible like a stone you can pick up from the ground 1 a 
condition which makes it necessary for history 1 s ~doers 1 be 
followed by interpreters ~who try to find the meaning of what the 
others have done 1 (RR, 222). 
Yet while it is the case that contextual events are not 
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given to consciousness im-mediately (that is, without lingusitic 
and ideological mediation) , but have to be constructed as 
meaningful objects put before a subject (~object' stems ~from 
Late Latin objectum something thrown before {the mind}'; C. E. 
~), the subject himself is not simply given either, always ready 
to receive experience into his schemas, but is disintegrated by·· 
traumatic experience; the implication is that the work ·of 
discursive construction is as much a self-reconstruction as it is 
an elaboration of an object of knowledge. Seeking to confront the 
Emergency, to address it face to face, the narrator finds that if 
it is not an event with an intrinsic meaning, the words by which 
he hopes to turn it into an object ~thrown before (the mind)' are 
~overtaken by events' (5), so that i~ spite of the Emergency's 
excessive quality it is an experience which, paradoxically, he 
misses and cannot con-front. Not only does it elude his 
objectifications: it impairs the means by which he be can posit 
himself as a subject determining an object (~from Latin subjectus 
brought under, from subicere to place under, from SUB- + jacere 
to throw'; C. E. D.). Admitting that he had stopped work on a 
novel ~for the simple reason that too much was happening around 
me-- a whole country ... erupting in flames-- to find the inner 
lucidity without which, even when one is in pain or rage, writing 
is impossible' (States, 3), the narrator recapitulates 1n 
abbreviated form three major conceptual models within which the 
effects of violence on the subject are often presented: sensory 
overload, defective vision, and paranoid space. Taken together, 
these three models provide a composite description of the state 
of numbness to which the narrator confesses when he complains 
that the Emergency ~had left me too numb to achieve anything' 
( 3) . 
II. The subject and sensory overload 
(i) The missed encounter 
The first, apparently straightforward, model of subjectal 
impairment centres on the notion of violence as an unassimilable 
excess over the subject's ability to process information. With 
~too much . . . happening around [him] ' the narrator finds himself 
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'overtaken by events' (States, 3). Elsewhere in Brink's writing, 
the model of excess is often found in the motif of violence as a 
deluge. A flood has overpowering mass, bears destructive force, 
submerges entire communities, but for all ,its emphatic presence, 
water (or violence) cannot be grasped by the hand (or mind) as an 
entity (or object of knowledge) 'defined and tangible like a 
stone' (RR, 222). 'If only something visible and graspable would 
present itself -to grapple with and overcome, ' Nicolaas-~ says, 
exasperated by the menace of an impending catastrophe and by the 
dangers which surround yet elude him: 'But in this anonymous 
flood I was helpless' (CoV, 316) . Should one imagine that such 
excess is simply a quantitative overload outstripping the powers 
of an integral, if limited, subject, ,it must be added that the 
flood deprives one of independent movement and self-examination. 
Having 'lost [his] grasp' over himself as he is borne away in a 
metaphorical rising tide, Galant is not simply outdone by 
something beyond his control but is himself undone in the deluge. 
Nicolaas senses in Galant, the slave who is soon to rebel, a 
~dark secret flood ... moving behind his actions' -- a flood of 
which Galant 'appeared to have no understanding' (275). There is 
a flood, but no grasp, which suggests a quantitative superfluity 
over an otherwise stable base; yet the agent of the grasp may be 
affected by the flood in ways of which he is unaware, a situation 
implying that a quantitative excess is coupled with a qualitative 
lack in the subject. In excess, there is both too much and too 
little. 
This paradox informs Blanchot's The Writing of the Disaster. 
While calling the disaster 'an excess of experience', he claims, 
'We feel that there cannot be any experience of the disaster ... 
even if we were to understand disaster to be the ultimate 
experience' (1986, 51). Blanchet's paradox turns upon two varying 
meanings of 'experience', the one fairly common-sensical, the 
other, philosophical. Following the common-sensical usage, the 
disaster does of course entail 'experience' in the sense that it 
is something which happens to one, which one undergoes. 'My 
experience of the disaster' refers to involvement in an event. 
But the same sentence may also suggest a distinction between my 
perception of the disaster, and the 'reality' of the occurrence 
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as it exists in itself. In this instance, 'experience' is 
understood as the condition in which phenomena appear to be what 
they are only by virtue of what they are for the specific subject 
1n question. In other words, phenomena come into being ·as 
meaningful and intelligible only inasmuch as they are 
constructed as objects by and for the subject. Following this/ 
philosophical/ sense, there is no experience of the disaster as 
'there is no "I" to undergo the experience' (Blanchot, 1986, 51). 
Blanchot can thus say that the disaster is a deficient excess: it 
is 'an excess of experience, and affirmative though it be, in 
this excess no experience occursi it cannot 
lavishly in some point of incandescence: 
... bestow itself 
it marks only the 
exclusion of such a point' (1986, 51) . ,This exclusion means that 
the disaster is not given to the subject as the unfolding of 
light, visibility and conceptual clarity, ·or· a-s· ·a--phenomenon 
·localized in a site ('a point of incandescence' i emphasis added) 
where all its meanings are condensed and originally accessible 
for the subject. To believe otherwise would be to imagine that 
the subject is im-mediately present to that which he suffers, as 
though his 'experience' were grasped by him in all its dimensions 
at the instant of impact, as if the experiencing (or suffering) 
subject were consistently and necessarily identical with himself 
as the subject of experience (a cognizing agency). Blanchot's 
paradox interrogates this putative self-identity. In line with 
Bettelheim's observation that while he and other prisoners were 
beaten by guards en route to a German concentration camp, he 
'became convinced that these dreadful and degrading experiences 
were not happening to "me" as a subject, but only to "me" as an 
object' (1960, 127), Blanchot points to a similar sense of 
dissociation when he notes that 'the disaster threatens in me 
that which is exterior to me -- an other than I [that is, '"me" 
as an object'] who passively become other [the execrable 
otherness which he is in the aggressor's point of view]' (1986, 
1). If the disaster is not given in an instant to the subject as 
an object of knowledge, and if the real is an unsayable 'which 
can only be invaded by language post facto' (Brink, 1992, 1) I it r 
is correlatively the case that the suffering subject is disjunct \· 
.\ from the cognizing subject, and that reconstructing the event is ·· 
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thus an attempt at 'restoring' this fissured self-identity -- or 1 
more pertinently/ it is an effort at arriving/ however belatedly/ 
at a 'missed encounter' (Lacan/ 1977b 1 55) with trauma so as to 
make good a deficiency of experience in the midst of too much 
experience. 
Likewise Derrida takes the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl to 
task in Speech and Phenomena for his presupposition that the 
subject is unitarily self-present to his own experience. Derrida 
argues that in order for this assumption to hold good/ Husserl 
must further presuppose that the subject is im-mediately present 
to experience: since any delay between experience and its 
registration by consciousness negates self-presence/ Husserl must 
maintain that the unity of experience (the co-incidence between 
suffering and cognizing) is 'produced in the undivided unity of 
a temporal present' (1973 1 60). Experience as consciousness and 
an undergoing is necessarily given in 'the now as point/ as a 
"source-point" ' ( 61) . As Husserl himself is cited as saying 1 the 
'now-apprehension is the nucleus of a comet's tail of 
retentions' (62). To paraphrase this 1 the subject's integral 
presence to himself in the instant or moment of undergoing forms 
a solid grounding and primary perceptual event which is retained 
as p-6 a merely derivative and secondary memory-trace. But to 
follow Derrida's critique by way of a comparable metaphor often 
employed by Brink/. a metaphor in which gunfire is likened to 'a 
star streaking through the sky light-years after it has burned 
out' (Act 1 5) 1 it is precisely through delay and deferral that an 
experience (a gunshot/ a star's explosion) comes to be received 
into the subject's cognitions; the implication is that it is the 
'retentions' (or later representations) which have primary 
efficacy since they constitute the subject's retroactive o( 
experience of the 'nucleus' and thus allow the missed 'nucleus' 
to come into being for the subject in the 'first' place. Derrida 
observes that Husserl 'rejects the "after-event" of the becoming 
conscious of an "unconscious content" which/' he adds 1 'is the 
structure of temporality implied throughout Freud's texts' (1973/ 
6 3) . Rather than conceptual ising the subject as identical to 
himself in a punctual instant of apprehension/ Freud's theory of 
the unconscious implies the subject's radical non-self-presence/ 
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such that, in Lacan' s formulation, 'I think where I am not, 
therefore I am where I do not think' (in Borch-Jacobsen, 1991, 
190) . Non-self-presence in turn implies that experience of trauma 
is postponed, and that the subject arrives late, 
punctually. 
(ii) Deferred action 
never 
In short, Derrida' s reference to Freud's 'structure of 
temporality' is an allusion to the notion of deferred action, the 
psychic process in which 'impressions and memory-traces may be 
revised at a later date to fit in with fresh experiences' 
(Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, 111). The locus classicus of this 
concept is Freud's work on the 'Wolf Man', a boy who had 
witnessed the primal scene of parental coitus in his second year 
but who had succeeded in understanding these memories only in his 
fourth year when his own libidinal development made it possible 
for him to make sense of what he had seen two years before. 'It 
is by deferral, ' Derrida notes, 'that the perception of the 
primal scene -- whether it be reality or fantasy hardly matters 
is lived in its meaning' (1978, 214). Above all, what is 
crucial is that it is only through deferred action that the child 
suffers the trauma of his initial perception, in the same way as 
the sound of gunfire and the light from a celestial cataclysm 
only reach the subject belatedly, bringing him to consciousness 
of his endangerment when in 'reality' -- it hardly matters from 
the perspective of pathogenic effectiveness on the subject -- the 
threat is over: 'I'd never known how serious it had been, ' 
Mynhardt says of a childhood ·illness, but ' [b] y the time I 
realised it, the crisis had passed' (RR, 158). While trauma is 
an influx of excitations that is excessive by the standard of 
the subject's capacity to master such excitations and work them 
out pyschically, ' it is equally true that, since it is the 
'epitome' of an experience which it is 'impossible in the first 
instance to incorporate fully into a meaningful context' 
(Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, 465; 112), its impact can only be 
inscribed in the subject by deferred action. 'Massive trauma, ' 
Laub says, 'precludes its registration; the observing and 
recording mechanisms of the mind are temporarily knocked out, 
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malfunction': as such, '[t]he victim's narrative ... does indeed 
begin with someone who testifies to an absence, to an event that 
has not yet come into existence [or has. 'not been taken 
cognizance of' by the traumatized subject], in spite of the 
overwhelming and compelling nature of the reality of its 
occurrence' (1992, 57). That is to say, a record ... has yet to 
be made' of the trauma (57) .Thus, it is 'only after the event' 
(Freud, ln Derrida, 1978, 214) that the subject can fully 
apprehend the seriousness of the crisis he has undergone and so 
(re-)experience it at his leisure, as it were. 5 
From these and other observations, Derrida draws several 
conclusions about language. If Husserl treats the subject's self-
identical experience as 'the nucleu~ of a comet's tail of 
retentions' (1973, 62), this nucleus is an undivided unity' 
having 'nothing to reveal to itself by the agency of signs' (60): 
it does not need to come into being for a subject through the 
deferred action of linguistic re-membering of fragmentary 
experience. In the same way as the nucleus is a primary base and 
its 'retentions' are secondary outgrowths, '[l]angauge and its 
representation is added on to a consciousness that is simple and 
simply present to itself' (58) . Language for Husserl is a 
supplement, added on to the foundation of a pre-existing 
positivity and unfissured wholeness. The idea of deferred action, 
on the other hand, grants an entirely different role to language t 
as it suggests that it is 'by the agency of signs' (60) that the 
subject seeks to· 'mend' his non-self -presence to trauma and 
reconcile the cognizing subject with the one-who-undergoes. More 
specifically, non- self -presence implies that the nuclear 
integrality of 'now-apprehension' is in fact riven, and that the 
supposed foundational positivity on to which language is added 
hides a crucial fracture. Language remains a supplement, but now 
the supplement 'which seems to be added as a plenitude to a 
plenitude, is equally that which compensates for a lack' 
(Derrida, 1978, 212). The addition of signs to the nucleus 'comes 
to make up for a deficiency, it comes to compensate for a 
primordial nonself-presence' (1973, 87) From maiming to 
meaning': one may thus say that inasmuch as the sign follows 
after and proceeds in the wake of the trauma, adding on to it, it 
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describes at the same time an itinerary of return and revisiting/ 
seeking to insinuate itself into the breach of an anterior lack/ 
so that it is through the posterior sign that the antecedent 
event is 'lived ln its meaning' (Derrida/ 1978 1 214): from 
meaning back to maiming. 
(iii) Living death: the deathcdrive 
It can be argued/ then/ that Brink's novels tend to be 
structured on the principle of deferred understanding of trauma 
as they typically begin with a scene of violence and narratorial 
impairment/ while the subsequent narratives retrospectively 
examine the course of events leading up to the primal scene/ and 
cyclically end at the chronological , point at which they had 
begun. To reiterate, Brink frequently employs the formal 
structure of the frame narrative in which an analeptic 
hypodiegesis is embedded within the diegesis, such that the 
hypodiegesis supplements the trauma recounted in the diegesis, 
successively adding to it yet retroactively compensating for the 
deficiency given in the narrator's 'missed encounter' with trauma 
and death. 6 In Rumours of Rain 1 for example, Mynhardt attempts to 
clarify the sequence of developments which had finally 
precipitated the crisis in his familial and politico-economic 
identity as a powerful white Afrikaner male. He is baffled by his 
bafflement and uncertainty about these events, 'since I was fully 
alive to what was happening all the time' (11), and so apparently 
self-present to the experience he underwent. Yet despite these 
claims to integral self-possession, he admits that 'I've always 
felt that something must have escaped me, a submarine something' 
( 11) . ·This rend in his self-identity in turn necessitates a 
project of self-recovery through the act of writing: one 
inevitably reaches this stage of simply feeling either unwilling 
or unable to go on,' Mynhardt says, 'before clearing up whatever 
lies behind in order to catch up with oneself' (12). Putting it 
differently, the cognizing subject lags behind, while the one-
undergoing is in advance. The attainment of deferred 
understanding is hence at once a movement toward the future (an 
attempt 'to catch up with oneself') .and a return to what 'lies 
behind': the cyclical narrative has a Janus-faced structure in 
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which a face looking to the future gazes at its own face in the 
act of surveying the past. Rumours of Rain demonstrates the 
principle most vividly in its description ?f Mynhardt's return-
trip from the family farm to Johannesburg, a journey which 
duplicates his earlier itinerary in reverse. 'I gradually became 
conscious of a curious impression of driving in against myself, 
against my own past, ' he remarks: 'If only I could see more 
clearly, I felt, I would be able to see myself coming on ahead on 
my way down to the farm' (415). It is as though two spatially and 
temporally separated forces are converging on each other, the one 
directing from the past into the present (and deferring trauma to 
a later period), the other directing from present into past (and 
thereby belatedly experiencing what had happened previously) . 
Significantly, their convergence as well as, of course, 
Mynhardt's self-recovery -- is envisaged as a cataclysm. While 
movement into the past is connoted as an aggressive penetration 
('driving in against myself'), the countermovement of the past 
into present time is presented as a menacing upsurge by a foe, 
'somewhere ahead, invisible but inescapable' (431). What would 
happen at the 'point of encounter' (431)? he wonders. 'A moment 
of illumination, or the apocalypse?' (431) . In this 'point of 
incandescence' (Blanchot, 1986, 51), trauma is (re-) experienced 
in a violent agon, yet it is nonetheless the case that the 
violence which appears to endanger Mynhardt as foe outside 
himself is, at the same time, precisely an unassimilated aspect 
of himself his own monstrous desire. As a result, one may r 
hypothesize that, where the sensory excess of trauma fractures 
the subject's notional self-identity, and necessitates the work 
I 
of deferred understanding, the consequent passage from maiming to 
meaning back to maiming is a process in which the subject 
recovers and re-asserts himself by taking exterior violence as 
the displaced image of his desire. Deferred understanding, in 
this reading, is a desire-driven operation in which the ~ubject 
' desires to know violence, desires to know the violence of his 
desire. In short, and as I shall explain later in greater detail, 
the subject desires tp_kpow (himself in) that which he initially 
misses: the t~r.r.or-of-death,_ which __ ~ynhardt approaches in his 
-~ 
death drive. 
-
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So if Brink's fictions are typically structured on the 
/ 
principle of deferred action, and if the latter's function is to 
bring the subj~nowledge of that which he cannot grasp in 
the trauma's disintegrating impact, then his fictions are 
explorations of the terror of death. A Dry White Season begins 
with the narrator's bemused reflections on the death of his 
friend Du Toit, an accidental activist liquidated by the security 
police. 'His death challenged everything I'd always thought or 
felt about him' (9), the narrator says of Du Toit's anomalou;:o 
fate. But by the same token, his death puts the narrator's 
preconceptions into crisis, showing them to be unwarranted. The 
Other's death, that is, serves to remind him again of his own 
mortality at a time when he has alrea~y been reduced to 'a vast 
apathy' by an awareness that he 'is no longer immortal' (11). Yet 
more than his sense of personal transience is at issue. As if 
compounding the 'challenge' to his assumptions by Du Toit' s 
death, a demonstration in Johannesburg, seat of South African 
capital, brings it to a standstill in which silent white 
onlookers, caught in a 'trance' (19), watch the silent advance of 
black protestors. 'The very heart of the city appeared to have 
been seized in a cramp, as if an enormous invisible hand had 
reached into its chest to grasp the heart in a suffocating grip' 
(19). As a figure for the narrator's collective political 
identity and the socio-economic order underpinning it, the city 
is dumbstruck by this portent of its mortality. Yet the news of 
mortality is strangely muted, viscerally felt but for all that 
received in a trance-like state in which shock is little more 
than a 'subterranean shudder' (19) If the city's foreboding 
amplifies on large-scale the narrator's own sense of finitude, it 
is similarly the case that however momentous an effect his 
friend's death has on him, he can discuss it only in the 
trivialising terms of certain journalistic discourses, and so 
make it sound either 'melodramatic' or 'humdrum' (9) in both 
cases, the discourse he has been professionally trained to 
inhabit is inadequate to register the magnitude of his 
perplexity. Whether as a citizen hearing tidings of massive 
political disruption, or as a friend whose identity is called 
into question by his counterpart's privateness and difference, 
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the narrator cannot assimilate these omens of mortality and 
rec<?gnise that it is he himself who is at risk. (To recall 
Bettelheim's observation, danger does not strike at '"me" as a 
subject, but only [at] "me" as an object'i 1960, 127.) In this 
non-encounter, then, the narrator misses his own death. But since 
the Other's death lS an analogue for, and herald of, the 
narrator's mortality, his reconstruction in the analeptic 
hypodiegesis of the course of events leading to Ben's death 
represents an attempt at writing himself into the Other's life 
and belatedly experiencing the Other's dying as his own. The 
narrator tries 'to catch up' (RR, 12) with himself by undergoing 
from the inside that which stands outside him as the death of an-
II 
other, a death which for all its apparent foreigness is uncannily 
' A 
pertinent to his own condition: it is as if a counterpart's death 
gives narratable form to his otherwise unaccountable feeling of 
deadness, so that by narrating the story of the Other's death he 
articulates for himself, and comes to know, the obscure, missed 
event/advent of his own death. k.s Ma-Rose declares in A Chain of 
Voices, knowing the external facts of a situation (such as the 
ones provided by the court's official description of the slave 
rebellion) is 'not enough' (19). 'One must try to understand too' 
(19), she urges at the commencement of the first embedded 
narrative to follow on the court's introductory summary of the 
rebellioni thanks to its inaugural position, her appeal stresses 
that, as in A Dry White Season, the dominant purpose of the 
retrospective hypodiegeses will be to seek deferred understanding 
of violent events by revisiting codified facts from the inside, 
from the perspective of insiders and the desires for self-
affirmation which cause them to risk and incur the death reported 
in the framing diegesis. 
Through the deferred action operating ln a cyclical 
narrative form, the subject relates himself to the initially dis-
related, and enters the interior of what had been exterior to him 
in order to live out the death he had missed in the trauma's 
overloading of his assimilatory abilities. Deferred action 
engenders a simultaneous backwards and forwards movement in which 
the narrative's advance from the opening aporetic scene is also 
a retreat into the past: a crab-like movement. Brink takes this 
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temporal pattern of co-incident retrospection and anticipation as 
paradigmatic of understanding in general, later suggesting that 
the pattern is informed by the subject's impulsion towards 
consciousness of mortality. Watching a seagull, Landman realizes 
that his comprehension of 'the whole exquisite pattern of its 
flight' occurs 'only the moment after it lS gone, when its 
imprint is retained by the retina' i alternatively, it is 
comprehended 'in advance' through foreknowledge of the 
'inevitable sweep', with the result that he apprehends the flight 
'only through what is either past or yet to happen' (Act, 375). 
The present, correlatively, is not present to itself: far from 
being an integral unit, it lacks positive content, 'is devoid of 
meaning' (Act, 375), and is defined relationally as the 
intersection of a past and a future. It can be understood only by 
deferral, such that 'the moment we grasp is already past in the 
grasping' (Act, 625) . These ideas provide the thematic context 
for the litany of metaphors which close the first section of An 
Act of Terror. One such metaphor repeats the motif of the 
crayfish which has had its tail torn off and 'claws its way 
across a slithery concrete slab, not knowing j~ it is already 
dead' (626). Yet in its crab-like movement, 'it curiously defies 
death' (626). How so? On one level, it can be said to defy death 
in that its death-throes maintain the illusion that it is still 
fully alive. But on another, less simple level, its defiance of 
death ought to be interpreted ln terms of the surrounding 
meditation on the theme of deferred action. In this sense, the 
crayfish's defiance is based not so much on its ignorance of or 
obliviousness to the mortal blow, as it is on its persistent 
movement-- movement which, like the gull's.flight, describes a 
pattern in which knowledge of a sense-less present is deferred to 
a later stage. The crayfish's forward movement is, thus, 
simultaneously an evasion of death and a deferral of the moment 
in which it will come to experience death in its own good time: 
the crayfish defies death because its activity creates for it the 
time in which it can become conscious of that which negates all 
consciousness. Its defiance is a defiance of nonconsciousness and 
any unreflective submission to injury. 'The crayfish get used to 
it' (371), a fisherman remarks about the gutted creatures 
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thrashing at his feet, a comment as much on the fisherman's own 
habitual indifference to the pain he inflicts, as it is on the 
crayfish's tendency towards resignation, acceptance, compliance 
and forgetfulness (a sentiment echoed by Kat Bester, the police 
officer commanding the manhunt after Thomas and Lisa: 'People get 
used to everything'; 139). Without the work of deferred 
understanding, then, the crayfish and the human subject are 
undefiant, enslaved to deadness, overloaded by trauma, insensible 
and paralysed: they are numb. 
( i v) Reprise 
'[T]oo numb to achieve anything' (3), the narrator of States of 
Emergency is disabled by a deficient excess. Yet aside from the 
fact that 'too much was happening' around him, he claims he lacks 
'the 1nner lucidity without which ... writing is impossible_•_ (3) .. 
With the loss of 'inner lucidity', the 'light' of his 
consciousness is extinguished ('lucidity' derives from lucidus, 
'full of light'; C. E. D.). If violence darkens the mind, if it 
is not ~n illuminating 'point of incandescence' (Blanchot, 1986, 
,s 
56), it~not available either to the subject as a concentration of 
force gathering itself into the spatial coherence of a 'point'. 
Instead, the disaster 'erupting' (States, 3) around him is a 
rapid centrifugal displacement of itself and thus an overcrossing 
of adjacent boundaries -- in particular, the boundary between 
menacing exteriori ty and the claustral interiority of 'inner 
lucidity'. The second and third models of subjectal impairment, 
therefore, are photological and spatial in nature. 
III. The subject and defective vision 
'Come, thick night, 
And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell, 
That my keen knife see not the wound it makes' 
Macbeth7 
(i) Dark mirrors 
In the photological and optical metaphoric, generally and in 
Brink's work in particular, the extinction of light, sight and 
visibility signifies epistemological failure and ethical lapse. 
24 
More specifically, 'darkness' connotes the disappearance of 
cognition, self-awareness, the subject's control, and social 
mutuality. At the risk of belabouring the obvious, one may point 
out that the equation between vision and knowledge is 
foundational in the Western philosophical tradition8 truth is 
clarity and transparency, error is benightedness, and so on. Less 
obvious perhaps are the etymological roots which key terms in the 
philosophical lexicon have in visuality. 'Phenomenom' stems from 
the Greek phainesthai, which means 'to appear' or 'to show 
itself'; 'idea' derives from eidein, 
from theorein, 'to look at'. In 
Heidegger points out, knowledge is a 
'to see'; and 'theory' comes 
this specular tradition, 
'lust of the eyes' (1962, 
216) in which the attributes of vision are generalized to the 
rest of the senses. He cites St Augustine's remarks that 'we even 
use this word "seeing" for the other senses when we devote them 
to cognizing': for example, one says, 'See how that tastes' and 
'See how hard that is' (215). Thinking, that is, is conceived in 
all its forms according to the structure of vision in which a 
subject throws an object before or under it, the better to see 
it. '[C] ogitatio is a Vor-stellung,' Borch-Jacobsen says 
(paraphrasing Heidegger), a 'representation' and a posing-
before' (1991, 54): Heidegger claims that the cognized is for the 
subject 'the bringing-before-itself and what-is-brought-before-
itself and made "visible 11 1n the widest sense' (in Borch-
Jacobsen, 1991, . 54, emphasis added) . In the optical metaphoric, 
then, violence impairs the subject's ability to see, to look at, 
to theorize, and casts a pall over what ought to be a brightly 
displayed object of knowledge. Violence contracts the subject in 
hyperemotionality (the narrator is in 'pain and rage'; States, 3) 
so that he cannot accomplish the projective posing-before or 
looking-at that constitutes thinking ('writing is impossible'; 
States, 3). 
But this blinding loss of 'inner lucidity' ( 3) is as often 
~· a sign of self-blindness as it is an indication that external 
events have darkened into incomprehensibility. That is to say, 
the subject's disintegration by trauma implies not only that he 
cannot 'make sense' of events and arrange them before himself in 
a satisfying interpretive order, but that he fails to make sense 
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of himself eitheri conversely, by making sense of violence for 
himself, he will be making sense of himself. The traumatized 
subject is estranged both from a bewildering exteriority and from 
himself. In his self-alienated self-blindness, he is unable to 
see himself as an object of knowledge posed before himself as 
thinker/seer or to recognise himself in the object placed before 
him. After all, Heidegger's discussion of the Vorstellung and the 
structure of visuality held to inhere in intellection is a 
meditation on the way that the subject is regarded in post-
Cartesian philosophy in terms of self-knowledge and self-
consciousness: the subject is 'self-knowing-itself' (Heidegger, 
in Taylor, 1987, 38). Taylor puts it succinctly: 'In Vorstellung 
the subject "places" (stellt) itsel~ "before" (vor) itself' 
(1987, 12). According to Heidegger's interpretation of the credo, 
cogito, ergo sum, the Cartesian subject's desire for certainty is 
a desire to exhibit himself reflexively before himself. To find 
that of which he can be completely certain, Descartes calls 
everything into doubt (the veracity of his perceptions, his body, 
the apparent fact that he is sitting in a room, and so on) until 
he reaches what he considers alone to be indubitable the 
existence of his doubting thought which empties the world of 
substance. Since the subject knows himself to exist indubitably 
only inasmuch as he thinks 'doubt is recognised as certainty' 
(Lacan, 1977b, 126) the (doubting) cogitations which are posed 
before him are thus a mirror in which he poses himself in front 
of himself in order to assure himself of the certainty of his 
t' 
being. The subject's thoughts, or the objects construcuted by his 
cognitive activity, are self-projections in which he recognises 
himself '[i] n the object the subject represents itself to 
itself or places itself before itself' (Taylor, 1987, 13). As 
Heidegger writes, '[E]very "I represent {I pose before myself} 
something" simultaneously represents a "myself" {poses me before 
.myself} ... ,' with the result that '[e]very human representing is 
. . . a "self" -representing {a "self" -posing before oneself} ' (in 
Borch-Jacobsen, 1991, 54) . So while violence may be conceived as 
a darkness eclipsing the object of knowledge and blinding the 
knowing subject, the object before which the subject 1s blind is ,_ 
himselfi in this metaphorical scheme, the 'darkness' of violence 
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is an opaque mirror in which the subject has yet to re-cognise 
himself. 
The implication is that the writing of violence entails morer-
than the objectification of events (putting them at a distance, 
in a lighted clearing as visible objects of knowledge) but 
crucially includes the re-subjectification of these objects of 
cognition. The subject, that is to say, must construe them as his 
'self'-posing: what has been objectified and set at a distance to 
enhance theoretical visibility must in turn be re-subjectified 
and re-interiorized by means of self-recognition. Rumours of 
Rain, for example, opens with Mynhardt's description of 'a whol~ 
swarm of gnats plastered on the windscreen' (11, 63, 415) of his 
car, an image to which he returns obsessively as the narrative 
progresses because 'for some reason or other it remains important 
to me' (63). His disturbance of vision is a recurring figure for 
his bewilderment at the deterioration of his personal 
relationships and the broader South African malaise of which 
these deteriorations are emblematic. In the text's network of 
allusions, Mynhardt's scotoma initiates a motival play on the 
link between vision, self-consciousness and violence. The gnats 
obscuring his view are the debris of an injurious impact, a 
'yellowish smudge on the windscreen, speckled with blood' (63). 
Within a system of metonymic transpositions, they signify the 
unacknowledged consequences of his brutality towards others as an 
unscrupulous entrepeneur, a womaniser, an errant boerseun 
betraying his familial heritage, a member of an oppressing ethnic 
class, and -- in general -- a subject of desire. The opacity on 
the windscreen, symptomatic of violence's damaging repercussions 
for the I/eye, is thus an instance of the narrator's refusal to 
see (to know, to re-cognise, to re-subjectify) his culpability in 
the compelling obscurity posed before him. Resolving not to allow 
the poor visibility to interrupt his motor-trip, Mynhardt quips 
to his son, 'One can still see, even though it's through a glass 
darkly' (66), but leaves unstated St Paul's anticipation of a 
face-to-face con-frontation, an apocalypse ('from Greek 
apokalupsis, from apokaluptein to disclose' i C. E. D.) of light 
in which we are said to know in full. 
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(ii) Sights and surveillance 
If the Cartesian subject is a theorist, a looker, and the L 
is an eye, then it is easy for light to lose its beneficent 
connotations and become the agency through which the subject 
subjugates otherness with his imperious scrutiny. Vision turns 
into the instrument of domination, as is apparent in Mynhardt's 
case. Having broken his spectacles, he retrieves the fragments 
'as if that would ensure a grasp.on the world', reflecting that 
in 'the vagueness of myopia ... one is exposed to space and left 
without any protection against objects invisible in the distance' 
(RR, 217). Clarity of vision facilitates his comprehending and 
appropriating grasp on the world 1 and ensures that he is 
ascendant over and never at the mercy of -- obstacles in his 
path. When he is unable to clean the windscreen thanks to a 
malfunction in his luxury car, he generalises the loss of clear-
sightedness into an omen of wider cognitive and technico-
political breakdown: 'If the wipers wouldn't work, anything else 
might fail me' (63) Reinforced by a technological 
infrastructure, light and sight are synonyms for mastery. Yet it 
is equally true that the power of Mynhardt's gaze is undermined 
by a recurring opacity. Since his blind spot is a figure for his 
self-blindness concerning the damaging effects of his mastery, 
this scotoma suggests that light, unbeknownst to itself, conceals 
a certain darkness (or 'barbarity') 
Similar inversions of the pacific qualities usually 
attributed to light have featured significantly in the work of 
thinkers ranging from Nietzsche to Levinas, Derrida and Foucault. 
The gist of their suspicions about the metaphori~ of light and 
visibility is conveyed by Lacan 1 s pun that 'the gaze 1s the 
instrument through which ... I am photo-graphed' (1977b, 106). 
Light 'graphs' one, inscribes one into a determinate form and a 
reductive legibility. The inscription into a 'photo-graph' 
delimits one's existential possibilities by separating one from 
what is protean and concretely lived, and correspondingly 
projecting one into a defined and de-realized form: one 'receives 
from the Other ... a mask, a double, an envelope ... a separated 
form of [oneself] ' (Lacan, 1979b, 107) which for all its 
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'abstractness' is the focus of the very tangible effects of 
attendant kinds of power. As the eye grids one into the cross-
hairs of its scope, one becomes a target, transported from the 
condition of being oneself into a reified category which bears 
the brunt of deadly force. 
Invoking Nietzsche's opposition between Dionysian 
bacchanalia and the form-giving abilities of the sun god Apollo, 
Derrida gives prominence to these trans-fixing properties of 
light in an essay on structuralist literary criticism. 9 'The 
meaning of meaning, ' he argues, 'is Apollonian by virtue of 
everything in it that can be seen' (1978, 26), implying that 
attempts at delimiting meanings are part of an Apollonian or 
heliocentric metaphysics seeking to stabilize being in, and for, 
I 
an all-comprehending theoretical gaze. Derrida contends that 
structuralism constrains the flux of textual signification by 
imputing the fixity and architectonic unity of structures to 
textuality. Not only are the text's proliferating meanings then -
hemmed in by being drawn back within the parameters of a 
structural design apparently anterior to the construction, but 
the text's sequential and linear nature (which gives duration to 
reading and lends itself to contingency and forgetting) is 
converted into '"a simultaneous network of reciprocal 
relationships"' presenting itself 'in its entirety to the mind's 
scrutiny' (1978, 42, emphasis added) The text is made into a 
'panoramagram' so that 'one can glance over the field divested of 
its forces more freely or diagrammatically' (5, emphasis added). 
The object, defined and neutralised, is a 'form which is visible 
for the metaphorical eye' (27), subject-ed by the heliocentrism 
of Westerm metaphysics. As a result, in the text 'everything not 
intelligible in the light of a "pre-established" teleological 
framework, and not visible in its simultaneity, is reducible to 
the inconsequentiality of accident or dross' (25). In an essay on 
Levinas, 10 who berates 'the synoptic and totalizing objectifying 
virtues of vision' fundamental to Hegelian and Husserlian 
phenomenology (Levinas, 1979, 23), Derrida's critique of the 
photological and optical metaphoric is more overtly displayed, 
particularly in a section entitled 'The Violence of Light' (1978, -, 
84-92) . Following Levinas, Derrida asserts that otherness is 
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always in danger of having its independence violated and of being 
subsumed into the categories of the observing, theorizing 
subject, since '[e]verything given to me within light appears as 
given to myself by myself' (Derrida, 1978, 92) Such 
reducti veness, he believes, stresses the 'friendship between 
light and power, the ancient complicity between theoretical 
objectivity and technico-political possession' (91) 
While Levinas and Derrida provide philosophical analyses of 
the reifying tendencies implicit in a dominant heliological 
metaphoric, Michel Foucault investigates this complicity between 
power relations, subjectal vision and objectal visibility as it 
is articulated in specific institutional contexts, notably the 
prison. In Discipline and Punish ,he argues that various 
disciplinary micro-practices prevalent in the 1700s found a 
theoretical crystallization in Bentham's influential Panopticon, 
a work which gave surveillance a central place in penitential 
machinery. As Bentham devised it, the Panopticon would be the 
'perfect disciplinary apparatus' since it enabled 'a single gaze 
to see everything constantly' ( 1977, 173) . · In this ideal 
embodiment of the principle of 'hierarchical observation', 
Foucault writes, 'A central point would be both the source of 
light illuminating everything, and locus of convergence for 
everything that must be known: a perfect eye that nothing would 
escape and a centre towards which all gazes would be turned' 
(1977, 173). It is worth noting how far removed Foucault is from 
Plato's allegory of the cave. Where Plato described the ig-norant 
as prisoners chained together with their faces pressed to a wall 
on which they can see only the shadows cast by a dim fire behind 
them, Foucault's prisoners are irradiated in an antiseptic light , 
which constitutes them as objects of knowledge. For Foucault, 
unlike Plato, the prison is not the zone of mystification, but 
the site in which knowledge is produced and the truth determined. 
Where Plato regards luminous space as the locus of freedom and 
truth, Foucault considers it to be the constitutive topos of 
imprisonment. 
(iii) Agora 
But in spite of the disparaging links Rumours of Rain 
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institutes between vision, light and Mynhardt's imperiousness, 
Brink's imagery frequently recalls the Platonic distinction 
between the cave and the sunlit plain in order to stress that 
light opens up a beneficent space of social reciprocity. 'All I 
can bring you is misery,' Galant tells his lover, attributing 
their estrangement to a common enslavement: 
We can't see properly because we got the eyes of 
slaves. But once we reach the other side we'll know for 
sure. There will be a sun rising. Then I'll tell you 
who I am. For the first time we'll really know each 
other (CoV, 395) . 
In States of Emergency an activist describes how he had abandoned 
a career in the District Surgeon's office after examining a 
detainee tortured by the police. He had been advised, after 
protesting to a senior official, that ~[t]he sooner you patch up 
your bleeding heart, the better your chances for survival in this 
business' (States, 128). Lamenting that he and his addressee are 
'imprisoned in our whiteness' (129), he concludes his account of 
state violence by observing that 'this mess of "us" and "them" 1 
(130), a division ingrained in apartheid ideology, is 'like being 
deprived of one 1 s own shadow' 'the sun has set, the light has 
gone out 1 , leaving everyone 'groping in the dark' (130) like the 
inmates of Plato's prison/misprision. 
Crucially ,_o_n~€__b_lindnes.s. __ to the other entails a 
~ correlative blindness to oneself, an inability to posit an 
identity, or as Galant says, to 'tell you who I am.' Those who 
are opposed to each other lose sight of the alterity (the term 
means 'the state of being other or different; diversity, 
otherness'; Taylor, 1987, xxix) which serves as a foil to the 
antagonists' entrenched and notional self-understandings. It is 
as though the Other needs to be taken from his or her 
classification as part of an undifferentiated and alien 'them' in 
order that the subject may know himself. A luminous clearing is 
required in which the Other is recognised as an equivalent 
subj ecti vi ty who can show the subject what he is. In this 
luminosity, the subject 'sees' the Other as other (not as one 
subsumed in the subject's schemas) and therefore 'sees' himself 
as well. In particular, 'seeing himself' means 'examining his 
\ conscie~ce', since the 'shadow' of which he is oblivious 
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signifies untenable aspects of himself which he would rather 
disavow: a cicatrised heart must be made to bleed. 
Thomas Landman, philosopher-bomber of An Act of Terror, 
similarly looks to a future dispensation of light in which former 
enemies escape from a vertiginous loss of perspective so as to 
recognise -- rather than degrade -- each other. At a funeral for 
those he has killed, he issues an imaginary plea to the victims 
and the bereaved: 
It isn't you I wanted to hurt! For God's sake, believe 
me. If not today ... then some day in the future. One 
day when we have all broken free from this whirlpool 
that has sucked us in and churns us round and round, 
madness, darkness, evil. It was to get us out of it 
that we have done it [the bomb attack] (230) . 
To break free, to reach the safety of the shore: to emerge from 
darkness in an illumination unfolding the Heimat. Earlier Landman 
had likened his bomb blast to ~a burning glass' in which ~all the 
history and prehistory of Africa would converge, beams of light 
bent inward to a single searing point where it erupts in 
flame' (Act, 31). Light synthesises the labours of the exiled and 
imprisoned, and heralds imminent repatriation in the same way as 
~columns of fire or smoke lead [ ... ] the children of Israel 
through the desert ln search of a promised land' (Act, 230). To 
emerge, to arrive, to gather, to know each other authentically in 
the clarity of light and the stability of the site, and to 
settle: to find repose on the solidity of land (Heimat) after the 
turbulence of water (war) , to reach a settlement in a forum, an 
assembly in a well-lit site or agora. The maelstrom exerts an 
irresistable force drawing everyone inside .its alienating 
darkness -- and the closer to the vortex, the more disoriented 
and benighted foes are, estranged from self and other alike. Each 
confronts the other not in his or her independence as Other, but 
as a reified pejorative category constituted on the negation of 
the Other's independence. Beyond the odium of misrecognition, 
however, is the site in which ~we'll really know each other', an 
agora in which subjects manifest themselves, freed alike of the 
vexatious imputations of their adversaries and of their own 
misperceptions of themselves. 
While darkness lS associated with a movement spiralling 
32 
inwards, 
explosion 
disparate 
the socially constructive violence of Landman's 
is described as the 'converg [ence] ' (Act, 31) of 
elements, and, then, as if pent-up forces had been 
released against darkness's constricting pressures, as an 
expansion towards the agora. Darkness volatizes space, isolates 
('[we] 're all groping in the dark'; States, 130), and mystifies . 
. •• 
By contrast, light stabilizes space} joins one into the homely 
plurality of the public site, and allows one to know, by way of 
others, the truth of one's identity, as well as to reveal to them 
dimensions of one's selfhood that were previously occluded by 
oppressive misprisions. 11 
IV. The subject and paranoid space 
'The stress makes me inclined to pull into 
my shell. I just lock myself in my room' 
-- Riot policeman12 
For the traumatized and benumbed subject, violence is a deficient 
excess; in a second pervasive system of metaphors, it is an 
extinction of light in which cognition fails and the subject 
lacks consciousness-of-self. If violence is said to eclipse the 
radiant agora in which self-conscj9usness may_p~produced, there 
is a third, and related, model which pr~?e~ts the deleterious 
d -- ~ - -- -
effects of violence in terms of the violation of spatiality. 
. . .. - ___ ...-) 
Light unveils space, distancing it in a panorama; darkness 
constricts it, bringing it depthlessly closer (as Mynhardt says, 
'[T]he impression I have is not so much that the vagueness of 
myopia causes one to feel isolated and remote from everything, 
but rather that one is exposed to space'; RR, 217) . Likewise, 
violence strikes its victims as a combination of the intrusive 
and constrictive, that is, as an encroachment scrambling and 
reinscribing subjectal boundaries. Territories ·are invaded, 
distances between domestic safety and foreign menace contract, 
formerly inviolate lines of division between meum et tuum are 
contested until borders are crossed, retracted, redrawn and 
overrun once more. Structures are occupied, the sanctuaries of 
. the domus, hearth and church are seized, destroyed or altered 
made other, re-made to bear the impress of the Other, who divests 
these spaces of previous cultural content and meaning, subverting 
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their integrity and fixity, and appropriating them into his own 
designs. Inasmuch as aspects of selfhood such as bodily form, 
mental processes and social practices are presented in terms of 
territorial organization and the attributes of edifices, violence 
is conceived as a dis-placement drawing the self out of the 
territories or edifices which it is usually said to inhabit. If 
one were to concatenate a series of binary oppositions pertaining 
to territory and edifice -- inside/outside, form/formlessness, 
control/powerlessness, familiar/strange, protection/danger, 
same/other, composure/anxiety, near/far, and so on -- the un-
settling repercussions of violence could be put down to a 
transgression of the border between the opposing elements, such 
that the second term crosses over and ~uperimposes itself on th~ 
lineaments of the first. The interior is then turned inside out, 
exposed and vulnerable to the destructuring work of an external 
agency, rather than enfolded in a sanctum; the distant insinuates 
itself into the intimacy of what is nearby 13 ; the familiar 
becomes alien, no longer a site in which the subject ~exercises 
his autonomy but one in which he is heteronomous ('subject to an 
external law, rule, or authority'; C. E. D.). 
In this conflation of 'orders of simultaneous experience' 
(Steiner, 1967, 181) normally divorced from each other, the 
aggressor's invasive inward movement is matched by the victim's 
eversion: the domus loses its self-containment. The condition is 
underlined in Ben du Toit's reverie on torture in police cells, 
discussed earlier. 14 His anxious thoughts are accompanied by a 
sense that the domus is at risk in the outlying space onto which 
it opens, exterior space all the more menacing in that he is 
routinely unaware of how it engulfs him and makes his safety 
contingent on forces outside the ambit of his control. Surrounded 
by homely sounds (a refrigerator door opening, his wife sighing 
in her sleep) , Ben envisions 'the night [lying] around him, 
limitless, endless; the night with its multitude of rooms, some 
dark, some dusky, some blindingly light, with men standing 
astride on bricks, weights tied to their balls' (ADWS, 75). This 
'small fierce stab in the mind' (States, 75), one will remember, 
is the same estrangement and incapacitation suffered by the 
narrating subject in States of Emergency, a text whose 
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collocation of diverse materials proceeds as a violation of 
borders between interior and exterior, between 'everything 
happening out there ... in those burning smoking streets', on the 
one hand, and the security of lovers 'inside this ordered 
comfortable room' (75), on the other. 
What is apparent from Ben's powerlessness is that exposure 
to space is linked to an awareness of his own confinement. 
Through its contiguity with the torture chamber, he thinks of his 
dwelling not as an autonomous unit but as another room in a 
'multitude of rooms' collusively bound in a single institutional 
complex. It is a complex devoted to cruelty, and its engineers 
may move from room to room, until they perhaps happen even onto 
Ben's corner. The domus becomes a pri~on, its space being 'both 
familiar and hostile' (Davies, 1990, 59): the form of the first 
term in the series of binarisms mentioned previously is retained, 
but now to signify the attributes of the opposing term. The 
inside is occupied by the outside, the distant installs in the 
nearby, the familiar becomes strange, the formerly protective 
appears entrapping. While in the spatial metaphoric violence is 
described, on the one hand, as an invasion of an edifice or 
territory, an invasion which takes one outside of habitual modes 
of residence, violence is presented, on the other hand, as an 
occupation by an aggressor in which a victim is interned or 
placed inside an oppressive structure or territorial 
dispensation. To repeat: on the one hand, the subject seeks an 
interior space which is instead ex-posed (the border lS overrun, 
the edifice collapses); on the other, the subject's tendency to 
extend himself outwards from a secure base is constrained (an 
enclosure is demarcated, he is fitted into a cell) . Living his 
disquiet through a set of spatial metaphors, the victim is 
consequently at once agoraphobic and claustrophobic, troubled by 
the menace of the 'limitless, endless' night (ADWS, 75), yet no 
less alarmed that his room, interchangeable with others, partakes 
of the persecutory form of a torture chamber. Scarry conveys the 
double sense of violence as an exposure and an internment in an 
observation that, during torture, the 'dissolution of the 
boundary between inside and outside' is an 'obscene conflation of 
private and public' bringing 'all the solitude of absolute 
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privacy with none of its safety, all the self-exposure of the 
utterly public with none of its possibility for cameraderie or 
shared experience' (1985, 53). The sufferer is wide open and shut 
in: a bear tied to a stake. 15 Although his body is 'turned inside 
out' (53), his will to move out beyond himself to share 
experience is curbed and he lS driven back into 'absolute 
privacy' (53). His is an exposure without self-extension into an 
agora, and an internment without sanctuary: Scarry's comment 
evokes the contradiction that in spatial terms violence is an 
opening up of limits and frontiers, and a limitation of the 
subject in which his borders are closed. 
Indeed, Scarry's wideranging and insightful investigation 
.into the nature of violence in The Body in Pain frequently takes 
recourse to the metaphoric of spatial violation and constrictive 
emplacement in order to account for the impact of violence on the 
subject. Nor is her use of the metaphoric an unselfconscious one 
adopted only for descriptive purposes, since she argues that 
representations of spatial closure may at times not simply 
provide a conventional means of re-presenting violence, but might 
well be complicit in aggravating acts of harming. That is to say, 
Scarry reflects on the metaphoric she employs, claiming that it 
is not merely a a nonviolent expression of violent acts happening 
at a remove from their verbal or physical imaging, but is itself 
likely to perpetrate an act of harming. In short, representations 
of closure may well be articulated in an intersubjective address 
in which the representations' performative or rhetorical effect 
on the addressee is to impress upon him the sense that his 
subjectal world is being encroached upon, negated and redefined 
by a menacing Other: the narrator of States of Emeraency suffers 
a comparable anxiety when he perceives that his own writing will 
be 'invaded' (14) by the codes of~the Other, and that, ln this 
semiotic closure, his personal uniqueness will be erased and 
replaced by the Other's impersonality. Let us, however, work 
through these arguments in finer detail. 
- One may begin by examining Scarry's use of the metaphoric of 
1 closure in her formulations on pain. Pain, she says, is 'world- ~. 
'destroying' (1985, 29) since it negates 'the contents of 
consciousness' (30) and redirects one's attention away from an 
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'increasingly 
palpable body' 
substanceless world' toward an 'increasingly 
(30). 'As the body breaks down,' she claims, 'it 
becomes increasingly the object of attention, usurping the place (;---.. 
of all other objects, so that finally the world may exist 
only in. a circle two feet out from [the one in pain]' {33) The 
motif of pain as an 'never-shrinking perimeter of pleasure 11 ' (33) 
is fundamental to Scarry's descriptions. Underscoring the notion 
of violence as an internment or an exposure, she writes that in 
pain the destruction of 'a person's self and world' is 
'experienced spatially as either the contraction of the.universe 
down to the immediate vicinity of the body or as the body 
swelling to fill the entire universe' {35). This constriction is 
at odds with what she regards as a fundamental human tendency, 
namely, 'the human being's impulse to project himself out into a 
space beyond the boundaries of the body in acts of making' (39), 
which are either physical or verbal. For Scarry, the room and 
'its protective, narrowing act is the location of the humc:m 
being's most expansive potential' (40), because it is 'back in 
the inward and enclosing space of the single room and its 
domestic content that the outward unfolding ... of civilization 
originates' (39). The room is hence both a metaphor for this 
expansive propensity and an aggregation of metonymies which stand 
in for different bodily functions. As 'an enlargement of the 
body' {38), the room stabilizes temperature and 'the nearness of 
others so that the body can suspend its rigid and watchful 
postures' (39); its furnishings serve functions on which the body 
would otherwise have had to expend energy -- one sits on a chair 
rather than balancing on one's haunches, for instance so that 
one can 'move weightlessly into a larger mindfulness' (39). As it 
makes the body less of an 'object of perception and concern' 
(39), the room enables humanity to .realize its projective 
impulsion. In the case of torture, on the other hand, the 
'torture room is not just the setting in which torture occurs' 
{40). The room, 'both in its structure and in its content' (41), 
is 'converted into another weapon, into an agent of pain' (40). 
A refrigerator door is turned into a bludgeon, a bathtub is used 
for drownings/ and so on. In general terms, formerly beneficent 
artefacts are unmade by being turned to anti-human purposes. This 
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'unmaking of the made' (41) radically alters the value assigned 
to the domus. For example, by using a door as a weapon, the 
'domestic act of protecting becomes an act of hurting and in 
hurting, [consequently] the object becomes what it is not, an 
expression of individual contraction, of the retreat into the 
most self-absorbed and self-experiencing of human feelings, when 
it is the very essence of these objects to express the most 
expansive potential of the human being' (41, emphasis added). 
Where the domus had previously signified self-extension and 
weightlessness, it now impresses the victim with a sense of his 
entrapment and vulnerable bodiliness. 
Scarry maintains that the torture room becomes a weapon, 
both in its contents and its structure., That is, its contents are 
employed to inflict physical harm 1 while the destructuration of 
its self-realizing potential, an expression of individual 
contraction' (41), represents the sufferer's painful world-
contraction and simultaneously amplifies (41) this process. The 
torture room is not simply the place in which cruelty occurs, but 
in its 'spectacle of power' (27) it 'is itself the torturer's 
weapon' (45), by which Scarry means that the representation of 
world-disintegration can have injurious efficacy in its own 
right 1 and can perform the same action which, on another 
occasion, it reports on from a non-particpatory remove. In the 
.. 
torture room's 'spectacle of power', the made world is desecrated 
'so as to pose before the victim a representation of pain which 
enacts his murder in effigy. Scarry believes Poe's The Pit and 
the Pendulum conveys the archetype of torture -- a situation in 
which 'walls collaps[e] in on the human centre to crush it alive' 
(45) . For the victim, space does not unfold to the horizon as an 
extension of himself or as an objectification through which he 
poses himself before himself in his activities. Instead, it is 
compressive and emplacing 1 and saturated with the intentions of 
an adverse Other who, like the invisible inquisitors in Poe's 
tale, does not have to be present to the victim as the agent of 
physical harming but can be apprehended as the bringer of death 
ln the representations he gives of his world-contracting 
capacities. The steadily-compressing walls of Poe's chamber --
which are physical objects operating on the body and emplacing 
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representations inducing anguish -- have a single final aim: to 
drive the subject into the pit, into nullity. -. 1 ~ 
Thus, Scarry draws a distinction between two levels of 
violation. On the one hand there is a level of physical harming, 
and on the other there is a level of harming by representation in 
which the objects causing pain serve both literal and figural 
purposes. Within the latter level, one may draw a further 
distinction between representations of spatial desecration which 
fulfill expressive functions and those which fulfill a 
performative function. That is, inasmuch as the torture-chamber's 
compressing walls to use Scarry's paradigmatic example of 
torture are divided from their physicality into the 
abstractness of signs, they 'external~z[e] the way in which the 
person's pain causes his world to collapse' ( 41) . Here signs 
\ 
nonviolently 'mime', 'externaliz [e] ' (41), ,. or re-present a 
violence which is undoing· the victim's interior world -- the 
'unmaking of the [physical] made' (41) becomes a sign standing in 
for his destruction. '[A]t the same time,' Scarry obse~ves, 'the 
disintegration of the world is here ... made painful, made the 
direct cause of the pain' (41). In other words the sign no longer 
'reports on pain from a distance but is actively involved in its 
production: the sign 'amplif[ies]' (41) the pain it re-presents, 
assuming injurious efficacy in its own right. 'Demonstrat[ing] 
that everything is a weapon' (41) posed against him, the domus 
and its objects hem in the victim by forcing him to 'experience 
the body that will end his life, the body that can be killed' 
(31) the body that is killable for others and that is an 
execrable, expendable thing for the Other, the lived reality that 
the Other seeks to nullify and appropriate. 
As we shall soon see, in States of Emergency Brink deploys 
a similar range of metaphors pertaining to contraction, closure 
and the crossing of boundaries. Yet in a move which invites· 
comparison with Scarry's argument that representations of 
violence need not only report on violence but can themselves 
produce the subject's world-contraction, Brink uses notions of 
spatial delimitation both to describe the effects of the violence 
as they occur outside the text in the Emergency, and to simulate 
these effects in the space of his writing. In the same way as 
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Scarry isolates ln torture a level of representational harming 
from a level of physical harming and in turn distinguishes 
between the expressive and performative functions of these 
representations, Brink draws a parallel between, on the one hand, 
the processes of semiotic determination at work in the text and, 
on the other, the Emergency's world-contraction. In one sense the 
processes of semiotic determination are invoked as expressions of 
processes operating in the Emergency. But in another sense, they 
also perform or enact these processes upon the narrator. The 
result is that the text's foregrounding of semiotic determination 
is an 'expression and amplification' (Scarry, 1985, 41) of world-
contracting processes occuring ln the Emergency a re-
presenting of what happens outside the ~ext, and an amplification 
in the text of those selfsame processes. 
'Don't project, 
Don't connect, 
Protect: 
Feeling numb' 
-- U2 
V. Numb 
Let us briefly retrace the,steps that have been followed so far, 
before going on to describe the traumatized subject's numbness in 
terms of the three preceding systems of metaphors. 
Wavering between writing and silence, States of Emergency's 
narrator is at impasse between the desire to write a 'simple love 
story' (5) and a duty to address his political context. While the 
context is not available to him as a settled object of knowledge 
which can be re-presented in his writing, it impedes the 
interpretive work it calls for, since the effect of trauma is to 
underm,ine the subject ' s cognitive mastery by which he can subject 
('bring under') his experiential flux into a graspable objectal 
('thrown before the mind') coherence. Like many of Brink's 
narrators, he begins with the admission that violent events 'had 
left me too numb to achieve anything' (3). 
The condition of numbness recapitulates aspects of the three 
models which often present the cognitive impairment caused by 
violence. For the numbed subject, violence is an excess of,, 
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excitation over his assimilatory abilities, a failure of 
cognition's self-projective visual posing-before, and a spatial 
intrusion restricting his tendency towards self -extension. In 
these respects, numbness is· equivalent to a· state of·· 
powerlessness and vulnerability induced by an acute awareness of 
one's mortal endangerment. Yet to call the subject 'numb' is to 
.'-... 
field a metaphor in which the body's insensate and anaesthetized 
surfaces of-the body~tand in for diminished mental receptivity '-.(·. 
to external and internal stimuli. Numbness, that is to say, both 
demonstrates and denies these registers of dysfunction -- there 
is (no) elusive excess, (no) opacity on the speculum, (no) threat 
clamped around one, and (no) piercing of subjectal interiority. 
Rather than feel engulfed by a traumatic influx, the subject 
' 
neutralises it in a swathe of frigidity; far from being blinded 
before violence or himself, the subject protests his clear-
sightedness and self-possession, blind to a blindness.· Instead of 
being opened up, he is protectively self-enclosed; instead of 
being coercively shut in, he imagines himself unconstrained, free 
to roam fearlessly. Again: an overload of affect is belied by the 
subject's dazed and automatous state, a dissociative fugue in 
which he is unaware of the impulses controlling his behaviour 
(one thinks of Galant, borne along by currents of which he 
'appeared to have no understanding'; CoV, 275). The 
frozen, indifferent to a dangerous exteriority and his 
affectivity, is, like Landman following the bomb attack, 
subject, 
troubled 
'a body 
stored in ice' (Act, 81), inured to the death he has missed, 
given to a blanket insensibility precluding the trauma from being 
placed-before him in its specificity. As Alexandre Kojeve says in 
his exegesis of Hegel's notion of the struggle for recognition 
a battle in which antagonists either risk death to assert their 
supremacy, or draw away from it and so elect to preserve life at 
the cost of freedom -- 'in the enslaving dread that the idea of 
death inspires ... terror [initially] remains internal-or-private 
and muter and consciousness does not come into being for itself' 
(1986 1 118). Helpless and inhibited before a danger he cannot 
control or escape, the subject is silenced by his terror: he 
cannot exhibit what is 'internal-or-private' in an external-or-
public formr and thus he cannot pro-ject his terror before 
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himself ln a constructed object which he can intra- j ect in a 
moment of self-consciousness. In short, he cannot become self-
conscious. But if terror leads to the subject's silencing, and 
his inability to be self-conscious~ his silence and corresponding 
absence of self-consciousness retroactively -cancels out his 
direct awareness of the terror he suffered. Aphasia and cognitive 
inhibition are hence ambivalent signifiers indicating both an 
overpowering impression of endangerment and a refusal to 
contemplate this threat (the combatant draws back from death and 
opts for servility to, and identification with, a master) . 
Putting it differently, the benumbed subject's silence points to 
the co-existence of two opposing attitudes which may alternately 
shift into greater or lesser p17ominence under varying 
circumstances -- that is, too great an awareness of mortality (an 
excess of traumatic experience) defensively changes into too· 
little an awareness of it (a deficiency of experience, a 
postponement of understanding) , while a protectively curtailed 
knowledge of mortality dissolves ln a re-experiencing of an 
intolerable traumatic influx. To be struck mute by violence, to 
be unable to function, is at one and the same time to acknowledge 
and disavow16 mortality. It is to be dead already but to be 
deadened (or numbed) to this death and to miss it at the moment 
one undergoes it. As Brink has the fisherman -- and the security 
policeman --say about the pain of his prey, 'The crayfish get 
used to it' (Act, 371). '[W]eariness' and 'inertia' (RR, 12), and 
'apathy' and 'paralysis' (ADWS, 11) express ·an immobilising 
stasis before a superior force and a dulling-over which suspends 
and de-realises this force: numbness attests alike to surrender 
and to continuing defensive action. With respect to the spatial 
metaphor of intrusion, numbness combines a lowered sensitivity to 
outside stimuli with the subject's distancing or detachment of 
himself from them, and his correlative withdrawal into a secure 
interior site, whether this take the form (as it does in States 
of Emergency) of a textual enclosure or the lovers' chamber. With 
respect to the related metaphor of violence as an internment, 
numbness is a denial of the delimitation implied by a retreat 
into an enclosure; yet its inertia, its lack of self-extension, 
its recessive movement into 'a 11 dead space 11 within' (Peterson, 
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Schwarz, and Prout, 
"'d . accomo at1on 
... 
to an 
1990, 22), amounts to nothing less than 
enclosure imposed on the subject by 
an 
an 
aggressor. The numbed subject may repudiate or blunt the reality 
of the aggressor's pistol pointed-at. his.head. (to recal1Adorno's-
image17) , but his retreat into an inner sanctum is nevertheless 
a surrender to delimitation. 
Q 
Numbness circumscribes~set of a multiple and contradictory 
subject-positions which alternate between mastery and servility. 
Yet an apparent mastery is belied by vulnerability, while 
servility is itself also more apparent than real, concealing as 
it does the violence of a desire which awaits its moment to risk 
death again in a resumption of the struggle for recognition. 18 
VI. Ecstasy 
'But love also goes beyond the beloved. This 
is why through the face filters the obscure 
light coming from beyond the face, from what 
is not yet, from a future never future enough, 
more remote than the possible' 
-- Emmanuel Levinas 19 
'I love the bad luck that you're bringing' 
David Bowie 
(i) Foreword 
The narrator's attempts to do his duty and address the violence 
around him leave him 'too numb to achieve anything' (States, 3). 
As a result, he can fulfil neither duty nor his desire for 
aesthetic production. How does States of Emergency describe his 
breaching of numbness and silence? I have argued that since 
Brink's fictions typically begin by recording a scene of 
narratorial impairment, the writing which ensues is an implicit 
commentary on the act of surmounting this impairment. Brink's 
'masterful images' (his completed statements) allude to the 
'mound of refuse' (that is, the derelict circumstances of 
enunciation) from which they originate, and thereby draw 
attention to the sublimatory artistic work of ascending the 
ladder from Yeats's 'foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart' . 20 In 
other words, Brink's self-reflexive narrative structures -- self-
reflexive, in that narrators self-consciously grapple with the 
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task of narration, with the result that their fictions reflect on 
fiction-making suggest that the statements he produces so 
avidly can be examined not only in terms of their propositional 
content, but their performance and utterance as well. What is 
said by them can be subordinated to a consideration of what their 
very saying entails: namely, a surmounting of a tendency towards 
aphasia. The saying of the said is an overcoming of unsaying 
but an overcoming that is always provisional, always in need of 
reiteration. In short, I am describing two directly opposed 
forces. On the one hand, violence expands its field of 
devastation and commensurately contracts the subject's self-
extension by means of his speech ('[S]o long as one is speaking,' 
Scarry says, 'the self extends out be-y;ond·the boundaries of· the 
body, occupies a space much larger than the body'; 1985, 33). 
Encroaching on one's borders from the outside, violence tends to 
unsaying and a numbing entrapment. On the other hand, however, 
the counter-force produced in an ecstatic saying is lik~wise a 
form of violence, a point Brink stresses (as we shall see) in 'An 
act of violence: thoughts on the functions of literature': to 
cite my opening contention, the terror of violence both inhibits 
and liberates writing. Brink's assertion of saying over unsaying 
thus effects a crucial reversal in which violence no longer 
incapacitates 
schematically, 
discourse, but instead empowers it. More 
it can be said that Brink reinscribes an 
opposition between violence and writing as a concordance in which 
the two previously exclusive categories mutually reinforce one 
another. Where the opposition between 'violence' and 'writing' 
could be broken down into the opposition, in one case, between 
'non-writing' and 'writing', and between 'violence' and non-
violence' in another -- a set of oppositions in which 'violence' 
necessarily means 'non-writing' (or unsaying), while 'writing' lS 
definitionally 'non-violent' -- Brink modifies their antagonism, 
such that 'violence' engenders 'non-writing' and 'writing', while 
'saying' is not 'non-violent' but is informed precisely by 
'violence'. I have argued that States of Emergency is Brink's 
most ostensibly self-reflexive novel to date, and that it 
consequently provides a useful 
demonstrating how his fictions 
organising 
tend to 
framework 
reflect on 
for 
the 
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problematics of writing under disabling conditions. In 
particular, I have depicted it as a Janus-faced text, a text in 
which violence intersects with the space of writing, and vice 
versa. To restate this, writing. is_ initially placed.- at .. risk by 
the encroachment of violence within its sphere of operations: 
saying is thwarted by unsaying, by a tendency to end discourse, 
to close it, to contract its proliferation of meanirigs into a 
determinate, imposed form. But this systolic movement, caused by 
the violence of unsaying, is matched by a diastolic (or ecstatic) 
action attendant on the violence of saying closure is 
shattered, the 
intertextuality. 
text's meanings expand into the realm 
With respect to the conflict between 
of 
the 
violence of unsaying and the violence o,f saying, then, one should 
not think of these systolic and diastolic movements in terms-of 
successiveness; rather, they .ought- to be .. conceived .in -relation :t.o _ 
the simultaneity of a struggle. Once we examine how States of 
Emergency plays out this tension between saying and unsaying, and 
ecstasy and numbness, I shall go on to investigate how the said 
~- Brink's 'masterful images' -- illuminates the dynamics of its 
saying; to this end, I shall take 'The dove in the grave' as the 
point of departure into Brink's voluminous body of work. 
The question is: how does States of Emergency tackle the 
difficulty of asserting saying against counterforces of unsaying? 
What follows lS an introductory overview of the narrator's 
attempts to re-affirm saying. 
Given that his aim is to have duty inform desire, and desire 
inform duty, his first move is to revive desire by writing 'a 
simple love story' (5). He stresses that the act of writing a 
love story, and the love story itself, are analogues of each 
other, since similar dynamics are involved in either case. The 
narrative about Philip and Melissa's love affair, for instance, 
is a dramatic exemplification of abstract processes involved in 
the text's narration (that is, the said exemplifies its saying); 
equally, the writing's juxtaposition of ordinarily separated 
domains of experience its transgression of boundaries 
performatively underscores the way the lovers cross the frontiers 
between one another and between themselves and the world at large 
(the saying exemplifies the said) . Since narrative and narration 
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are analogous, the narrator's aphasic numbness corresponds to 
Philip's lovelessness, while the commencement of writing and the 
love affair entails in either case an ecstatic passage beyond a 
circumscribed self. However, what writing and the love affair 
have in common at first, is a tendency to seek security in an 
enclosed space, whether of aesthetic production or erotic 
intimacy, unhampered by the--riskiness of the public sphere. Since 
this tendency is essentially afflight from a violent world, the 
writer and the lover still remain entrapped in a numbing 
foreclosure of terror. The nature of desire, according to the 
narrator, is to shatter boundaries. As such, the strategy of 
seclusion ultimately stifles desire/ although it initially 
appeared to be a means of reactivatiryg it. In the love story, 
then, the lovers' enclosure and its frenzied context begin to 
cross over into each other. A- similar· interpenetration takes· 
place at the level of narration:o-the Emergency-'s··violence is--
refracted into the space of textuality, while the text 
reciprocally extends into the Emergency, so allowing violence 
which in the beginning stands outside and opposed to text -- to 
be experienced inside the text. By so doing, the text actually 
con-fronts the violence its earlier self-absorption disavows; it 
comes a full circle from its benumbed starting position. Thus, 
text is no longer simply predicated on avoidance of terror and a 
retreat into the safety of the story -- it is nothing less than 
an insistent attestation to terror. Seen in this way/ the text 
duplicates the Emergency's violence/ not only in the sense of 
reporting on it, but inasmuch as the very enunciation of the text 
enacts the narrator's movement into danger, disintegration, and 
death. The text thus postulates a concomitance in the effects of 
writing and the effects of violence. To this end, it implicitly 
draws on a body of post-structuralist literary theory, in 
particular the latter's themes about the 'death of the author' 
and semiotic closure (in this respect, one ought to bear in mind 
Scarry's claims that representations of closure can simulate the 
experience of world-contraction entailed in acts of physical 
injury) . Having previewed the course writing and desire follow 
in States, let us proceed through the argument in closer detail. 
46 
{ii) ~Stuck in myself' 
While confronting violence -·leaves· the narrator numb and· 
workless, by turning away to reflect on the intended love story's 
formal properties he asserts a provisional detachment- from events 
which permits him to sustain a discourse, no matter how 
precariously. ~It is, perhaps, no more than an attempt to test 
the extent of my own freedom,' he remarks of the project, 'that 
freedom which may involve the choice to write a love story ... 
when something else appears to be demanded of me (States, 
6) . There seems to be a necessary connection between his wish to 
test his 1 imitations and his wish to write a love story. If 
violence narrows his freedom of self-extension and causes him to 
withdraw into a state of numbness di~avowing terror, Philip's 
lovelessness is also a denial of the ~terror that 1 ies in 
exposing oneself totally,-- unreservedry- lto · ·tne· ·Other]' ;-"-thEt· 
readiness to risk everything' (55) , and likewise entails his 
retreat into 'my own solitude, the feeling of being "stuck" in 
myself' (55). If the narrator regards writing, on the other hand, 
as a way of broaching constriction, loving involves a similar 
transformation in an imaginary address to Melissa, Philip 
appeals, ~Don't you realize, I felt my insides crying at you in 
the silence, don't you realize I want to open myself up to you, 
to deliver myself to you; I want nothing of my life to remain 
secret to you ... ' (55, first emphasis added). Significantly, for 
Philip love is not a state of benign affectivity only. He 
describes it instead as an address, an oblation, a self-
transformation through speech. Love lS discourse: it is a 
rapture of speech and an ecstatic offering of self to the Other, 
an ekstasis of a delimited form (from Greek for 'displacement, 
trance, from ex- out + histanai to cause to stand'; C. E. D.). 
The narrator underlines the analogy between a narrative about 
love, and the ecstasy of narrating such a narrative. 'Love, and 
the text I should like to write about love,' he says, ~cannot be 
separated' (104) , implying. that stqtements reporting or re-
presenting a condition of ecstasy anterior to them are 
inseparable from an ecstasy inhering in the very act of uttering 
them. The saying of the said is an address to a beloved 
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interlocutor, an address which takes the form of a sacrificial 
self-opening offered to the Other. But what he offers is not so 
much the said, but the fact of his saying. His ecstatic speech 
itself constitutes the gift rather than .simply being .the .medium 
in which the gift is transmitted: his gift is a performance, an 
'open [ing] ' up, more so than it is a statement disclosing 
whatever had been concealed before. In particular, the gift of 
the saying acquires its value from the resistance against which 
it has to struggle. The lover's will to manifest himself to the 
interlocutor, to 'expos[e him]self totally' and broach the 
'silence' in which he has been 'stuck', courts the 'terror' of 
'risk [ing] everything' (55). As a supplication, his discourse is 
a movement towards the beloved; yet t~e ekstatic movement away 
from the position in which he is 'stuck' is a risky movement 
against a countervailing _force, which---Pits its._ tendency to 
unsaying against his saying. The struggle is performed in the 
view of and for the benefit of the Other: the greater the 
struggle of ~aying against unsaying, the more valuable the gift 
which is dedicated to the interlocutor. As ekstasis, then, saying 
is both struggle and gift. In relation to struggle, saying 
implies the existence of a foe; with respect to the gift, it 
entails a recipient, 'a subject of desire and, as such, a subject 
of response, of a called for answer' (Felman, 1992, 32). That is, 
the violence of saying presupposes and invokes an Other-as-agora 
for whom the struggle is enacted, thereby situating itself in 
relation to a larger community, or '"opening" and "openness" into 
which [truth] can unfold and where everything comes to light' 
(Borch-Jacobsen, 1991, 131); by contrast the violence of unsaying 
atomizes people into unrelated monads 'stuck' in themselves. 
Breaking out of the anomie of his numbed silence, the lover's 
violent engagement with constricting forces is an invocation and 
positing of a youtopia, a summoning of the Other who stands at a 
threshold between private intimacy and the agora's worldliness. 
If love is a discourse, if the utterance of statements about 
ecstasy itself performs an ekstasis for the constricted narrator, 
then there are important parallels in States of Emergency between 
the level of narrative and the level of its narration. As such, 
an examination of the love-story will shed light on the 
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vicissitudes of utterance in contexts which negate the ability to 
speak: this is the path we shall now pursue before looking at the 
level of the text's enunciation. 
The act of writing and the oblation of love both entail an 
ekstasisi however, writing and loving also share an inclination 
towards seclusion. As writing turns away from the Emergency to 
take pleasure in elaborating scenarios of desire -- apparently 
vindicating the Fugard epigraph, 'The only safe place in the 
world is inside a story' -- the lovers 'retreat from a violent 
and urgent world' (20) into the mythical sanctum of 'the island, 
the encapsulated paradise' (131). Although withdrawal facilitates 
writing and nurtures the love-relationship, the problem for the 
narrator remains ' [h] ow to articula~e, within the -desperate 
exclusiveness of their love, the weight and madness of the 
violence surrounding them' (States, 158). By cultivating a space 
for aesthetic experimentation, the narrator has escaped his 
original sense of constriction -- but only to arrive ln yet 
another enclosure. In the same way, Philip goes beyond being 
~stuck' (55) in himself, but finds that he is emplaced in a 
different solitude, the lovers' retreat. This sanctum and 
writing's claustral realm arrest the ecstatic, world-extending 
propulsion of eros, which 'exposes one to an experience radically 
different from that of order, regularity, equilibrium, common 
sense': eros 'propels one towards the transgression of frontiers' 
( 231) It precipitates the interpenetration and emergence into 
each other of mutually exclusive domains i but by maintaining 
these domains in an unmediated opposition, the flight into 
enclosure suspends desire. 
(iii) The narrative: enantiodromia 
The ideal of an edenic lovers' sanctuary (an analogue for 
the notion of a self -contained site of artistic endeavour) is 
shown to be chimerical from the start, since it is always at risk 
of suffering intrusions by the outside world. For example, 
Melissa and Philip first make love in a hotel rumoured to contain 
a bomb. 'Are they not walking more deeply into danger with every 
step?' (States, 31) Philip wonders, while a footnote warns him 
about the 'pain and exposure and terror and chaos' (35) that is 
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likely to attend his adultery. Every refuge the lovers find 
afterwards is disturbed again by reminders of the political 
turmoil imperilling their liaison. As Melissa exclaims, '[A]ll 
around us the country's burning, the troops are massing 
(63). Yet a curious change 
which parallels Brink's 
[t]here's no security in our love' 
occurs as the text advances, one 
reinscription of the antithesis between writing and violence. 
Where love and violence were first seen as polar opposites 
negating each other, they are described as 'meeting, 
intersecting, reinforcing one another' such that each discovers 
'something of the other in the self' ( 184) . Where 'violence' 
embodied the principle contrary to 'love', it.informs the lover's 
ekstatic movement to the Other and agaipst dangerous constraining 
forces. And where 'violence' impl·ied the absence of communality, 
it now suggests an ekstatic positing -of a- loving- agora, as is 
evident in the campus demonstration in which the separate areas 
of individual consciousness, political violence and sexual 
ecstasy are described as converging into a continuum. More 
specifically, the violence of political assertion or saying 
(having a demonstration) is countered by the violence of unsaying 
(the riot squad waiting to charge) i the violence of this ekstasis 
issues into a loving unity (continuity with others). In the mass, 
Melissa enters 'a kind of ecstasy' (182) i alongside her, Philip 
is in a state of transport: 
There is no 'I' or 'you' lefti they are no longer a 
thousand individuals standing there: in the simplicity 
of this singing all separateness is transcended. No 
sentiment or thought or conviction is located 'inside' 
anyone anymore: they have been transformed into pure 
energy, a single, vast electric field (183). 
In this merging of love and violence, sexual transgression and 
political conflict, the lovers emerge from their former 
irisulari ty into the public space of history, ethical 
responsibility and mortality. Each lover is in relation to the 
other a liminal figure mediating between interiority and 
exteriority, the opening onto the agora's openness rather than 
the limit sealing off a circumscribed domain of privatized 
intimacy. 
From closure to 'the openness ... of a country for which the 
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future is still possible' (States/ 244) 1 from the opposition 
between categories to their intersection: the crossover from Same 
to Other happens not only at th~-outer borders of the-lovers' 
'encapsulated paradise' (131) but in the very interior of their 
union, where it takes place as the piercing of a figurative 
hymen. Enraptured by Melissa, Philip ruptures the boundaries 
between himself and the Other: no longer keeping otherness 
defensively at bay by remaining 'stuck' in himself/ he breaks his 
'silence' (31) with an ekstatic discourse. Melissa likewise 
ensures that 'her "silence" remained impenetrable' ( 144) despite 
Philip's sexual penetration. Traumatized by a past rape, she 
retains her virginity or 'innocence' which the narrator 
defines as 'a state of mind' (144) 1 as ,a system of psycholbgical 
defences -- by disavowing the shock of the intrusion into her 
body. 'Innocence' is a condition of numbness. In reaction to the 
rape Melissa withdraws behind a· ·hymenal ·barrier 1 'distancing 
herself from whatever was happening to her body [so that] she was 
was -never really · involved' ( 144) ; in response to a traumatic 
overload, she denies its reality/ meaning that 'in her deepest 
experience nothing had happened' ( 145) in excess there is 
deficiency. In short 1 her 'innocence' is predicated on the· 
diffusion of danger emanating from the Other/ and on an 
inhabitation of a paradisal garden in which she is 'without 
history 1 weightless' ( 131) . However I weeping 'uncontrollably' 
during an orgasm, 'she fully inhabited her body' and so 'offered 
herself to love which also meant exposing herself to the 
possibility of being hurt/ betrayed/ wounded to the quick' (145). 
She crosses the distance she had held between 'herself' and her 
body/ the target of aggression and a source of empowerment. She 
risks assuming the historicity of her specific embodiment/ that 
is 1 her past engagement with trauma and her exposure to ~ the 
prospect of future suffering. At the same time as Melissa comes 
to terms with her mortality/ she welcomes alterity 1 no longer 
suspending the Other in a de-realized form with the aim of pre-
empting injury. Crucially the combination of welcoming alterity 
and knowing mortality concludes her introverted 'silence' (144) 
in a fit of crying. Hymenal innocence is thus a polysemous trope 
for disavowed experience/ in the same way as the hymen evolves 
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into its opposite to embrace meanings normally disjunct from it. 
Paraphrasing Derrida, the narrator notes that the term 'hymen' 
refers to the 'vaginal membrane' and coitus: '[t]he word that 
signifies separation, division, boundary, also signifies the 
transgression of the boundary, the celebration of unity' (103). 
In other words the experience of the lovers, and the semantic 
reversals in the terms which exemplify their experience, 
demonstrate the concept of enantiodromia, 'the turning of each 
thing into its opposite' (McFarlane, 1976, 84). 
(iv) The narration: apophasis 
While the narrated love-relationship is governed by the 
principle of enantiodromia, the self~reflexively foregrounded 
level of its narration is . subjected to a similar change. At 
first, the narrator concentrates on the internal procedures of 
fiction-making in order to avert his gaze from- his perilous 
context, but the repressed violence returns to be re-enacted in 
the asylum of literary form itself. Janus looks away from terror, 
but simultaneously stares back at it in fascination the 
silence caused by violence (the absence of writing) is replaced 
by discourse, yet discourse subsequently revisits violence and 
death. When one is located within the scene of violence, Shoshana 
Felman observes, one undergoes the loss 'of voice, of life, of 
knowledge, of awareness, of truth, of the capacity to feel, of 
the capacity to speak' (1992, 231) The narrator tries to ward 
off this loss. Scheherezade-like, his 'episodes, character 
sketches, trial runs' (States, 104) delay an impending lapse 
into silence. 'That,' after all, 'is what novels are about,' he 
quotes Fuentes as saying: 'the postponement of death' (205) He 
concurs. 'Perhaps our most basic drives are those directed 
towards countering, or negating, or rebelling against [the 'sense 
of an ending'] , ' he declares, mentioning ' [a] rt, love, work, 
religion, language, sex' as examples of deferral, '[e]ven if each 
of them ends up by confirming what it has set out to deny' (17-
18) . 
The significance of this qualification should not be 
overlooked. Not only does it underscore the processes of 
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enantiodromia at work in States, but in so far as Brink inverts 
the relation between violence and writing, it provides an 
invaluable description of the reversals informing the rest of his 
fictions as well. Enantiodromia, in other words, is related to 
the principle of deferred action on which his novelistic forms 
are frequently based. Inasmuch as his narratives return 
cyclically (and compulsively) to the traumas on which they open, 
one may schematize their structures even more by thinking of them 
as describing sequentially the subversion of the opposition 
between 'violence' and 'writing'. As such, the text which, at 
first, sustains itself in opposition to 'ending' (States, 17), 
death and the termination of discourse, returns through a 
sidelong, crayfish-like, Janus-f~ced m?vement to assimilate the 
trauma it sought to evade -- each thing turns to and merges with 
its contrary since the textual supplement to trauma adds onto it 
(a series of additions progresses away from their founding term) 
while compensating for an anterior. deficiency (the series of 
additions loops back to its first term). Again: 'writing' 
maintains a rigid distinction between its aesthetic self-
enclosure and the 'violence' outside itself, but insidiously 
comes to engage with 'violence', in that non-violent 'writing' 
turns into a form of 'violence' i thus, as an act of 'violence', 
'writing' is embroiled in an agon between the violence of its 
ekstatic saying (a shattering of circumscribed forms) and the 
violence of unsaying (an imposition of delimited forms) Like 
tv1ynhardt, 'driving into in against [himself]' (RR, 415) as he 
heads towards the looming disaster, the violent 'writing' 
confronts exterior violence but finds 'something of the other [of 
'violence'] in the self' (States, 184). Like the crayfish/ 'not 
knowing it is already dead' yet 'claw[ing] its way' (Actr 626) to 
a deferred consciousness of the death it missed/ 'writing' 
postpones ending and evades 'violence' yet 'ends up by confirming 
what it set out to deny' (States, 18). In the otherness of 
violence/ it discovers something of the self: the death it missed 
through its evasive tactics. Tfie inclination of each thing to 
' 
turn into its opposite hence implies that, firstly r writing 
recognises the violence of its own ekstatic desire ln the 
violence facing it from the outside, and that, secondly, writing 
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becomes conscious of the death or 'ending' it tried to disavow. 
The principle of enantiodromia -- enacted in the double movements 
of deferred action, a process confirming what it denies and 
mediating the antithesis of Same and Other by showing the Same to 
contain elements of the Other -- is consequently a principle of 
self-consciousness. 'Writing' recognises itself in 'violence', 
and by acknowledging implicit concordances between the inside and 
outside, Same and Other, it inwardises exteriority. As a result, 
'writing' experiences 'violence' within itself, allowing the 
writer to become conscious of the violence of his ekstatic desire 
and of the death he failed to encounter: he becomes conscious of 
himself as a mortal, desiring subject within and by means of his 
writing. 
In short, writing shows him his mortality and the ekstatic 
violence of his desire. His saying of the said, his assertion of 
a self-extending voice, is an act of breaking through the world-. 
contracting counterforces of exterior violence which press him 
into an enclosure; by entering this agon he necessarily puts his 
self~possession (his authorial control over the meanings of his 
text) at risk and, increasingly aware of what he has to lose, and 
how tenuous his hold over it really is, he is made of aware of 
his mortal finitude, something of which he previously tried to 
remain oblivious. That is, he denies the 'ending' (States, 17) of 
his discourse by waging a struggle, yet in placing himself in 
danger, he confirms, for himself, his capacity to end and shatter 
into' nothingness. For himself: in States of Emergency the 
narrator self-reflexively foregrounds the act of saying the said, 
as if by bringing it into greater relief, and making it visible 
to him, he were 'stepping back' from his saying the better to 
view it and pose it before himself. In the same way, then, as 
Descartes (according to Heidegger) finds certainty of self by 
placing his doubting thoughts before his theoretical gaze as the 
the evidence which convinces him that he exists indubitably ('I 
think, therefore I am'), the narrator places his ekstasising 
enunciation/s before himself as a Vor-stellung in which he can 
recognise himself in the action of ekstasising, 'doubting', or 
otherwise negating the determinate forms surrounding him. 
'[E]very "I represent {I pose before myself} something" 
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simultaneously represents a 11 myself 11 {poses me before myself},' 
Heidegger writes (in Borch-Jacobsen, 1991, 54) : the subject 
projects an object and introjects it when he sees himself as a 
subject over there' in the object. Saying is therefore an 
ekstasis of given form, but it is also an expressing or 
exteriorization specifically of the subject. It lS an 
autoenunciation -- that is to say, an enunciation Qy and of a 
subject, and an ekstatic action by which the subject dis-places 
himself from his compact or constricted 'unity' with himself to 
exteriorize and pose him before himself in the statements he 
utters. As Borch-Jacobsen says, the speaker projects 'himself 
11 0utside 11 himself in the utterance of the statement where he 
(re) presents himself' (1991, 189) . Foll,owing this autoenunciati ve 
model of language, when the narrator of States reflects 
emphatically on the act of utterance, he is-simply underscoring 
the way in which a-speaker 'normally' views himself reflexively 
in the statements presenting or expressing him to the Other. 
So, writing is initially disabled by violence, but by 
subsequently maintaining itself in opposition to violence, it 
succeeds in developing its own procedures; like the crayfish 
which stays alive a little longer by forgetting its death, yet 
which moves to knowledge of death, writing describes a trajectory 
of deferred action in which opposites merge into each other and 
writing experiences violence within itself. Furthermore, the 
narrator draws attention to the vicissitudes of saying in order 
to heighten his (self)consciousness of his ekstatic shattering 
into death. By actively placing before himself 'the violence of 
[his] articulation' (AVFL, 37), the narrator recognises the 
principle of his own eros an impulsion 'towards the 
transgression of frontiers' (States, 231) in his 
rapturous/rupturous saying: he comes to know violence, the 
violence of desire, and to recognise himself in and as it. That 
the subject poses specifically violent enunciation/s 'in front 
of' himself is corroborated by Brink's article, 'An act of 
violence' (1991) . Arguing against what he perceives as the 
'traditional' (33) notion of literature as a safe haven from the 
dangers of conflict, he contends that 'literature as a body and 
as a phenomenon, and each individual poem, play or novel 
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separately, [is] a subtle and complex set of responses to . . . the 
violence of "the world"' (34). Retreat lS one such response, but 
since it implies, contrary to his stated intentions, that 
literature lS a nonviolent refuge, he refines his position. 
'[T]he literary text,' he emends, 'is not merely a [nonviolent] 
response to violence, or even a subsuming [and hence a 
suspension] of violent impulses in an otherwise serene narrative 
package, but is itself an act of violence' (36). To stress that 
his argument does not 'concern only representations of processes 
of violation' (39), which would suggest that violence lS the 
represented content of a proposition whose utterance is itself 
free of violence, Brink declares that 'what is important lS not 
only the articulation of violenc~ but the violence of 
articulation' (37). 'It is an action,' he claims, ~directed in 
the first instance against the very notion of "authority"' --not 
particular invidious manifestations of it, 'but, ln Platonic 
terms, the_idea of authority' (39), which withdraws behind every 
instance it supplies of itself. This 'sanctioning authority [is] 
ultimately a deity who determines what is "right"' (36), Brink 
adds, firmly situating 'the violence of a.rticulation 1 in the 
intersubjectivity of a struggle between a superior and a putative 
inferior. Their polemic ('from polemos war'; C. E. D.) is, once 
again, presented as the conflict between an expansive and a 
constrictive force. In this 'interpenetration between text and 
reader' (41), or (for our purposes) literary codes and speaking 
subject, 'text' seeks to conscript 'reader' into obeisance with 
its authoritatively codified meanings, while 'reader' penetrates 
'text's' space through an act of reinscription and re-
interpretation; by the same token, 'reader's' assimilation of 
'text' into his received categories lS disrupted when 'text' 
crosses its boundaries and calls these assumptions into question: 
systole meets diastole, diastole meets systole. 'Reader' , or 
narrator, is, crucially, put at risk, placed in crisis. To recall 
the contradictory implications identified in the metaphoric of 
invasion, the victim is opened up and shut in, exposed without 
the protection of inner sanctuary (since the latter has been 
disrupted or called into question by the aggressor) , and interned 
without self-extension (circumscribed, that is, by an 
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authoritative determination) . Entering the polemos necessarily 
entails that one puts oneself at risk; and as the conflict 
escalates one must needs take increasing risks, a predicament 
which brings home to one with ever-shriller urgency how much one 
stands to lose and how frangible one's being in fact is. Thus 
Philip's ekstatic speech causes him 'terror' since his desire for 
self-projection into alterity is accompanied by his 'readiness to 
risk everything' (States, 55) , while the narrator pictures 
himself as a Macbethian figure who has no choice but to continue 
with the 'violence of [his] articulation' (AVFL, 37), violence 
which distances him ever-further from the shore's safety (that 
is, his enclosed identity) and launches him into.conflict~bound 
to take his life. 'I've stepped in blqod so far' (States, 104), 
he laments, that should he wade no more, returning were as 
tedious as to go o' er. 21 
Through the self-reflexive form of States of Emergency, the 
narrator poses before himself his implication in a mortal agon. 
More specifically, he poses himself before himself precisely-as 
a desiring subject prepared to violate his boundaries and 
(inasmuch as ekstasis involves the 'terror' of risking his being) 
to shatter into death. The death which he risks in this context 
is his death in the signifier. He undertakes a passage from a 
condition in which he is apparently self- identical and self-
possessed, in control of his text's meanings, to one in which his 
significations are re-defined by authoritative codes -- codes 
which circumscribe him and put his self -understanding of his 
meanings into question. In other words, the subject 'solidifies 
into a signifier' (Lacan, 1977b, 199) inscribed in a particular 
symbolic system. 'The signifier ... makes manifest the subject of 
its signification,' Lacan explains, '[b]ut it functions as a 
signifier only to reduce the subject in question to being no more 
than a signifier, to petrify the subject (1977b, 207). The 
narra-tor's appearance in a signifier, his autoenunciati ve 
e~ressing of himself, is thus accompanied by his disappearance, 
for 'when the subject appears somewhere as meaning, he is 
manifested elsewhere as "fading", as disappearance' (Lacan, 
1977b, 218). The enunciating subject and the subject of the 
statement pro-jected before him simultaneously coalesce and 
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divide; as such, his appearance in the statement 'in front of' 
himself marks his disappearance, while, oddly enough, this 
disappearance is simultaneously the appearance ·(note Lacan' s use · ·· ·· ·· --
of 'manifested') of the subject as a void constituted by his 
tendency to ekstasise into no-thingness, that is, to go beyond or 
transgress every delimited form of himself until he is no-thing, 
no given signifier. It lS precisely 'in this movement of 
disappearance that I have called lethalr' Lacan reiterates, that 
'the subject manifests himself' (1977b, 207-8). So an appearance 
is a disappearance, while a disappearance is an appearance: each 
thing turns into the other, discovering something of the self in 
the other. That is to say, as the subject appears ln the 
statement, striving, Scheherazade-like,, to evade ending (closure 
and death), he undergoes that very same 'lethal' disappearance 
(Lacan, 1977b, 208). Yet while suffering this disappearance in 
which his mortality is revealed to himself, he also manifests 
himself to himself as one who 1 broaching self-containment in an 
ekstatic act of saying and thereby exposing himself to the danger 
of such a fatal disappearance, is propelled by 'the readiness to 
risk everything' (States, 55) . Eros, driving him towards the 
transgression of existential frontiers, 
as much a source of 'terror' (States r 
approaches him from the outside 
is life-endangering, and 
55) as the menace which 
world. Therefore, his 
disappearance into signifying orders exterior to himself reveals 
not only the threat which these orders hold (they 'petrify' him; 
Lacan 1977b, 207), but the threat which his own self-extensive 
desire holds for him in that it impells him into an agon with 
them; and, inasmuch as the subject 'is' his desire, 22 his 
disappearance manifests him to himself as a being who, heedless 
of self-preservative needs, emerges into a signifying order by 
plunging himself into states of emergency. In this way discourse 
'ends up by confirming [the ending] it has set out to deny' 
(States, 17-18) as much as it postpones ending, or the 
punctual moment of termination, it effects within itself ending 
as a process of undoing and disappearing, a process which is 
autoenunciatively posed before the speaking subject. 
If art and language, according to the narrator of Statesr 
confirm in fact what they ostensibly deny/ they are forms of 
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apophasis, which is the rhetorical 'device of mentioning a 
subject by stating that it will not be mentioned' (C. E. D.): it 
involves an '[a]ffirming by apparent denial, a stressing through 
negation' (Cuddon, 1979, 52). A famous example is the Verneinung, 
or defence of negation, which Freud identified in the speech of 
his patients. Should the analysand say, '"You ask who this person 
in the dream can be. 
to: "So it is his 
hypothesis, however, 
embracing language in 
It's not my mother,"' Freud 'changes this 
mother'" (1925, 437). The narrator's 
applies to more than isolated statements, 
toto -- irrespective of their content, all 
statements in this view are apophantic allusions to the 
unutterability from which they emerge and with which they will 
merge. So if writing is the surmounting of inertial counterforces 
to silence, a negation, it is a negation which insistently refers 
to and aligns itself with that which it repudiates: if to write 
or to speak is to live and to appear to oneself, speech and 
writing insidiously manifest their other in themselves. 
In States of Emergency the notion of text as an apophantic 
reference to violent context is shown most clearly in the case of 
the novella sent to the narrator by the character Jane Ferguson. 
Initially, it appears to be a love story notable only for the 
striking absence of political themes when all about the country 
is beset with strife. But the absence proves to be apophantic, an 
affirmation by negation of Ferguson's engagement in the 
Emergency's severities. As if showing in reverse-order how a text 
overcomes a troubled context and therefore in turn 
demonstrating how an accomplished statement or 'masterful image' 
refers to its utterance in traumatic situations -- States begins 
by noting how anomalous Ferguson's text is, and how enigmatic her 
self-immolation, only to reveal later that her novella is rooted 
in her love affair with an activist who had died in police 
detention, and that the apparently apolitical love story is 
indeed intended as a monument to the activist's memory. In line 
with Benjamin's pronouncement that '[t]here is no document of 
civilization which is not at the same time a document of 
barbarism' (in Davies, 1990, v), her text emerges from violence 
to constitute a 'nonrepresentational testimony' (Felman, 1992, 
passim) to the anterior event of a murder; in addition, 
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Ferguson's text-- which she likens to '[w]ords of fire' (States, 
205), a figure combining the lovers' ardour with the intensity of 
the political struggle -- merges with the violence of 'ending' 
since she burns herself to death after completing the novella. 
Hers is hence a felicitous demise which suggests that death by 
fire lS part of an inexorable textual logic and the necessary 
outcome of her ekstatic, self-endangering utterance of '[w]ords 
of fire'. 
Ferguson's novella exemplifies the process through which 
'the text detaches itself from the world in order finally to be 
restored, in a changed form, to the world' (States, 75): that is, 
her text's negation, or detachment from, the Emergency amounts to 
an apophantic presencing of the Emerge~cy. As the narrator says, 
'Every story can be traced back to a trigger character or 
episode, 1 although these 'may not even apDear in the final text' 
(7) . 'What assumes the form, at the moment [of composition], of 
an agglomeration of citations will eventually ... be absorbed by 
that text to exist only ... as "mirages"' (205) . Statement is the 
surmounting of an enunciatory situation. Yet the latter persists 
in the statement in the negative, negated form of a 'mirage': it 
is mentioned in the mode of not-being-mentioned, it is made 
present in that which is predicated on its disappearance, it is 
negated, yet preserved in an altered, voided form. In its fiery 
assertion of life, love and writing, Ferguson's text is premised 
on the supersession of the antagonistic principles of death, the 
loss of love, and the silencing of the activist. However, it is 
also a testament to the activist's fate in the cells. As such, 
Ferguson's text insists that that which has been negated in the 
process of composition is nonetheless present -- present as a 
'mirage', as the activist's ghostly lineaments. In the text's 
affirmation of life, text points back to death; in the lover's 
discourse, death speaks. 
What applies to cases presented in the narrated diegesis of 
States of Emergency applies to the travail of its narration. If 
the narrative sketches, meditations on craftsmanship, literary 
critical commentaries, fragmentary structure and other self-
reflexive devices chart a prospectus for the novel the narrator 
wants to write, and so signal a strengthening capacity for 
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production, isn 1 t it. self-evident that writing about writing and 
deferring the completed work to a future occasion is a 
reiteration as well of a present inability to write? Isn 1 t it the 
case that this formal introversion -- termed 'narcissisticJ by 
Linda Hutcheon and others23 -- is matched step for step by the 
registration of the disablement threatening that apparent 
'narcissism 1 and self-regarding aestheticism? Aren 1 t these 
metafictional strategies, that is to say, apophantic, 
highlighting the effects of violence with the same gesture by 
which the narrator had hoped to neutralise them, and reiterating 
his anxiety with every attempt at escape? Moreover, as his escape 
attempts multiply and his notes accumulate (an empirical volume 
which, one might imagine, would indicate a growing mastery over 
his perilous circumstances), courts a new danger, namely, 'the 
danger intrinsic to the story-telling act: having committed 
oneself to it, there is no turning back. Which is why I still 
insist that this is only a preliminary exploration, a testing of 
possibiliti~s 1 (65) Yet his insistence betrays a fear that 
writing may end up by 'confirming [the danger] it has set to. 
deny 1 (18) and replicate its negated other. What is this danger? 
Through his pun on ·'commitment 1 the narrator refers to the perils 
of commitment to an adulterous relationship, the dangers of a 
literary engagement with political struggle, and the hazards of 
writing itself. As we have seen in the discussion of the narrated 
love story, to embark on a love affair is ultimately to enter the 
alterior space of the Emergency which exposes one 'to the 
possibility of being hurt, betrayed, wounded to the quick 1 (145). 
But what have narration and the Emergency 1 s violence in common, 
particularly when 'violence 1 and 'writing 1 have been regarded as 
mutually exclusive? On the one hand, the narrator claims that his 
writing must continue as stopping would leave 'only that other 
inextricable weaving of a land in flames 1 (104), repeating the 
idea that writing sets itself in opposition to a violent worldi 
on the other hand, writing also advances implacably through 
annihilation: the narrator must carry on 'because I 1 ve stepped in 
blood so far 1 (104), implying that through his writing, he has 
become. e~oiled in a polemos in which he is both an aggressor and 
... 
victim. 
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(v) Death of the author 
Violence overloads, blinds, disintegrates, and paralyses the 
subject into a retracted form imposed on him. In the disaster, 'I 
am wrested from myself' for its contingencies strike at me as a 
categorical target rather than 'the unique being I would like to 
be' : 'I am he whom anyone at all can replace, the 
nonindispensable by definition' (Blanchot, 1986, 18) By 
precipitating the death of the author, writing enacts a similar 
fall into nonindispensability and delimitation. 
Barthes' famous essay on this topic addresses several issues 
the canonical privilege traditional literary scholarship has 
given the institution of authoria1ity, the principles of 
bourgeois property relations granting private ownership of the 
text to a juridically defined person, as well as the 'metaphysics 
of subjectivity'. According to Taylor, the latter has been the 
foundation of modern Western philosophy ever since Descartes 
maintained 'that the subject's relation to -all otherness is 
mediated by and derived from its relationship to itself' (1986, 
3). The subject, Taylor explains, is 'the first principle from 
which everything arises and to _which all must be reduced or 
returned' for it is the 'locus of certainty and truth' (3). 
Similarly, Barthes' author is the mythical original or 'final 
signified' (1988a, 171) underlying the text's diversity, such 
that the 'explanation of a work is always sought in the man or 
woman who produced it' (168). In this mystified logic, the author 
absorbs the other of textuality. He is the source, owner and 
final court of appeal for determid$ the meaning of the text, 
which is illumined in signification thanks to an imaginary or 
expressive continuity with the author's interiority. Conversely, 
the text is a Vor-stellung, reflecting back to the author the 
mirror-image he has posed before himself. But the image does not 
'take' on the textual surface. The portrait's narcissistic 
uniqueness is eroded by the effects of symbolic articulation, so 
that the mirror is shown to be an anamorphosis disclosing a 
memento mori much like that found ln Holbein's The Ambassadors: 
Lacan notes in his discussion of this painting that as you turn 
to leave its specular gratification, 'you apprehend in this form 
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... What? A skull' (1977b, 88). What the authorial subject poses 
before himself is the enantiodromia of an appearance of himself 
to himself in which he disappears, and a disappearance of himself 
which, nevertheless, 'appears' before him. 
Barthes' deconstruction of authoriality proceeds from the 
premise of Saussurean linguistics that the subject is not the 
origin or guarantor of the meaning of his statements, but is a 
function of the linguistic system which inscribes him in it as a 
speaking subject. That is to say, subjectivity does not precede 
discourse -- for Benveniste, '"Ego" is he who says "ego"' (1971, 
224), while for Barthes the subject speaks only within an 
autonomous network of cultural codes which precedes him, and. 
which exceeds his efforts to control, linguistic meanings. The 
'inner "thing"' the subject seeks ... to "translate" is only a 
ready-formed dictionary, its words only explainable through other 
words (Barthes, 1988a, 170), for subjectivity is always~ 
already written into discourse as 'the wake of all the codes 
which constitute me' (Barthes, 1974, 10) . The author, Barthes 
says, 'is never more· than the instance writing, just as .l is 
nothing other than the instance saying .l' (1988a, 169). 
Barthes' reference is to Benveniste's essays on subjectivity 
1n language, in particular to the latter's assertion that each 
use of the personal pronoun .l does not signify on every occasion 
the same lexical entity. 'There is no concept "I" that 
incorporates all the .l's that are uttered in the mouths of all 
speakers, in the sense that there is a concept "tree" to which 
all the individual uses of tree refer' (Benveniste, 1971, 226). 
Instead, the .l is "solely a "reality of discourse' (218) -- a 
'mobile sign' (220), it is one of the 'empty' forms (219) of 
discourse (along with shifters like deictics and distinctions in 
tense) which receive a 'momentary reference' ( 22 6) only in 
relation to the specific discursive context in which they are 
spoken. '.l signifies "the person who is uttering the present 
instance of the discourse containing .l"' (218), Benveniste 
writes. Were it not for these shifters or 'empty' forms, each 
speaker would ideally be obliged to invent a language to suit his 
or her circumstances, so that 'there would be as many languages 
as individuals' (220). However, it is the case that language 'is 
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so organized that it permits each speaker to appropriate to 
himself an entire language by designating himself as X' (226). 
What lS important to Barthes is Benveniste's suggestion that 
individuals do not themselves constitute their subj ecti vi ties 
when writing, but insert themselves into pre-existing subject-
positions available in discourse. 
The crucial difference between Barthes and Benveniste turns 
upon the distinction between . speech and writing. Benveniste 
accentuates the way in which 'empty' forms acquire determinable 
reference in specific 'instances of discourse' (217), while the 
enunciations which concern Barthes subvert attempts to 
their reference. For Benveniste, shifters like here 
now and then, and I and you, are 'defined only with 
the instances of discours~ in which they occur' (226), 
say, in 'the discrete and always unique acts by 
ascertain 
and there, 
respect to 
that is to 
which the 
language is actualized in speech by a speaker' (217). Speech 
gives shifters content. 
But Barthes puts forward a very different view in a segment 
of Roland Barthes titled 'The shifter as utopia'. Discussing a 
postcard with the message, 'Monday. Returning tomorrow. Jean-
Louis', he remarks, 
[I]f Jean-Louis knows perfectly well who he is and on 
what day he is writing, once his message is in my hands 
it is entirely uncertain: which Monday? which Jean-
Louis? How would I be able to tell, since from my point 
of view I must instantly choose between more than one 
Jean-Louis and several Mondays? I speak [as a 
writer] but I wrap myself in the mist of an 
enunciatory situation which is unknown to you [as a 
reader] (1977, 165-6) . 
The inscription of speech negates the self-enclosure in which the 
subject is self-certain and in conti!luity with the signs he 
emits, signs having a univocal meaning thanks to their proximity 
with the speaker who serves as their guarantor. Distanced from 
' himself by the inscription on a postcard, however, and thus no 
longer posing himself before himself in a circuit of self-
reflexivity, the author of the message loses his self-identity 
while his meaning becomes indefinite. The transition announces 
the beginning of the textuality and writing celebrated by post-
structuralists, for writing is an ekstasis of 'signalization' 
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which, according to Derrida, 'is always enveloped within the 
regional limits of nature, life and the soul' (1978, 12). Derrida. 
maintains that the inscription of speech frees meaning from the 
constraint of univocality and 'from the natural predicament in 
which everything refers to the disposition of a contingent 
situation' (12). He says, more pointedly, that it is 'when that 
which is written is deceased as a sign~signal that it is born as 
language; for then it says what is, thereby referring only to 
itself, a sign without signification since it ceased to be 
utilized as natural, biological or technical information, or as 
the transition from a signifier to a signified' (12). 
Barthes' own formulation in 'The death of the author' is 
strikingly similar. 'As soon as a fact ~s narrated no longer with 
a view to acting directly on reality but intransitively, that is 
tO Say, I he declareS, 'finally OUtSide Of any function Other than 
that of the practice of the symbol, this disconnection occurs, 
the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death, 
writing begins' (1988a, 168). 
And as writing commences, various privileged terms are 
dispossessed by their other -- speech is inscribed, univocality 
yields indeterminacy, bounded territory 'enveloped within 
regional limits' and 'wrap [ped] in its own mist' opens its 
borders to a hazardous exteriority, the self-proximate is 
distanced from itself, the centrifugal gives way in Barthes' 
imagery to flight, migration, dispersion, irrevocable departures 
and scattered ashes, while life is negated, only to return as the 
birth of the reader and the text. Writing dislocates 
'subjectivity at rest in itself and contemplating its own images' 
(Sartre, 1986, 296); text 'takes my body elsewhere, far from my 
imaginary person, toward a kind of memoryless speech which is 
already the speech of the People' (Barthes, 1977, 3) . 'What 
summons us to write,' Blanchot contends, 'is the attraction of 
(pure) exteriority' (in Taylor, 1986, 32) 
If the text's semiotic plurality emerges as an ekstatic 
outward crossing of borders, the determination of meaning is a 
constrictive inward movement. The narrator of States of Emergency 
regrets that the name of his central female character 'will be 
invaded and tarnished by meanings' so that its evocation of 
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'limitless possibilities will be reduced to a circumscribed set 
of codes' ( 14) . What should have remained 'undetermined and 
intact' will be snuffed out by being made 'accomplished and 
forgettable' (15). A lovers' enclosure is 'invaded by meaning' 
and vulgarised as an 'affair': 'Through the intrusion of language 
this experience can now be compared to others', implying that the 
incomparable 'can _be defined, circumscribed .... Decay sets in' 
(132). Less and less can the narrator's love story 'be regarded 
as exclusive, insular, unique' (103). 'To love' implies 'I love 
you, here, now' ( 103) , he says. 'But this 11 I 11 , this "you", this 
"love" : do they not already include all my own previous 
experience of love, and yours, and of all others who have been 
involved in it? An entire history and l~terary tradition converge 
ln us' (103) According to Barthes, the text suffers the 
'subjugation' (1974, 9) of connotation, which limits it to 'a 
circumscribed group of privileged signifieds' (Silverman, 1983, 
3 0) . The text's denotative signs (the sign is the union of 
signifier and signified) are a base for a 'second-order 
semiological system' (Barthes, 1972, 123) in which they become 
connotative signifiers. Each is linked to 'anterior, ulterior, or 
exterior mentions, to other sites of the text (or of another 
text) ' (Barthes, 1974, 8) which are their signifieds. That is, 
each connotative signifier 'represents a digression outside of 
the text to an established body of knowledge [from which it draws 
its signified] ' (Silverman, 1983, 31) . The connotative signifier 
is 'the starting point of a code' ( 1974, 9) , Barthes says, 
defining literary codes as 'so many fragments of something that 
has always been already read, seen, done, experienced' (20) . They 
are 'systems of literary knowledge possessed by the reader [and] 
inscribed in the literary community to which he belongs' (1977, 
97), and in the course of reading the text lS assimilated by 
these 'deja-vu models' (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983, 123) The codes are 
systemacities of conventionalized meaning which structure the 
text's reading, steering it in pre-ordained directions by 
assigning habitual and seemingly natural or compulsory signifieds 
to connotative signifiers. In short, they close the text in a 
'nauseating mixture of common opinions, a smothering layer of 
received ideas' (Barthes, in Silverman, 1983, 31) that 'are so 
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worn we take them to be marks of nature' (Barthes 1 1988b, 192). 
Thus the narrator says, 'At every moment meanings tumble 
into this love from outside,' but adds that 'at the same time, 
from the inside, it keeps spilling over its own boundaries' 
(States, 103), dispersing its own specificity by embodying 
elements of the great love narratives which have preceded it. The 
change of perspective from inward to outward movement is 
significant in terms of the value which is placed on the codes. 
Where in one reading they impoverish meaning through the 
operations of connotation (as in Barthes' Mythologies, where 
connotation 'naturalises' historically specific ideologies), in 
another they afford access to the classic text's limited 
plurality/ becoming 'avenues of meanings' (Barthes, 1988b 1 173), 
. ' 
the 'beginnings of intertextuality' (193). This altered 
perspective is the result of 'a choice' -- a choice 'to live the 
text in its plurality' (Barthes, 1988b, 173) despite pressure 
toward restriction. In particular, Barthes' practice of 
interrupting the text's superficial continuity and 'the 
''naturalness" of ordinary language' (1974, 13) by dividing it 
into arbitrarily chosen lexias and so examining in 'slow motion' 
( 12) how the text produces meaning, is nothing less than a 
renewal of the entrances to the text' (13)/ sealed by received 
interpretations, for he postulates that 'everything signifies 
ceaselessly and several times' (12). That is, a plurality of 
codes overlap across the denotative sign, each translating it 
into a connotative signifier linked to 'anterior/ ulterior or 
exterior meantions' (1974 1 9). The codes create a 'stereophony' 
( 19 8 Bb 1 193) of meanings simultaneously resonating about the 
denotative sign. But the key point Barthes makes is that there is 
no basis on which to choose which is the 'true' one 1 since even 
the denotative meaning is emptied out as being merely 'the last 
of the connotations' (1974, 9). '[W]hat is specific to the text/ 
once it has attained the quality of a text, is to constrain us to 
the undecidability of the codes' since 'in an utterance, several 
codes and several voices are there/ without priority' writing 
'is precisely this loss of "motives" to the profit of a 
volume of indeterminations or overdeterminations' (1988b 1 194). 
That is why codes become 'departures of meaning, not arrivals' 
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(1988b, 174). They are the means by which texts spill over 
boundaries and are "plugged in' (1988b, 174) to other texts, 
even if the author of the text·had not foreseen them, and even 
if it was historically impossible for him to foresee them' (1981, 
3 7) . "What founds the text ... , Barthes maintains, .... is the 
outlet of the text onto other texts; what makes the text is the 
intertextual' (1988b, 174). One may say that intertextuality is 
the .... (pure) exteriority' (Blanchot, in Taylor, 1986, 32) into 
which the initially self-proximate disperses -- "pure', because 
severed from subjective self-reference. The intertext is a 
proliferation of "codes, formulae, rhythmic models, fragments of 
social languages' (1981, 39), anonymous "citations, references, 
[and] echoes' (1977, 160) which trav~rse the text as always a 
text-between-texts. And if the text, "destroyer of all subject, 
contains a subject to love, that subject is dispersed, somewhat 
like the ashes we strew into the wind after death' (Barthes, 
1971, 8-9). 
(vi) The art of dying 
Writing flees violence and the numbed subject seeks ekstasis 
instead of remaining "stuck' (States; 55) in himself; but writing 
is circumscribed by invasive codes, and the codes' capacity to 
withdraw the writing from itself into intertextuality intimates 
to the subject his imminent "ending' (17) and the time· of his 
non-being. The codes close in; beyond them one senses the era of 
the text's independence and the subject's death. While Melissa 
sleeps, oblivious to him, Philip looks ahead to ·this era in which 
the world will continue despite his absence and even its memories 
of his most desp~rate experiences will disappear. 'My love, my 
love,' he wonders, "will you remember, thirty years from now, 
when I am dead and you about as old as I am now, your lover of 
this deranged year?' ( 204) . Once again, what applies to the 
diegesis obtains at the level of its enunciation. "I have begun 
to write: surrounding my words lie the horizohs of their end' 
(17), the narrator says. Initially, formal introversion is an 
attempt to evade a numbing delimitation caused by dread of the 
Emergency. Yet as the text is elaborated, it sets up several 
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equivalences between the Emergency's effects and semiotic closure 
by the codes. The text's delay in producing a finalised, closed 
narrative is therefore a reiteration of its evasion of the 
Emergency; but at the same time the text's ' subjugation' 
(Barthes, 1974, 9) by the codes is unavoidable: closure, or 
' ending', is longer extra-territorial threat but is the no an 
intratextual threat towards which the text is headed even as --
or precisely as it tries to avoid it. As such, formal 
introversion implicitly affirms that which its function is to 
negate. 
Fragmentary writing, for instance, indicates at first the 
narrator's hesitation in committing the different narrative 
trajectories he plots to a non-contraqictory structure. 'Liking 
to find, to write beginnings, he tends to multiply this pleasure: 
that is why he writes fragments: so many fragments, so many 
beginnings, so many pleasures,' Barthes says of himself (1977, 
94). Since multiple beginnings keep the text in an indeterminate 
suspension, they are not beginnings at all. They are vacillations 
,·-· 
before the prospect of entering the rigour and synoptic totality 
of the Book, and of broaching the Emergency. Nonetheless, the act 
of 'branding the paper' implies that 'instead of unlimited 
potential, there are facts -- a presence, a thereness -- to be 
respected; or at the very least traces to be respected' (States, 
17). Freedom is insidiously impaired because 'one has to take 
responsibility' (17) for these traces; dispossessing the narrator 
of autonomy, it is the text (rather than the intention preceding 
writing) which asserts a logic of its own, establishing by 
dictate (and fortuity) which paths are to be followed, and which 
not. Consequently, the accumulation of 'beginnings' unwittingly 
affirms 'ending' since their encrustation of detail delimits the 
options available to one who seeks to nurture 'unlimited 
potential': the latter 'will be reduced to a circumscribed set of. 
codes' (14) beyond one's control. Having inadvertently committed 
oneself to writing, 'there is no turning back' (65) from a fatal 
destination. 
Brink demonstrates the lethal power of heteronomous 
definition in a showdown between the adulterous Philip and his 
wife. He 
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listens to the world she is conjuring up for him: a 
sordid affair in dark rooms, underground, dishonest, 
insignificant, perverse. Nothing of what she says is 
relevant to him. It cannot be Melissa and him she is 
talking about. (So detached does he feel that he finds 
time for a literary reflection. Lacan: ~It is the world 
of words that creates the world of things.') She is 
fabricating an existence wholly strange to him, a world 
that has no right or reason to exist (192) . 
Exposed to judgment by an outsider, the lovers' enclosure is 
negated in its lived reality and re-constituted in an-other's 
interpretive framework as ~an existence wholly strange to him' 
(192). As interior intimacy is displaced by an external 
determination, and the familiar rendered strange, the autonomous 
made heteronomous, Philip loses the basis of his self-certitude. 
After all, whose version is right?' Philip's status as an 
authorial guarantor of the ~original' meaning of his desire is 
undone. Can his authorship of an apparently privileged 
interpretation withstand the relentless restructuration of 
experience by the Other's discourse? Is he -- or someone else 
the master of his meaning? 
What is true? [he wonders.] Does that smooth cool room 
exist in which he was with Melissa but an hour ago, 
with its roughly plastered uneven walls, the crevices 
in the ceiling .... Does that bed exist, with its grey-
and-yellow duvet? The table with its pile of books ... ? 
Does the deserted garden exist, and this wood, and 
the night they first met? -- What happened that night? 
Did she come to him in his study? ... Did they spend 
the night in a hotel where a bomb might go off at any 
moment? He isn't sure: he can no longer tell. He 
doesn't know anything anymore (192-3). 
His doubts remove all substance from a once stable structure, 
erasing the lovers' room and then the diegetic world in which he 
is situated. To recall Scarry's discussion of torture and spatial 
imagery, his loss of self-projective and self-defining capacities 
is presented in terms of the collapse of space, a world-
contraction culminating in the obliteration of the contents of 
his consciousness -- ~He doesn't know anything anymore' ( 193) . 
His world contracted, the contents of consciousness dispelled, 
Philip is nullified into fictiveness by a displacing/emplacing 
discourse. But what delivers the coup de grace is the concluding 
narratorial interpolation: 
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There he stands, wondering whether Melissa's room, or 
the past, or memory exists. Whereas he himself doesn't 
exist! He owes the possibility of his own being to me 
as I sit here writing him into literary existence. 
(Does that make me exist?) ( 193) . 
Philip's inscription as a cipher in an-other's narrative order is 
made overt so as to emphasise his fictionality and thereby take 
to its logical extreme his disintegrative passage from a self-
subsistent reali~y existing for himself, to an unreal state in 
which he is no more than a 'paper X' (Barthes, 1977, 161) or a 
tissue of quotations' (Barthes, 1988a, 170), sustained by a 
meshing of semiotic codes. And as Philip's diegetic world loses 
its depth and rises to the surface formed by a layer of codes 
given by the Other, the narrator's own world of 'unlimited 
potential' projected before himself, into the diegesis 
correspondingly empties and retracts into a paper-thin surface 
marked by signifiers which will receive their signifieds not from 
him, but the Other. The reality of the narrator's existence, 
thus, also falls under suspicion ('Does that make me exist?'; 
193) he is as heteronomous as his fictional characters. 
' Here and elsewhere, foregrounding the fictiveness of the 
fiction is coupled with the narrator's underscoring of 'the 
danger intrinsic to the story-telling act' (65). Textual self-
reflexivity highlights -- or poses before the narrator as a 
Vorstellung -- his disappearance; it sharpens his awareness of 
the way that the text not only reports on violence, but enacts in 
its enunciation the transition from a state in which 'he is at 
one with himself [facing] the perfection of the yet unstarted 
narrative' (Blanchot, 1982, 84), to a realization that the ideal 
text he wants to write has been ossified by an accretion of 
meanings. He is thus brought to the terminal 'horizon' (States, 
17) beyond which it is the Other who invests words with meaning, 
not the Author. In Heidegger's formulation, the 'relation between 
death and language flashes up before us' (in Vattimo, 1988, 69). 
Formal introversion foregrounds the experience of dying in, as it 
were, the controlled environment of a text. 'Perhaps, ' the 
narrator muses, 
the concept of the island, like the concept of the 
novel as a rounded whole is not just a 
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manifestation of the urge to escape, to deny the world, 
to seek refuge from what you cannot handle, but the 
result of the need for self-preservation and survival. 
In which case the supreme irony is that on the island 
we recreate the conditions of the world we try to 
escape (204). 
In short, his textual strategy is to stay alive by evading death 
from the outside world, but to stay alive the better to die 
inside the text -- to stay alive in the face of death, to die 
while staying alive, and to live on his own terms the death which 
gestures blindly at him in the Emergency and paralyses writing. 
Efforts at self-preservation are 'circuitous pathfo death', 
Freud notes, for 'self-assertion' and 'mastery' are 'component 
instincts whose function it is to assure that the organism shall 
follow its own path to death, and to ward off any possible ways 
of returning to inorganic existence other than those which are 
immanent in the organism itself' (1984, 311). Con-fronted 
directly, violence halts writing. It can be approached only 
circuitously by way of artifices simulating terror for the 
subject,-- allowing him to pose before himself, within his own 
labours, that which initially resisted symbolic r~gistration, and 
to be present at his death, which, numbed, he would otherwise 
miss. 
VII. Clamour 
'While reasoning is a dialogue which acknowledges 
the opponent as a source of interests, claims and 
arguments/ violence can be described as a monologue, 
and in that sense it is mute and irrational' 
-- Johan Degenaar24 
I have argued that Brink's fictions testify to a reversal in 
which terror and violence are transformed from impediments to 
writing to the resources which empower literary production. 
Noting the way in which his narratives often follow the principle 
of deferred action, and so describe a sequence consisting in a 
self-protective departure from an initial scene of trauma and a 
cyclical revisitation of it (a revisitation in which the 
narrating subject undergo~s the death he missed)/ I suggested 
that this pattern may be seen schematically as representing a re-
inscription of the opposition between 'violence' and 'writing'/ 
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where 'violence' implies 'non-writing', and 'writing' implies 
'non-violence'. Focussing on States of Emergency as a text which 
exemplifies this process, I pointed out how 'writing', which at 
first maintains itself in distinction to the silence, ending and 
death associated with 'violence', insidiously confirms what it 
negates and thus replicates its other inside itself: non-violent 
writing participates in a polemos between the violence of saying 
and the violence of unsaying. As I said at the outset, States is 
concerned with the merging of antagonistic domains -- the domains 
of the Emergency and of aesthetic activity. 
Two points follow from this summary. The first is (again) 
schematic, but it will serve as a bridge to more complex 
inquiries. We have seen how the cate9ory 'writing' lS altered 
from the condition of 'non-violence' to 'violence', but we have 
yet to find out how the category 'violence' loses its exclusive 
characterisation as an example of 'non-writing' and becomes 
supportive of rather than oppositional to 'writing' In a sense, 
this has already been addressed: if writing is a form of 
violence, then obviously 'violence' reinforces 'writing'. But in 
another sense, these distinctions between 'violence' which, on 
the one hand, degrades writing in particular and more generally, 
relations between interlocutors, and 'violence' which promotes 
them on the other hand, represent a crucial component of Brink's 
meditations on violence which I have as yet not examined. 
The second point which follows from the preceding summary is 
this -- if States (taken as exemplary of processes operating in 
other of Brink's novels) foregrounds the criss-cross movement 
from 'maiming' to 'meaning' and 'meaning' to 'maiming', and hence 
stresses that completed statements are apophantic allusions to 
their derelict circumstances of enunciation, these statements, in 
particular Brink's statements about armed struggle and the 
effects of political violence on interpersonal relations, may be 
regarded as an indirect commentary on the practice of writing and 
may be examined in order to expand on the problems of utterance 
raised by States of Emergency. In short, the said the 
'masterful images' underlain by the 'rag-and-bone shop of the 
heart' -- can be considered to illuminate the dynamics of its 
saying. 
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What, then, indeed does Brink have to say about violence? As 
I noted earlier, the distinction between violence which debases 
relations between interlocutors, and violence which promotes 
them, occupies a crucial place in Brink's work. Not only does it 
inform a dominant theme concerning the armed struggle in South 
Africa, but if his thematic statements are viewed as reflections 
on the processes of writing, then Brink's analysis of the factors 
distinguishing legitimate militant resistance from less salutary 
violence can provide insight into the ways in which violence 
changes from a force inhibiting writing to one liberating it. In 
that case, what form do relations between speakers take when they 
are afflicted by violence, and what form when stimulated by it? 
From the commentary Brink supplies, wh~t analysis may one unpack 
of the interpersonal conditions prevailing in a state of terror? 
And as these conditions describe a general malaise which affects 
the practice of writing as well, what are the implications for 
writing? 
Brink's qualified endorsement of violence as politically 
necessary, and often even virtuous, is well known. A Chain of 
Voices and An Act of Terror, for example, are sophisticated 
apologias for urban terrorism and insurrectionary bloodshed, 
while in Rumours of Rain Franken is tried for his involvement in 
sabotage. The sophistication of the apologias resides in Brink's 
attempt to differentiate between violence which entrenches an 
'historical silence' (Dove, 11) between oppressors and oppressed, 
and violence which endeavours to re-open dialogue between them 
and shatter the 'historical silence' by affirming discursive 
exchange. The most trenchant formulation of this viewpoint (as 
well as other of Brink's key pre-occupations) is to be found in 
'The dove in the grave', a newspaper article he wrote in April 
1993 shortly after Chris Hani, then leader of the South African 
Communist Party, had been assassinated by a right-wing movement. 
Anguished by the renewed political polarization and upheaval 
which followed the assassination, and on the verge of being 
paralysed by 'the temptation of despair', Brink eulogises Hani, 
formerly the chief-of-staff of umKhonto we Sizwe, as a soldier 
and a Shakespeare enthusiast who had set an influential example 
inasmuch as he harmonised the 'sword and word' (Dove, 11). Hani 
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was a man of action inspired by the conviction that we shall not 
1 i ve by the sword alone but by the word' ; he managed to 
'reconcile in himself these two urges normally regarded as 
incompatible' (11). Unlike Bani's use of violence, that practised 
by his assassins is 'mindless' ( 11) : his murder 'negated the 
voice of reason itself' and returned the forces of 'sword and 
word' to 'their initial positions of antagonism, mutual exclusion 
and otherness 1 (11). The implication, then, is that word and 
sword need not inevitably be opposed to each other the 
opposition can be displaced to appear within the category 
'violence' as a distinction between violence in which 'the word, 
the mind and the nobler achievements of the human spirit' (11) 
are advanced, and violence perpetuating, retaliation and reprisal. 
The former ideally introduces a centripetal tendency to social 
unanimity, abolishing itself as it ?Chieves an eventual 'triumph 
of reason over violence' (11); the latter fragments the body 
politic into the anomie of a Hobbesian war of each against all. 
It ruins 'the word', fomenting an 'incomprehensible clamour' (11) 
instead. 
'What seems like a dark wave has broken over South Africa; 
and all the space of experience appears invaded by an 
incomprehensible clamour of rage, pain and fear' ( 11) , Brink 
writes, reprising the motifs which convey the subject's sense of 
ethical and cognitive impairment in the disaster. Violence is a 
deluge or ungraspable excess, violence is a disturbance of 
vision. Above all, it is an invasion of a closed space and an 
agora. As such the apparent extroversion of the conflict -- a 
'clamour of rage, pain and fear' -- is belied by the antagonists' 
retreat into an isolating, socially atomising hyperemotionality. 
It is precisely this estrangement from others which Brink views 
as 'the core of the historical silence lurking in the heart of 
the present clamour' ( 11) . The assassins' 'mere mindless 
violence' 'invades' 'the word', hollows out its interior, and 
leaves behind a void of 'silence', so that language retains only 
the debased form of a 'ctamour' ( 11) . What is subtracted from 
'the word' is reciprocal interaction between speakers, who 
withdraw instead into their own troubled bodiliness. In the 
babble everyone speaks past each other, missing one another in 
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their delirium. If 'mindless violence' (unlike its supposed 
counterpart, 'mindful violence') instigates a 'clamour' -- if 
'clamour' lacks a vital feature of 'proper' language, if the lack 
turns language into a virtual 'silence' then this is another 
way of pointing to the profoundly flawed relations between self 
and other which obtain in a condition of violent engagement. In 
spite of outward clamour, these relatio-ns- manifest 'a silence of 
confusion and incomprehension, not true stillness but an 
inability to hear properly' (ADWS, 305). They fit into the 
pattern of what Degenaar calls the 'mute and irrational' 
'monologue' (1990, 85) between aggressor and victim, and into the 
paradigm of what Brink himself calls, citing Sartre, 'the 
dehumanisation of the oppressed' and 'the alienation of the 
' 
oppressor' (Dove, 11). Consequently, dominator and dominated, or 
aggressor and victim, do not exchange the word but are 
asymmetrically positioned at opposing ends of the sword which 
cuts into the interior of 'the word'. 
To summarise, we have a category of violence which debases 
language, severs the 'sword' from the 'word' (it qoes not advance 
'the mind and the nobler achievements of the human spirit'), and 
reinforces the 'historical silence' between oppressor and 
oppressed. On the other hand, there exists a category of violence 
which promotes language, allies the 'sword' to the 'word' (it 
eventuates in a 'triumph of reason over violence'), and clears 
the way to dialogue between oppressor and oppressed. Yet since 
'mindless violence' is inseparable from the 'clamour' it 
instigates, it is evident that 'violence' has infiltrated 
'language' such that 'languagei, in turn, becomes one of the 
staging-grounds for 'violence': language is violence. This 
implies that the opposition between the two categories of 
violence outlined above must be re-inscribed as follows: on the 
one hand, we have language-as-violence degrading an ideal model 
of language ('the word') in which language is conceived as a 
paragon of nonviolence enabling peaceful resolution of 
antagonisms; on the other hand we have language-as-violence which 
promotes this ideal model. In total, then, there are three forms 
of language -- there is the pacific ideal and two subcategories 
of language-as-violence, one negating the ideal and the other 
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furthering it. We shall examine these subcategories respectively 
in the next two chapters. 
The first category of language-as-violence we shall explore 
lS that which asserts the 'sword' to the detriment of the 'word' 
and in so doing entrenches an 'historical silence'. This silence 
may be broken down into component silences 1 since ln the 
configuration determined by the 'sword' there are three 
interlinked silences: at the sword's point 1 at its hilt 1 and 
across its shaft. We shall take this configuration -- as well as 
the claims 
organizing 
questions 
Brink 
trope 
raised 
makes in 'The 
for the next 
therein will 
dove in the grave' as the 
chapteri on the horizon of the 
be the encompassing problem 
concerning the alteration of violenc~ from an inhibiting to a 
liberating force in writing. 
* 
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2. THREE SILENCES 
'[I]t was inconceivable that any historical 
insider [to the Holocaust] could remove herself 
sufficiently from the contaminating power of the 
event so as to remain a fully lucid, unaffected 
witness, that is/ to be sufficiently detached from 
the inside, so as to stay entirely outsid~ of the 
trapping roles, and the consequent identities, 
either of the victim or of the executioner' 
-- Dori Laub1 
How do words kill? If one may infer from Brink's commentaries on 
violence that there is a species of 'clamorous' language-as-
' 
violence which asserts the 'sword' to the detriment of the ideal 
of an eirenic 'word', one might ask how language participates in, 
and enacts, violence. Lecercle contends that a 'direct 
relationship' between language and the body's v1olation is 'one 
in which words would kill' (1990, 234). How then might words_be 
said to execute a death sentence? And if the utterance of a death 
sentence 1 or the act of plunging the sword home, imposes an 
'historical silence', what is the nature of the silence's various 
components? What are the registers of subjectivity determined by 
each component, and how do these feature in Brink's work? More 
importantly, why does Brink believe that language-as-violence is 
also capable precisely of shattering each of these respective 
silences? And again, what light can these shatterings cast on the 
work of transforming violence from an impediment to a resource of 
writing? 
The opposition between language and violence self-evidently 
suggests that language is either unrelated to the prosecution of 
conflict/ or that it is at least trivial and secondary to it. In 
the latter sense, language is superstuctural and derivative with 
regard to a determining base: it is an epiphenomenal froth rising 
from the place where the real work is done, simply representing 
(or misrepresenting) tensions at another constitutive level. Yet 
clearly this view precludes discourse from having constitutive 
capacities in its own right, in the sense that it actively 
contributes to the shaping and construction of conflictual 
80 
relations and therefore plays a formative role in conflict by 
conditioning the way in which the various parties interpret their 
predicaments, opponents and themselves. Discourse and social 
practice are inextricably linked, so that it is in and through 
historical discourses that conflicts are experienced instead 
of merely giving abstract expression to conflicts happening 
elsewhere in pure form, these historically-located and 
ideologically-inscribed 'way[s] of talking (and writing and 
thinking) ' (Belsey, 1980, 5) establish the mis;;_~_ en scene of 
socio-political conflicts. That is, while discourse as social 
practice shapes the field of interpretation within and through 
which conflicts are waged, discourse (given its historicity) is 
itself shot through by traces of its jmplication in antecedent 
and ongoing conflict: in other words the shaper of conflict is, 
in turn, determined by conflictual practices. This implies that 
any specific conflictual relation, mediated by discourse, is 
situated in, and replicates, overarching histories of conflict. 
As Fowler says, utterances by individuals carry 'semantic and 
social meanings' only by virtue of an encompassing 'diachronic 
and synchronic' context, so that the 'immediate speech situation 
and what is said and done within it are constituted by, and 
simultaneously constitute, social macro-structure' as a result 
(1981, 191) . On the one hand, one may contend that the universal 
devolves into the particular inasmuch as a specific conflictual 
situation is informed by wider antagonism. On the other, the 
particular can be said to magnify and project itself into the 
universal: as microcosm reproduces macrocosm, speakers cast 
colossal shadows and their utterances are turned into violent 
events located in a panoptic syntax, skirmishes in a war, or 
'interventions' consolidating and sabotaging political structures 
looming behind the antagonists. 
How do words kill? In the preceding model utterances in an 
immediate speech situation participate in violence in two senses. 
First, utterances are inscribed within contending ideologies, and 
are produced according to socially specific 'way[s] of talking 
(and writing and thinking)' (Belsey, 1980, 5). Utterances thus 
mobilize these ensembles of interpretations and bring their 
weight to bear on the situation in question. Words kill since 
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they are instrumental in shaping relations between antagonists; 
and while shaping these relations, they necessarily import 
determining histories of conflict into particular instances of 
utterance. Words kill (in the first sense of language-as-
violence) as the social macrocosm's violence inserts into the 
immediate speech situation. By same token, however, words become 
violent engagements in a second, broader sense. That is, they are 
seen as manoeuvres contributing to a macrocosmic aqon. In this 
view, speakers are not so much indi victuals as proxies, or 
incarnations, of collectivities at war with each other, while 
their words are parts of an encompassing whole a whole which 
is a massive battleground or Manichean struggle (a class war, an 
ethnic war, a religious war, a gender W?r, and so on). Enactments 
of discourse, then, are considered to be violent in that they are 
said to underwrite or subvert the interests of rival 
collectivities and therefore to be implicated, willy-nilly, in 
the overarching polemos. Following this conceptioh of language-
as-violence, there is no such thing as a 'private' utterance or 
a Switzerland of neutrality. Whether they know it or not, or 
whether they protest their 'innocence' , speakers are always 
considered .to be speaking from the determining context of warfare 
(however this warfare is characterized), with the result that 
they are always-already declaring for a certain camp and, 
consequently, against rival social formations, in spite of their 
claims to the contrary. 
Yet this model explaining how words kill practices a 
violence of its own. While it rightly insists on regarding 
conflicts in their contexts by emphasising the socially located 
identities of speakers, it runs the risk of construing violence 
exclusively in terms of 'macrocosmic' conflict and thereby 
understanding violence only at the level of an encounter or clash 
between hypostatized collectivities and social categories. The 
model runs the risk, that is to say, of reifying the speakers, 
and of thus repeating the reificatory tactics the speakers 
themselves employ with regard to the enemies they attack in their 
speech. Reification is the 'act of regarding an abstraction as a 
material thing' and so ossifying the real in a fixed, reductive 
conceptual model; applied to conduct toward human subjects, the 
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term refers to the 'treatment of men as objects of manipulation' 
(Bullock and Stallybrass, 1977). Antagonists typically reify each 
other by viewing one another as metonymies of adverse totalities. 
As Mang~nyi and Du Toit argue, 'political violence is aimed not 
against particular individuals as such, but as representatives of 
an oppressive order, or, conversely, of a subversive group ... ': 
what is important is 'the representative character of the agents 
and targets of these acts of violence' (1990, 6) . To regard 
violence only from a macroscopic perspective, in which 
representatives of collectivities are seen to pit themselves 
against each other, is hence to risk thinking of violence as an 
action performed by one collectivity upon another, and to 
overlook the violence by which the an~agonists reify each other 
as representatives and metonymies in the first place. 'The other 
is present in a cultural whole and is illuminated by this whole, 
like a text by its context,' Levinas claims: 'But the epiphany of 
the other involves a signifyingness of its own, independently of 
this signification received from the world' (1986, 351). By 
fixing the Other as simply an element in a whole, violence 
obliterates his or her independent capacity to signify. 
How do words kill? Degenaar argues that violence or 
language-as-violence takes the form of a monologue 
annihilating the Other. Citing Aristotle's dictum that violence 
'seems to be that whose moving principle is outside, the person 
compelled contributing nothing• (1990, 70), Degenaar notes that 
while 'reasoning is a dialogue which acknowledges the opponent as 
a source of interests, claims and arguments, violence can be 
described as a monologue, and in that sense it is mute and 
irrational I (85). Words kill, that is to say, when they institute 
a monologue negating the Other 'as a source of interests, claims 
and arguments' and imposing upon him or her a heteronomous 
definition. More simply, words kill by negating the Other in the 
inaccessible privateness of his or her own lived reality, in 
which he or she is an-other 'origin of the world' (Derrida, 1978, 
125). Words kill by performing the negating act of denigrating, 
repudiating, vituperating, damning, caricaturing, excluding, 
subjugating and categorising. They kill by enacting a death 
sentence, by consigning the Other to nullity. 
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If words kill, and language-as-violence affirms the 'sword' 
over and against the 'word' (Dove, 11), this implies that they 
are amenable to the analysis Scarry gives of the structure of the 
weapon. Trigger and muzzle, hilt and blade, grip and bludgeon, 
may be conceived as being bounded by a 'singular vertical line 
yet so radically different at its two ends that it can ... be 
pictured as connecting the two realms and preserving their 
absolute difference' (Scarry, 1985, 198). The sword's point 
intensifies the victim's sense of his bodiliness through the 
threatened or the actual infliction of pain, and thus retracts 
the worldly extension of sentience, destroying above all the 
ability to use language, which.is a potent means by which 'the 
self extends out beyond the body' (33). While the weapon's one 
end causes a 'dimuni tion of personhood' ( 19 9) , its 'power end' 
(213) induces a feeling of invulnerable potency in the aggressor, 
as he beholds the spectacle (the display, the grotesque) of his 
world-negating capacity registered at the weapon's '~entient end' 
(213). Traversed by the sword's dis-relating connection, the 
self-immured aggressor opposes himself to a self-withdrawn victim 
as a 'bodiless voice' to a 'voiceless body' (200) . 
From an earlier summation of her account of torture2 it will 
be recalled that Scarry makes an implicit distinction between two 
categories of harming, one physical, the other, representational. 
She notes that in the practice of torture domestic artefacts and 
space are utilized as means of inflicting pain such that 'the 
unmaking of the made [world]' (41) becomes an instrument, a 
weapon. At the same time torture involves 'an obsessive, self-
conscious display' (27) of the torturer's ability to inflict 
damage: the torturer endeavours to make the pain in the victim's 
body 'visible to those outside the person's body' (28) and pass 
it off as an indication of the state's strength. Given this 
feature of torture, the 'unmaking of the made' is not simply an 
instrument. It is a sign-- a sign 'externalizing' (41).the 
unmaking of the victim's own subjectal world, a sign aggravating 
and 'amplifying' the victim's distress by being 'made [itself] 
the direct cause of the pain' (41). Intriguingly, what Scarry's 
analysis suggests is that these two levels can have an injurious 
efficacy independently of one another. A weapon, that is, can be 
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turned from a physical instrument into 'the sign of the weapon' 
(17), and both the weapon and the weapon-as-sign can hurt. If an 
actual weapon or material thing can be distanced from its 
physicality into the abstractness of a sign, 'the sign of the 
weapon', it is self -evident that the thing is a signifier 
signifying a signified. But Scarry says in addition that this 
signifying function can be fulfilled by verbal constructs as well 
as physical artefacts. For instance, she quotes Richard Nixon as 
having said, whenever he had discomforted a journalist, 'That 
really flicks the scab off' (18) . Nixon implies that his 
utterances were weapons inflicting pain o~ the journalists, and 
that the pain caused served to impress on his interlocutors the 
palpable and thus unmistakable 'fact' o,f his dominance over them. 
By purporting to oppose his discursive command and own triumphant 
freedom from pain to the addressees' silencing and distress, 
Nixon poses himself as a 'bodiless voice' exalting above a 
voiceless body' (200) and so reproduces in his utterance the 
structure of the weapon. What this example suggests, then, is 
that the sign, or verbal construct, can be a weapon, and that 
this sign-as-weapon can consequently assume the same signifying 
functions as the weapon-as-sign. Where a thing could be used as 
the instrument of pain (a first level of physical harm), but 
could also become a sign (a second level of representational 
injury), a verbal construct could come to signify the same 
signified as that which is signified by the physical thing in its 
capacity as a sign. 
So, if the weapon is a sign, what does it indeed signify? 
And if the sign is a weapon, what does its weapon-likeness in 
turn signify? Physical artefacts and verbal statements, Scarry 
remarks, can give an objectified, visible and public~ly 
shareable form to a sufferer's invisible, private reality-- they 
can externalise for the observer what is an isolating and 
internal experience for the one in pain. The artefacts Scarry has 
in mind are the instruments causing pain: to show an observer the 
nail upon which one has stood is to give that person an idea of 
the pain one experiences, and hence to rouse him or her to come 
to one's assistance. The statements she has in mind are, 
likewise, those which refer to the object inflicting pain, or 
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which (in the absence of external causation) liken one's pain to 
that caused by an external object: one speaks of a 'hammering 
pain' or a drilling pain', for instance. In other words, she 
notes, 'an actual agent [of pain] (a nail sticking into the 
bottom of the foot) and an imagined agent (a person's statement, 
"It feels as if there's a nail sticking into the bottom of my 
foot") convey something of the felt-experience of pain' to an 
observer (15) . An actual or imagined weapon is evoked as a sign 
to signify the sufferer's internal condition to an observer. But 
while this 'mental habit of rec~qg::ni_zina pain in the weapon' (16), 
that is, of seeing the weapon as a signifier of a sufferer's 
pain, can be put to beneficent purposes, it is equally possible 
that the actual or imagined artefact ~ay become independent of 
its bodily referent and thus signify something else besides the 
sufferer's malady. If the weapon -- whether physical thing or 
statement externalises (and absorbs, as it. were) pain's 
attributes, it can happen that these attributes can be 
appropriated from the body and be transferred onto political 
institutions as their attributes. Scarry lists the attributes of 
pain. They are 'incontestable reality', the 'ability to eclipse 
all else', 'totality', and 'the power of dramatic alteration and 
world dissolution' (56). When the sign of the weapon is 
appropriated by a political formation, the weapon still signifies 
pain, but it signifies it precisely as a confirmation of the 
formation's indubitable existence: the Same reads the Other's 
actual or imagined pain as the index of its power. Thus, in 
torture, for instance, the weapon is an actual agent of pain and 
a sign representing the features of pain as the regime's 
properties. This is why torture is an 'act of display' (27): it 
announces that 'it is not the pain but the regime that is 
incontestably real, not the pain but the regime that is total, 
not the pain but the regime that is able to eclipse all else, not 
the pain but the regime that is able to dissolve the world' (56). 
Scarry calls this transposition 'analogical substantiation' (13) 
a process in which political constructs turn pain into 
analogues of power and convince themselves of their realness by 
regarding the Other's bodily suffering as a testament to their 
world-dissolving power. 
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The weapon-as-sign signifies a mutually reinforcing polarity 
between a world-dissolution and a world-dissolving agent, between 
a world that is vitiated and a world that is (therefore) 
incontestably real. Likewise the sign-as~weapon signifies, by 
virtue of its weapon-likeness, a capacity of world-negation that 
underscores the realness of the aggressor's world and diminishes 
that of the victim's. The speaker, situated at the 'power end' 
(213) of the weapon, performs in his utterance the act of 
nullifying the Other as the 'source of interests, claims and 
arguments' (Degenaar, 1990, 85), of negating the Other as a self-
determining voice, and of dissolving the Other's world. In the 
death sentence, the speaker regards the Other's (directly or 
indirectly) invoked pain and distres~ as confirmation of his 
essentiality: that lS to say, he displays his ability to 
incarnate world-shattering pain for the Other, to be the 
harbringer of his or her death. The speaker claims this power of 
world-negation for himself as validation of his conception of 
himself as a 'bodiless voice' , as a pure, unhampered self-
extension transcendent over the Other. Through his act of 
sentencing to death, he asserts himself as being-death (for the 
Other) a diabolic voice. However, at the 'sentient end' 
(Scarry, 1985, 213) of the word-as-weapon, the victim finds 
himself interpellated as a nullity, and reduced to the status of 
a 'voiceless body' or a silenced, execrable thing. Where the 
aggressor presents himself as being-death, the victim is reified 
as a dead beingi and while these registers of subjectivity are 
linked together within the determining structure of the weapon, 
they nonetheless preserve 'their absolute difference' (198). 
Brink's own descriptions in 'The dove in the grave' of the 
clamorous language-as-violence besetting South Africa after Chris 
Hani's death give similar prominence to the speaking subject's 
relationship with deathi his descriptions suggest, in addition, 
that one may discern three silences in the 'historical silence' 
(Dove, 11) perpetuated by the assassination. The first silence 
derives from 'the dehumanisation of the oppressed' (11) and it is 
Nelson Mandel a, aware that he lS a prisoner of unfolding 
history' , who represents this silence: in particular, he is 
'paralys[ed]' inasmuch as he 'knows too much [about death]' (11). 
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Mandela's silence arises from his overconsciousness that he is a 
dead being. The second silence that stemming from 'the 
alienation of the oppressor' -- is exemplified by F W de Klerk, 
then President, whose 'ignorance' Brink lampoons: 'Ignorance, 
above all, of his own -- that is, his regime's -- mortality' 
(11) . Brink gives a key role to such 'ignorance' as it is nothing. 
less than 'the core of the historical silence lurking in the 
heart of the present clamour' -- 'the core' of 'the silence that 
divides white from black, the silence of unknowing' (11; emphasis 
added) . If De Klerk 'knows too little. [about his death] 1 , this 
does not simply mean that he is unaware of his finitude: it 
implies as well that given his 'obliviousness of the need to show 
remorse for apartheid' (that is, given pis inability to recognise 
the Other whom he has subjugated), De Klerk is unaware of himself 
as having being-death for the·Other. The third silence -- or the 
'absolute difference' between the sword's polarities (Scarry, 
1985, 198) -- arises from a situation in which the prospects for 
the establishment of an agora are shattered. The assassination of 
Chris Hani, Brink says, impeded a 'real and unstoppable basic 
groundswell [in South Africa] towards understanding' (Dov~, 11) 
and national reconciliation. While De Klerk e'xacerbated this 
state of affairs by neglecting to try to gather 'the whole of 
South Africa into a communal act of contrition and concern' , 
Brink confesses that even he himself came close to compounding 
this particular silence when he nearly succumbed to 'the 
temptation of despair 1 (11) . If he were to have despaired, he 
would have fallen into unproductive silence; but more than 
personal quiescence is at stake. Indeed, his despairing silence 
would have been 'an insult to the future' -- that is, he would 
have contributed to the silencing of the 'unstoppable groundswell 
towards understanding' by negating the idea of a youtopic agora, 
by negating an other to the present quandary: by negating the 
Future/the Other. 
In this following chapter, I shall discuss each of these 
silences at length. A dominant concern in my examination of the 
silences found at the sword's hilt and its point will be the 
relationship between mortality and alterity. Given that, in 
Brink's view, the oppressed (or the victim) is a 'living corpse' 
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(Kojeve, 1986, 108) knowing too much about his mortality, while 
the oppressor (or the ·aggressor) is a solipsist knowing too 
little about it, it would seem that their excessive and deficient 
knowledges are linked to the extent to which they respectively 
apprehend and disavow the Other. Taking the hypothesis further, 
it appears, then, that the Other lS one who presages the Same's 
death. Emmanuel Levinas touches on this theme in Totalitv and 
Intini~i for Sartre (Levinas's unacknowledged master) it is a 
pre-occupation fundamentally shaping the way he represents the 
self -Other relation in ;B.s;,_ina Q.Dd Nothin_gn_ess. Levinas contends 
that death has traditionally been described as either a passage 
to an altered existence or a disappearance into a void. However, 
he claims that thinking of death as, a disappearance entails 
thinking of it in terms of the deaths of other people: because 
somebody dies, because she goes away, never to return, I 
extrapolate that the same will happen to me when I die. To this 
acquired knowledge of death, Levinas opposes a 'knowledge' .which 
he likens to 'an instinctive knowledge of death' (1979, .. 233). 
This 'knowledge' derives not from conjectures I make on the 
grounds of my worldly experience, but from an anxiety I have 
about my safety in the world, an anxiety undoing me as a subject 
of knowledge capable of making conjectures (an anxiety which is 
therefore inimical to, and more fundamental than, the knowledge 
I acquire about 'death' as a topic or matter I so happen to 
encounter on occasion) . '[M] y relation with my own death', 
Levinas says, 'is not deduced from the death of the others by 
analogy i it is incribed in the fear I can have for my being' 
(233, emphasis added). If I relate to death through fear for my 
being, rather than through knowledge of which I am in control, my 
fear is 'the fear of violence' liable to emanate from an 
invisible 'bad will that surprises and stalks [me] ' (234-5). In 
short, this fear is a 'fear of the Other' (235) Levinas is close 
to Sartre 1n this account. Sartre observes that all fear 
originates in 'the fearful discovery of my pure and simple 
object-state in so far as it is surpassed and transcended by [the 
Other]' (1958, 288). Through fear, I learn of, or am reminded of, 
the primordial fact that I am 'a presence in the world' (288) 
a presence which can be harmed and which is hence not the world's 
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sole originator, but one object among many, a defined object 
vulnerable to the freedom of other subjects. Through fear, that 
is, I apprehend that I am an object for the Other, and thereby 
affectively experience 'being-for-others 1 • (288) Being conscious 
of one 1 s mortality one 1 s limitedness, abjectness and 
dispensability consequently entails being aware of one 1 s 
existence for alterity. 
However close Levinas is in this respect to Sartre 1 s view 
that one 1 s awareness of being-for-others lS given ln the 
apprehension of the world 1 q hostility to one, he maintains· 
(unlike Sartre) that relating to the Other as to a ma~evolent 
force does not exclude the possibility of peaceful co~existence 
between self and Other. In fact, Levi~as goes so far (entirely . 
unlike Sartre) as to make peaCe-rather_ than war·thefundamental ,. ' 
nature of their relation. War; he announces, 'presuppos~s peace, 
the antecedent and non-alle~gic presence of the Oth~r; it does 
not represent the first event of the encounter 1 (1979, 199). 
Ironically, Derrida takes this assumpt;.ion, among others, to ta9k 
in his essay on Levinas, 'Violence anci Metaphysics 1 (1978,- 99-"' .-
153) -- ironically, because:_.Di=rrida 1s, __ count~:t;-argument 'to·this.: _.,,,,,,, 
notion approaches Sartre 1 s position, ~the same Sartre' who had been: 
ousted from his post-war eminence by the very intellectual 
movements of the 60s and 7.0s . that .. herd swept: Derrida. -to fame. 3 , __ ,. 
While we shall examine Derr:ida 1 s:,~..: es~ay :.late:r;,: 0:-.we ~;,shall. a1so 
provide an overview of the.route· Sartre takes iri p~esenting the 
self-Other relation as essentially a warring encounter in which 
the Other is a iethal nemesis. In particular, we shall attend to 
the way in which the Same (or being-for-itself, in Sartrean 
terminology) , when con- fronted by ; .the Other, undergoes 
simultaneous yet apparently contradictory process of having~ 
world both dissolved and fixed under the Other 1 s gaze. To 
Scarry 1 s vocabulary, it lS as though, on the one hand, 
appearance or assertion of t;.~e OtherJs world:withirrthat of 
Same displaces, contracts, and vitiates the Same 1 s world, while 
the 
its 
use 
the 
the 
-- on the other hand -- the Other circumscribes the Same as an 
object, or being-in-itself. That is, the Other erases the Same 1 s 
being-for-itself, its lived reality, and fills that void at the 
same time with its own impositions: a twin process of negating 
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and positing, destabilizing and stabilizing. The Other thus 
appears to the Same as a world-shattering eruptive force and a 
world-encasing compressive force assigning an identity and 
meaning to the Same. This is the .'fundamental relation with ari 
Other [as other]' (1958, 361) Next, Sartre superimposes on the 
'fundamental relation' a series of possible 'concrete relations' 
(363) which the Same can assume with regard to the Other. These 
fall into two broad categories. In the first category the Same 
adapts itself variously to the Other's freedom, meaning that it 
adjusts itself to what it is for the Other (Sartre lists love, 
language, and masochism as possible options) . As such, the Same-
as-victim may elect to become for itself that which it is for the 
Other-as-aggressor and thus -identify, itself with the Other's 
designations to the exclusion of its own capacity for autonomous 
self -assertion -- as the aggressor __ says he is, so the .. victim __ 
imagines himself to be, and his selfhood perishes as a result. 
Knowing 'too much' about death·· (Dove, 11) , knowing too fixedly 
that he is an expendable and execrable object for the Other, 
knowing how tenuous his life is before the Other's indomitable 
freedom, and hence knowing, rigid with terror before the Other-
as-death, how precious this life is which he stands to lose, the 
oppressed victim surrenders to the terms offered him by the 
aggressor and preserves his life: his dead life. As the fishermen 
(and the security policemen) point out in An Act of Terror, the 
crayfish 'get used to' their victimisation and living death 
(371) . 
However, the second category of 'concrete relations' assumed 
by the Same with regard to the Other involves the contrary 
strategy of negating, or suspending, the Other 1 S upsurge, such 
that the Same remains inviolate from the Other's threatened 
dissolution and objectification of its world. These relations 
entail desire, sadism, hatred and indifference. Sartre 
describes indifference as 'a sort of factual solipsism 1 in which, 
at ease and feeling untouchable (or bodiless, ln Scarry's 
language), 'I act as if I were alone in the world' (1958, 380) 
and view others as objects arrayed beneath my transcendent 
subjecthood as bothersome obstacles or as tools I can learn about 
and use for my own designs. Rather than be objectified by the 
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Other's gaze, I make myself the agent of the gaze which theorizes 
the Other, which looks at a thing and changes it into an object 
of knowledge. Yet the indifferent subject's triumphant gaze is at 
the same time a 'kind of blindness with respect to others'-·- (380), 
Sartre observes. (One recalls Mynhardt in Rumours of Rain: visual 
clarity is the condition of his power but it is nevertheless 
troubled by blind spots -- as on the windscreen of his car --
relating to his subjugation of others.) 4 Indeed, Sartre claims 
that the paradoxical situation in which visual (or theoretical) 
acuity is a form of blindness, arises from the subject's anxiety 
-to 
about his being an object exposed ,.. the Other's freedom. His 
tran¢'~scendence over the Other is a refusal of being-for-others, 
a refusal which nonetheless reiterat~s the the very condition 
which he flees. That is, indifference, confidence, and apparent 
mastery are ambivalent signfiers apophantically signifying their 
opposite numbers discomfiture,· unease, servility: If· -the·· 
victim 'knows too much' about mortality, the aggressor 'knows too 
little' thanks to his having neutralized the . alterity which 
impresses upon him the knowledge of his vulnerable being-for-
others; but 'too little' knowledge indicates, at the same time, 
that a prior excess of such knowledge has been foreclosed. 
Indifference is anxiety, the master is a slave: enantiodromia. To 
recount an earlier discussion of indifference and numbness, 5 the 
condition is one simultaneously providing multiple yet 
contradictory subject-positions. It can, in other words, be seen 
as a subjectivity which, at one and the same time, emphasises and 
disavows the fearful experience of being- for-others. In the 
situation in which the subject is met with violence, with hostile 
otherness, with the Other-as-death, there are three general 
metaphorical systems available to represent his consequent 
disintegration: he suffers a sensory overload and deluge which 
dissolves him as a cognizing agency, he goes blind (he cannot 
theorize) , and he is interned and emplaced in a spatial 
contraction. Translating these metaphors into terms commensurate 
with Sartre's depiction of the Other's upsurge into the Same's 
phenomenal field, the Same undergoes a world-dissolution into 
nothingness (the Other is a disruptive force), it is deprived of 
its theoretical gaze (the Other commands the look), and it is de-
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limited as an embodied object (the Other is a compressive force) . 
On all three counts, the numb subject denies his being- for-
others. He is not disrupted, but cool and at ease; he is clear-
sighted, and looks at others calculatingly through his sights; 
nor is he vulnerably embodied or transfixed, but advances almost 
frictionlessly out into spaces emptied of resistances ('I brush 
against "people" as I brush against a wall, ' Sartre says, 'I 
avoid them as I avoid obstacles'; 380). But the Other, thrice 
denied, is thrice affirmed. Blindness to the Other, Sartre 
stresses, is a symptom of anxiety, and hence 'includes an 
implicit comprehension of being-for-others' (380)·. 
To disavow alterity is to ignore mortality; crucially, it is 
also to renounce morality, not onlY. in the sense that the 
negation of alterity is a violent, appropriative act, but in the 
sense as well that this very act cancels out the conditions 
required for the subject to gain consciousness. of himself as a 
being who is murderously disposed towards the Other. That is to 
say, ignorance of mortality, and its concomitant repudiation of 
the Other, prohibits 'the commencement of moral consciousness, 
which calls in question my freedom', 'calls in question the naive 
right of my powers, my gloriqus spontaneity as a living being' 
(Levinas, 1979, 84). If this twin action of negating the Other as 
a being for-itself and positing him as an object of instrumental 
calculation leaves one immured in an unreflective, naive, and 
self-mystified state, then undergoing the upsurge of the Other in 
his capacity as a subject would, conversely, inaugurate the 
passage to self-consciousness and facilitate one's change from 
indifferent blindness to a remorseful self-recognition, or 
anagnorisis. 6 In the Other's upsurge I feel shame at my conduct 
and realize 'I am not innocent spontaneity but usurper and 
murderer': thus, says Levinas, the point at which the subject 
feels his freedom to be 'arbitrary and violent' in relation to 
the Other, is the point at which '[m] orality begins' (1979, 84) . 
It begins in shame and guilt before the Other, 7 and it is by way 
of shame that the subject's unreflective self-conception is put 
in crisis. As Sartre pointedly notes, the Other 'teaches me who 
I am' (1986, 311), while the self-presentations I construct for 
myself are unsubstantiated illusions until they have been 
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ratified or refuted -- by an independent Other. 'The Other 
looks at me and as such, he knows the secret of my being, he 
knows what I am,' Sartre maintains (1958·, 363). Solely through 
the Other do 'I gain my abjectness' (1986, 307); solely by the 
Other can I be seen from outside myself and so appear as I am 
'objectively'. By contrast, the private self-conception I 
entertain about myself, the mirror image or object I pose before 
myselC is only a 'quasi-object' (315), as it is one I myself 
construct, from the inside, and without outside validation from 
the Other. Crucially, Sartre says that 'the impulse of this 
consciousness is to becom [e] conscious of itself in all 
respects ... by giving itself obje·ctivity' and by making 'its own 
existence for itself appear[ ... ] to it ~san independent object' 
(285). In his reference to 'this consciousness' Sartre is 
alluding to the model of self-reflexive consciousness Hegel 
outlines in his Phenomenology of Spirit, a model in which 
consciousness (or the divine subject) is seen as the ·'movement of 
becoming an other to itself, i.e., becoming an object to itself, 
and of suspending this otherness' (Hegel, 1986, 79). According to 
Hegel, the~ subject lS defined as a movement toward self-
consciousness; in his gloss, Sartre says that the subject is 
informed by an 'impulse' to make itself an object of cognition, 
while Heidegger describes the subject as 'self-knowing-itself' 
(in Taylor, 1987, 38). In a word, the subject at issue is the 
Cartesian subject 'looking for his certainty' (Lacan, 1977b, 
129), and, as such, moved and impelled to see himself as an 
object posed before_himself in the Vorstellung which assures him 
of the certainty and indubitability, the realness, of his being. 
Since the subject appears as an authentic object (as compared to 
a 'quasi-object'; Sartre, 1986, 315) only outside himself in the 
Other's gaze, his impulsion to certainty-of-self can be satisfied 
only by the mediation of the Other who teaches him what he in 
fact is; as I can 'be an object for myself only over there in the 
Other', being-for-others 'is a necessary stage of the development 
of self-consciousness' (Sartre, 1986, 286). Or as Taylor puts it, 
'In order to establish the objective truth of its subjective 
certainty [and attain self-consciousness]', the subject has to 
elicit 'acknowledgement of [his] substantiality' from the Other 
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(1980, 192-3). Without the Other, however, the subject, in his 
self-identity, might have certitude about what he is, 'but this 
certitude still lacks truth' inasmuch his existence has not yet 
been placed before him as an independent object' (Sartre, 1986, 
285). As Kojeve points out, without exterior validation '[t]he 
value he attributes to himself could be illusory', and 'the idea 
that he has of himself could be false or mad' (1986, 105). By 
having negated the Other, the numbed and spuriously immortal 
subject thus labours in a state of self-mystification in which he 
lacks certitude of being (the world is unreal, and he himself 
.. 
fictive), and in which he is oblivious to the injustice of his 
violence. 
It is through the Other's upsur;:_:re, then, that his self-
mystification gives way to the awareness of his cruelty. In the 
appearance of the Other as other (rather than a reified object 
mapped into the Same), the subject experiences shame in which he 
apprehends the monstrous thing he is in his aggressive relation 
with the Other: he realizes the nature of his desire, which is no 
longer something he lives spontaneously and unthinkingly, but 
something taking him aback, back from himself, and 'presenting 
itself' to him across this distance from himself. As the narrator 
comments ln States of Emergency, '"guilt" lS equated with 
"knowledge"' (145), a remark which he makes in the context of a 
discussion of Melissa's loss of innocence as 'a state of mind' 
(144) when she weeps during an orgasm. One will recall 8 that her 
innocence is a defensive reaction to her having been raped, such 
that she mentally 'distanc[es] herself from whatever was 
happening to her body' ( 144) . In particular, this imaginary 
bodilessness is a disavowal of being-for-others, that is, the 
condition of being an object vulnerable to the Other's freedom: 
innocence is a foreclosure of the Other. Conversely, by welcoming 
the Other (Philip, in this case) she assumes the historicity of 
her being-for-others and enters the mortal estate of 
susceptibility to being 'wounded to the quick' (145) . But re-
embodying herself, she crosses the distance she had held between 
herself and her desire which now, as it were, re-appears to her 
after its repression. The arrival of the Other is concomitant 
with her regained knowledge of desire -- a concomitance which the 
95 
narrator underlines ln a pun on the German word for 'guilt', 
Schuld, for this term suggests Schule, 'school' , both in the 
sense of a place of learning' and 'a grouping, a multitude' 
(145) . Guilt thus encompasses the knowledge of desire as well as 
'that moment when one has to come to terms with the knowledge of 
others, of outsiders, of the masses' ( 145) . 
Likewise for Levinas, guilt occurs when the Other as other 
manifests himself to the Same and the Same's freedom 'discovers 
itself murderous in its very exercise' (1979, 84). Yet if, as 
Levinas says, the Other disarms the Same with its question, there 
is another question as to how the. Other disarms the Same. How 
does the Other overcome the Same's violence: by way of pacific 
discourse or militancy? Levinas argue~ for the former while in--
'Violence and Metaphysics' Derrida implicitly speaks for the 
latter case. At the risk of over-simplifying Derrida's extensive 
critical inhabitation of Levinas's writing for the purpose of a 
concise exposition, one may say that Derrida interrogates t_wo .. 
related assumptions that underpin Levinas's exclusive endorsement 
of a pacifist or 'moral resistance' (Levinas, 1979, 225) in which 
the-Other resists, '[n]ot by opposing me with another force in 
the world [that is, by retaliating against my manipulation of 
machines of war with his own strategic deployment of force] , but 
by speaking to me from an other origin of the world [by 
approaching me from his private and incalculable difference from 
the realm of coercive engagement my acts create and tactically 
anticipate]' (Derrida, 1978, 104). The underpinning assumptions 
are that discourse constitutes 'pacific opposition', and that 
discourse, necessarily locating the agg~essive Same in an 
intersubjective relation with the Other as other, restores the 
peacefulness Levinas holds to be fundamental or intrinsic to 
their relation: 'War presupposes peace, the antecedent and non-
allergic presence of the Other [as the absolutely other]' (1979, 
199), he notes. More pointedly, one may add that discourse (in 
Levinas's view) presupposes peace, that discourse is peace. In 
short, what these assumptions amount to is an assertion of an 
evidently mutually exclusive opposition between discourse and 
violence. Derrida's reading of Levinas may, as such, be 
characterised in part as a deconstruction of the latter binarism. 
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Without as yet entering into the argument's details, one can note 
that Derrida's deconstruction proceeds as a reductio ad absurdum 
in which the notion of an essentially nonviolent language is, 
even within Levinas's own theoretical terms, shown to be self-
contradictory as such a language would (according to Derrida) be 
non-language. And since language and violence are inseparable, 
Derrida propounds that '[n]onviolence would be the telos, and not 
the essence of discourse' ( 1978, 116) -- that is, a permanently 
deferred destiny. Significantly, he states that language can 
only indefi_nitel:;t_ tend toward justice [the telos or ideal of 
nonviolence] by acknowledging and practicing the violence within 
it [against silence, which is 'also the medium of violence'] ' 
( 117, emphasis added) . In other words, Derrida proposes that 
language-as-violence be mobilized to affirm the telos of 
language-as-nonviolence and 'to avoid the worst violence 
which precedes or represses discourse' (117). One may say, then, 
speaking schematically, that, in the context of t.his monograph· on 
Levinas, Derrida describes .language-as-violence as caught between 
two extremes: on the one hand is a futural telos in which 
discourse realizes its so-called eirenic essence, while on the 
other is the utter silence of violence 'preced[ing] or repressing 
discourse' (117, emphasis added) . Lang~ge, 'practi~ing the 
violence within it' against tendencies to silence and hence 
'indefinitely tend[ing] toward justice', is termed '(v]iolence 
against violence' ( 117) violence enacted against 'the worst 
violence' of absolute silence and for nonviolence. One ought to 
note the similarities between Derrida and Brink in this respect, 
particularly those relating to the implicit distinctions Brink 
makes in 'The dove in. the grave' between violence which severs 
'the word' from 'the sword' and entrenches an 'historical 
silence' between the oppressor and the oppressed, and violence 
serving 'the word' (an ideal of nonviolence) by fostering 
dialogue between them. 9 Brink and Derrida seem to suggest that, 
given the conflation of 'discourse' with 'violence', one can 
distinguish between discourse-as-violence which forecloses the 
Other, and discourse-as-violence by which the Other appears as 
other. Yet as one may suspect, the latter suggestion is anathema 
to Levinasian doctrine for he contends that it is only within 
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peace that the Other appears as other to the Same; violence 
necessarily involves the reduction and occlusion of alterity. 
War, Levinas declares, presupposes anterior peace. What Derrid~ 
does to this second assumption on Levinas's part, is to effect a 
sinister reversal in which, following the logic of Levinas' s 
argument to an absurd conclusion, he turns the formula for peace 
into a formula for war. At the same time, Derrida counter-argues 
that it is their warring relation which allows the Same to regard 
the Other as the same-as-itself (an L), as well as to apprehend 
that it is the Other's other. That lS to say, ~a~ creates the 
conditions for peace ln which the Same perceives that it is the 
other for another-L, rather than a solipsist oblivious of its 
accountability to any other. (As we sha~l see in Chapter 3, Brink 
adduces similar arguments in defence of violence) . 
If this salutary violence affirms the telos of nonviolent 
discourse, its less-salutary counterpart stifles this projected 
'groundswell towards understanding' ,(Dove;· 11)·· between erstwhile 
oppressors and oppressed, and maintains the former's alienation 
and the latter's dehumanisation. In the silence, no-one can make 
h\f<' ~-tl+ . 
themselves heard. Thelr stories vanish, and they lack 
acknowledgement of the realness of their sufferings and 
aspirations; if they are heard, it is at the cost of a misprision 
of their discourses, a mishearing which occurs in the official 
hearings hegemonic rule offers. They are witnesses to calamity, 
but they lack a Witness -- an addressable Other -- to whom they 
may confide their testimonies. In Brink's fictions, it is 
incumbent on these witnesses to calamity and oppression to 
maintain faith in an overarching metanarrative progression from 
their present site of mishearing to a futural communal topos or 
agora ln which it is claimed their narratives will be witnessed 
that is, heard and authenticated as real, rather than 
spurious. Beyond this third silence given in the hiatus between 
the aggressor at the hilt and the victim at swordpoint, they must 
imaginatively recreate a prospective space of- 'truly serene 
silence' ·free from 'confusion and incomprehension' (ADWS, 3 05) : 
a space of unrestricted speech and unprejudiced audition. And to 
the person of the writer falls a further obligation. He or she 
must fulfill the role of a conservator, one who both preserves 
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these testimonies and sets them in active circulation, such that 
the narratives may survive their silencing by hegemony and have 
instead a continuing impact on the lives of those who come to 
read them. Where hegemony had sought to limit the meanings of the· 
testimonies, they open themselves -- given their dissemination 
into intertextuality -- to a plurality of interpretation. The 
conservator, from the perspective of the witnesses, is an 
emissary of the agora; in turn, the text which he or she 
produces, prefigures, in its effusion of meaning, the rapturous 
discourse mythically occuring in the agora. The conservator is 
charged with nothing less than the task of repealing the death 
sentence to which the witnesses had been consigned. 
Having outlined in detail the course to be taken, let us 
' proceed to a consideration of the three silences imposed by 
language-as-violence. 
II. First silence: The victim's dehumanisation 
'When the enemy is separated from you by a 
barrier of fire, you have to judge him as a 
whole, as the incarnation of evil; all war is 
form of Manicheism' 
J.-P. Sartre10 
'[T]hen we entered the trenches .... And then 
the first shells fell near us. I was so innocent 
that in spite of our so-called training, of all 
the propaganda, I had never really been able to 
believe that someone might want to kill me' 
--- John Fowles 11 
Terrified at swordpoint, the victim suffers a world-dissolution 
impairing his capacity for self -determination; while his own 
world is nullified, he is forced to validate the priority and 
substantiality of the aggressor's reality at the cost of his own 
bonds, loyalties and ideals (Scarry, 1985, 35-6). Violence, as 
Aristotle claims, is 'that whose moving principle is outside, the 
person compelled contributing nothing' (in Degenaar, 1990, 70). 
Likewise for Levinas violence 'does not consist so much in 
injuring and annihilating persons as in making them play 
roles in which they no longer recognise themselves, making them 
betray not only commitments but their own substance 
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21) . Losing his voice, his ability to posit himself as .L the 
victim can plead only from the position of the you into which he 
is locked for the benefit of the aggressor's I, a you having the 
status of an it separated from his lived identity, negated as 'a 
source of interests, claims and arguments' (Degenaar, 1990, 85), 
and cast in the role of a dispensable category. 'The Other, if he 
calls upon me, calls upon someone who is not I by no means 
the unique being I would like to be,' Blanchot declares (1982, 
18) : 'I am called upon to enter this separate, this other 
relation with my selfhood gangrened and eaten away' ( 23) 1 
reduced to 'a living corpse' (Kojeve, 1986, 108). 
In 'The dove in the grave', Brink argues that Nelson Mandela 
'has come to represent an historical ~ilence' (Dove, 11) in the 
clamour which followed Hani's assassination. Mandela assumes this 
role in his capacity as a figurehead for the 'dehumanised' 
oppressed and as a statesman whose political control was 
outstripped by the run of events in the aftermath of the murder. 
'Mandela's contemplation of the grave into which Hani's coffin 
was lowered could not but evoke in spectators,' Brink 
conjectures, 'the speculation that he was watching . the 
premonition of his own death' (11). According to Brink, what is 
critical in Mandela's silence is the apparent fact that he 'knows 
too much [about his death]; and in its own way this knowledge is 
paralysing' (11). Violence induces a consciousness of mortality 
which immobilizes and silences. 
If consciousness of mortality is accentuated by an awareness 
of that which exceeds one's control and subjects one to an alien 
will, this is to say that the sense of mortality is related to 
the upsurge in one's sphere of activity of the Other 1 who 
presages death by divesting one of selfhood and maintaining one 
in the paralysed death-in-life of his impositions. In the 
association between alterity and mortality, subjection and 
abjection, one may say that death is apprehended as an Other 
while the Other is seen as a herald of one's death. The · 
connection between alterity and mortality lS developed by Sartre 
and Levinas .from a set of shared premises (Levinas is in many 
ways the early Sartre's philosophical legatee). As we saw in a 
previous discussion, Levinas distinguishes between the knowledge 
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of death that one 'deduce[s] from the death of the others' and a 
'knowledge' which he likens to pre-reflective 'instinctive 
knowledge of death' (1979, 233). His distinction seems to turn on 
the observation that, while I am in the process of thinking about 
the death of others and extrapolating the facts of dying, I 
maintain myself as a controlling subject of knowledge distant 
from the object of knowledge which I have made of death; but, he 
implies, I have a sharp sense of 'my own death' only through 'the 
fear I can have for my being' (233), a fear undoing me as a 
subject of knowledge. Levinas argues that 'the fear for my being 
which is my relation with death is ... the fear of violence--
and thus it extends into fear of the Other (235) . My relation 
with death, that is, situates me in ~ paranoid 'interpersonal 
order' in which death is a nemesis, a 'foreign will' (234). It is 
thus as though murder, 'rather than being one of the occasions of 
dying, were inseparable from the essence of death, as though the 
approach of death remained one· of the modalities of the relation 
with the Other' (234). 
While Levinas points out that such antagonism between self 
and Other is only 'one of the modalities of the relation with the 
Other' (234), and does not preclude the ethical, pacific quality 
which he believes to be an intrinsic element of their relation, 
in Sartre's Being and Nothingness it is the case, as Blanchet 
notes (1982, 22), that the Other is conceived as being, 
fundamentally, an enemy. In Levinas' view, if the subject is 
aware of his mortality, this is a sensibility he has not through 
a knowledge of the death of others, who are his analogues, but as 
a consequence of 'the fear I can have for my being' (1979, 233), 
that is to say, fear which is evoked at the prospect of violence 
striking him from an exterior source, a violence engineered by an 
unfathomable 'foreign will' (234). In short, Levinas locates the 
subject's apprehension of his mortality within what Sartre calls 
the affective experience of being-for-others. 'Fear ln fact 
implies that I appear to myself as threatened by virtue of my 
being a presence in the world ... , Sartre writes: 'It is the 
object which I am which is in danger in the world (1958, 
288), an object vulnerable to violence emanating from the Other's 
freedom. For Levinas, fear defines my awareness of mortality, 
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while for Sartre, it conditions the apprehension of alterity. 
'[T]he origin of all fear is the fearful discovery of my pure 
and simple object-state in so far as it 1s surpassed and 
transcended by possibles which are not my possibles [but the 
Other's]' (288), Sartre declares. To sense one's mortality is to 
fear violence; to fear violence is to discover one's 'being-as-
object' (288) vulnerable to. an alien will, which is 
simultaneously to discover the freedom of other subjects. 
What conceptual route does Sartre follow in depicting the 
self -Other relation as the experience of dread before a foe? 
Broadly, his account of the relation attempts to subvert the 
'logic of identity' prevalent in the tradition of Western 
philosophy. Descombes defines the 'lo~ic' as a 'form of thought 
which cannot represent the other to itself without reducing it to 
the same, and thereby subordinating difference to identity' 
(1980, 75). A key example of this logic is the 'metaphysics of 
subjectivity' , 12 which privileges subjectivity as the foundational 
principle of certainty from which all else is derived and to 
which everything is relative. As a result, other objects and 
subjects lose their unicity and are turned into elements of the 
subject's 'mediate self-relation' (Taylor, 1986, 3). The Other is 
conceived as a secondary category derived from and dependent on 
the originary subject who defines the Other in terms of its 
relationship to himself taken as a foundation: the Other is as 
the subject says it is. Sartre notes that 1n the logic of 
identity, it is as though 'I derive the concept of the Other from 
myself by reflecting on my own powers and by prqjection or 
analogy' (1986, 311). Thus, he claims that 'the problem of 
Others has generally been treated as if the primary relation by 
which the Other is discovered is object-ness' (300). In 
opposition to the tradition which views the Other as an object of 
knowledge constructed by a subject, Sartre contends that the 
Other, instead of appearing as an object for the subject, must be 
regarded as manifesting itself as an independent subject to the 
subject; and as one can be a subject only when one is in relation 
to an object, the Other's appearance as a subject implies that 
one is put in the position of an object. That is to say, in the 
Other's upsurge as a transcendence over the world constituted by 
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the subject's cognitive acts, the subject disintegrates qua 
subject, and becomes instead an object for the Other-as-subject. 
To state it differently, '[i]t is in and through the revelation 
of my being-as-object for the Other that I must be able to 
apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject' (301). Since the 
logic of identity is subtended by an optical metaphoric13 linking 
subjectivity to knowledge and vision, it is appropriate that the 
subject's descent into objecthood should involve the disablement 
of his gaze, while the Other's ascent into subjecthood should be 
manifested by a look which theorizes and 'photo-graph[s]' (Lacan, 
1977b, 106) the subj~ct as he moves into the cross-hairs of the 
Other's scopes. The Other, Sartre notes, is 'the one who looks at 
me and at whom I am not yet looking .. , . ' (1986, 305) -- the one 
whom my own look has not reduced into an object of cognition by 
way of defence (305). Surprised in an embarrass:Lng action by the 
appearance of the Other, 'I recognize that I am as the Other sees 
me' (281), a base object; correlatively, given that the Other 
commands the gaze and blinds the Same, the Other is described as 
'the immense, invisible presence which supports this shame' 
(306). While I concentrate on the lecture I am delivering, the 
Other's presence similarly 'remains undifferentiated'; if 'I want 
to verify that my thought has been well understood and if in turn 
I look at the audience, then I shall suddenly see heads and eyes 
appear' (1958, 281-2). To be aware of the Other's look is not to 
see objects, but 'to be conscious of beina looked at' ( 1986, 
303) . As such, 'the look will be given just as well on occasion 
when there is a rustling of branches, or the sound of a footstep 
followed by silence ... ' ( 3 02) 
Sartre' s account of the Other as a death-bearing enemy 
becomes clear when one examines the condition of being an object 
exposed to the look of the Other, since Sartre contends that 
endangerment defines 'the permanent structure of my being-for-
others' (1986, 304) The Other's look manifests a transcendence 
'beyond the world' (306) mediated by the subject, so that the 
Other upsurges im-mediately as a subject. Thus, the Other's 
'immense, invisible presence' (306) , provoking affective 
reactions like anxiety and shame, causes 'an immediate shudder 
which runs through me without any discursive preparation' 
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{ 2 81) . In this immediacy the 'subject' lS without the self-
extensive 'setting at a distance' {Buber, in Soja, 1989, 132) by 
which an object may be thrown and posed before it -- rather, it 
contracts into an engulfing bodiliness. Prefiguring the motifs in 
Scarry's The Body 1n Pain, Sartre suggests that the Other's 
trans-ascendence is an invasive opening up of subjectal borders 
and an imprisoning closing in. The Other, he says, 'denies my 
distances from objects and unfolds its own distances' (1986, 
306): '[t]he world disintegrates in order to be reintegrated over 
there [in the Other] as a world' (309). Disintegration and 
reintegration: in this double process of destabilization and 
stabilization, the Other is manifested to the subject as a 
disruptive and compressive force. Tha~ is, the Other appears to 
the Same in a seizure of terror, for in the state of terror one 
has the simultaneous sense of being fixed (transfixed, frozen, 
petrified, reified as a pejorative category) and obliterated or 
un-fixed: describing the bondsman's dread before the lordi Hegel 
observes that the bondsman's consciousness 'has been quite 
unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being, and 
everything solid and stable has been shaken 
in this 'melting-away' (1978, 117). As 
'shudder' (1986, 281) before the Other, 
to its foundations' 
Sartre remarks, I 
who 'determines an 
internal flow of the universe, an internal hemorrhage' (301), and. 
a 'dissolution of my knowledge' (309). But at the same time, the 
Other's look is 'apprehended as spatializing' (303): under the 
gaze, 'my possibles ... [are] limited and fixed' (307). I am cast 
into nothingness and brought back into being as an heteronomous 
object determined by another subject's freedom. I am the object 
of value judgementsi and 'in so far as I am the instrument of 
possibilities which are not my possibilities, ... and which deny 
my transcendence in order to constitute me as a means to an end 
of which I am ignorant -- I am in danger' ( 3 04) , separated from 
my selfsame identity and turned into an element of the Other's 
world, at the expense of my own. 'What I apprehend immediately 
when I hear the branches crackling behind me is not that there is 
someone there,' Sartre says, 'it is that I am vulnerable, that I 
have a body which can be hurt, that I occupy a place in 
short, that I am seen' ( 3 03) . It is this look which makes me 
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undergo 'the death of my possibilities' (307) before the Other-
as-death. 
Sartre argues that the 'fundamental relation with an Other' 
(1958, 361), in which the Other objectivates the subject, is· 
implicated in a secondary set.of 'concrete relations ... wholly 
governed by my attitudes with respect to the object which I am 
for the Other' ( 3 63) . Do I accept or reject . the being whicl1 the 
Other offers me? Descombes summarises the central issue in this 
respect: 'the other is a phenomenon for m~, but I am no less a 
phenomenon for himi manifestly, one of us will have to renounce 
the role of subject and content himself with being for himself 
what he is for the other' 
'concrete relations' is 
(1980, 23). As such, one category of 
characteri~ed by the collapse of 
subjectivity before the Other, and the subject's identification 
with his being-as-object. Sartre explores this attitude at length 
in his Saint Genet. In their discussion of the work, Laing and 
Cooper indicate that Genet 'affirmed the priority of the object_ 
which he was in [the Other's] eyes over the subject which he was 
for himself' '[h] is being an object for the others had 
priority over his being a subject for himself and he experienced 
himself as being, in the depths of himself, a being other than 
himself' (1964, 73). That is to say, in this attitude the subject 
submits to the aggressor and accedes to the position of the 
victim. He plays a role betraying his substance, and although he 
speaks within the aggressor's discourse, he languishes in silence 
as 'a living corpse' (Kojeve, 1986, 108) whose selfhood has been 
petrified/putrified. 
III. Second silence: The aggressor's alienation 
'My ability to feel as a human being towards 
others has been damaged. At the time there's 
a numbing, an insensitivity, you feel nothing. 
I remember feeling a great distance from 
everything' 
-- SADF conscript 14 
'[E]ach type of conquest is no doubt the deed 
of a man fleeing a threat' 
-- Georges Bataille15 
'How could I kill him -- he looked into my face 
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and I looked into his' 
World War Two partisan16 
(i) Indifference 
At swordpoint, the victim experiences being-for-others, the 
paradigm of mortality, and a~quiesces to being an object jor the 
Other. Yet Sartre analyses a·-second set ··of· --'-concrete -re-lations' - ·--
premised on the collapse of the Other's subjectivity. In response 
to the upsurge of the Other's look, one can return the look and 
so objectify the Other -- a defence, he says, which frees one 
from one's 'being-for the Other' (1986, 305) and from the danger 
the Other presents. This strategy of indiff~rence is 'a blindness 
with respect to others' (Sartre, 1958, 380). Like Mynhardt in 
Rumours of Rain, whose social dominance is connoted by his luxury 
car, particularly by the visual control its machinery is supposed 
to give to the captain of industry securely encased inside it, 
the one who is indifferent maintains himself as a triumphant gaze 
unsubjected to the look of the Other, which he neutralises. Like 
Mynhardt, who treats others as ¢' a means to an end, the 
indifferent subject views them, if not simply as things blocking 
his path, then as 'functions' 17 whose knowledge of him 'does not 
touch [him]' (Sartre, 1958, 380) 'I am self-confident ln 
no way conscious that the fact that the Other's look can fix my 
possibilities' (381). And like Mynhardt, whose vision is 
nonetheless disturbed by a blindspot impairing his technical and 
cognitive mastery, the subject's look is a 'bli11dness' which 
'includes an implicit comprehension of being-for-others' (380), 
an anxiety given in 'the consciousness of a "wandering and 
inapprehensible" look' (382) whose challenge is glimpsed out of 
the corner of the eye. The subject's uneasiness before the 
Other's sensed independence is compounded by his lack of in-sight 
into himself. 'Why am I always confronted by the strangeness of 
others?' (RR, 68) Mynhardt wonders. His perplexity at the ruin of 
his marriage, his estrangement from his son brutalised by a tour 
of military duty in Angola, and the scandal of Franken's 
participation in the armed struggle, stems from the independence 
of others, their capacity to differ from the notions he 
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entertains about them. Mynhardt views their alterity as 
treachery, since his reductive knowledge of them reciprocally 
defines his own identity, while their excess over this knowledge 
disrupts his self-certitude" and mastery over a familiar 
environment. For instance, in Mynhardt's discovery that Franken, 
whom he believed he knew best (that is, whom he made the 
privileged 
stranger', 
guarantor of his self-conception), was a· tot'al · 
he laments, 'It felt as if he'd betrayed me by· 
changing into someone other than the man I'd known' (RI:L 68) . 
Even more troubling, however, is that the Other's independence 
calls him to account by forcing him to ask, 'What is the re2son 
or the cause of it all?' (68) and begin a self-examination. In 
'the strangeness of others' he finds h~s strangeness to himself: 
to paraphrase Sartre, Mynhardt learns the truth about himself 
through his obj ectness for the Other rather than the quasi-
object' which he alone devises, and with which he holds himself 
to be identical. Sartre stresses that, in indifference, I 'ignore 
the Other's subjectivity as the foundation of mybeing-in-itself 
and my being-for-others' (1958, 381). 
It is Mynhardt's son, disenchanted by military service, who 
connects numbing and indifference to the broader context of 
political and economic domination in South Africa. 'All that 
matters,' he says, 
is whether you can switch off all right .... I realised 
that nothing could shock me anymore. Nothing. Death, 
wounds, filth, atrocities, I couldn't care less 
this whole country depends for its survival on the fact 
that you can shut off your conscience' (RR, 292). 
In 'The dove in the grave', Brink's criticism of F. W. de Klerk's 
failure to draw 'the whole of South Africa into a communal act of 
contrition and concern' after Hani's murder, and his attack on De 
Klerk's obliviousness of 'the need to show remorse for apartheid' 
(11), brings to light similar forms of self-preservation through 
the disavowal of alterity. De Klerk's '"them-and-us"' (11) 
mindset 'shuts off' (RR, 292) any receptivity to the Other. Safe 
behind the 'bullet-proof windows' of an armourised vehicle he 
tours the townships, watching 'black rage' and objectifying the 
oppressed as 'dangerous and inferior' (11), instead of regarding 
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them as equivalent subjects. Thanks to this protected viewpoint, 
he. can continue to believe ~that he is immortal' (11), in 
counterpoint to Mandela's consciousness of his mortality. 
Remorseless and immortal because indifferent to the Other, De 
Klerk evades acknowledging his culpability in the violence he 
sees: he can escape the obliterating knowledge of what he is for 
the Other when an .I in his own. right, and not , merely the 
oppressor's object. Brink combines the themes of mortality, 
alterity, self-consciousness and the degradation of language-
relations, with the claim that de Klerk's ~[i]gnorance ... of his 
own -- that his, his regime's -- mortality' is precisely ~the 
core of the historical silence lurking 1n the heart of the 
present clamour' (11). In the absenc~ of reciprocity, 'clamour' 
consists in the silences of the victim at swordpoint and the 
aggressor at the sword's hilt. Embroiled 1n escalating feats of 
cruelty directed at his slaves, - Nicolaas ·describes the 
habituation by which he becomes numb to the nature of his 
violence ~It was such a simple discovery really: that 
revulsion diminishes; that only the first act in any series is 
important: the first time one forces onself, 1n lust and 
loathing, upon a black woman; the first time one ties a man's 
hands to flog him (CoV, 275) . With the implementation of a 
social practice which habitually negates the Other as another-.I, 
he says, one enters a solipsistic void in which both self and 
Other are alienated: ~All that remains 1s the agony of the 
silence surrounding every act -- a silence no longer penetrable 
from inside or out' ( CoV, 2 75) . Nicolaas is deprived of his 
~shadow' (States, 13 0) , the other-.I who reveals to him an 
untenable aspect of his identity. Like the victim, the aggressor 
plays a role in which he cannot recognize himself -- operating in 
a fictive self-understanding, he does not know what he is in his 
terrible actions. After all, ' [c] onsciousness of self, ' 
Benveniste notes, ~is only possible if it is experienced by 
contrast': that is, ~I use .I only when I am speaking to someone 
who will be a you in my address ... .I posits another person, the 
one who, being ... completely exterior to "me," becomes my echo 
to whom I say you and who says you to me' (1971, 224-5). But the 
aggressor cannot be you for another .I, since the victim is unable 
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to pronounce himself as an L, having been fixed as a you having 
the status of an it for both the aggressor and himself. The 
aggressor's dehumanisation of the victim thus alienates him from 
the victim's personhood and from the consciousness of self' 
afforded by the Other's L. Without this 'completely exerior' 
being capable of disqualifying his self-conception, the aggressor 
misrecognizes himself and is self-estranged. As Scarry says in 
relation to torture, the infliction of harm involves a 'negation 
of the [aggressor's] recognition of what is happening' (1985, 44) 
which in turn (as in Nicolaas's case) allows him to continue 
his destructive behaviour. By defensively negating the Other, he 
loses the means by which he may discover his guilt and thus be 
moved to desist from his actions. 
(ii) Levinas 
(a) Totality 
This state of affairs pre-occupies Levinas, particularly in 
Totality and Infinity. Where Sartre presents the Other as a foe, 
for Levinas it is instead the Same, 'produced as egoism' (1979, 
38), which lS characterised by a tendency to in-difference, the 
domination of difference. He proffers that the Other is not an 
alter ego formed as an analogue or projection of the subject, 
clothed with the latter's attributions, but stands beyond an 
abyssal disjunction with the Same as an extra-worldly, 
'unanticipatable' (1979, 34) being who is 'refractory to every 
typology, to every genus, to every characterology, to every 
classification' ( 73) . Certainly it is true that the Other is 
'present in a cultural whole and is illuminated by this whole, 
like a text by its context,' Levinas says, insisti~g, though, 
that the Other appears to the Same as other precisely by 
'divesting himself of the form which . . . manifests him' ( 19 8 6, 
351) within the phenomenal field of the Same. In Totality and 
Infinity, Levinas pursues this argument in a critique of the 
(Hegelian) philosophical tradition which regards being as 
determined by totality and which makes the l and the Other 'play 
the role of moments in a system, and not that of origin' (1979, 
216). Totalization is intrinsic to war, Levinas indicates, 
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whether this be war in historical fact or war as it features ln 
the conflictual models of philosophy. Being 'reveals itself as 
war to philosophical thought' since war is believed to expQse the 
austere reality peace elides; at the same time, the. 'visage ·of 
being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of 
totality, which dominates Western philosophy' (21). As a result, 
individuals 'are reduced to being bearers of forces that command 
them unbeknown to themselves', so that their meaning 'is derived 
from the totality' (21-2), in confirmation of Sartre 1 s 
observation that '[w]hen the enemy is separated from you by a 
barrier of fire, you have to judge him as a whole, as the 
incarnation of evil; all war is a form of Manicheism 1 (1966, 53). 
Circumscribed by a totality, by the SY,noptic scheme which, as a 
synopsis, presupposes the objectifying gaze of the Same, the 
Other is reified by the Same as a concept in a scrutable and 
knowable configuration. 'Thematization and conceptualization 
a~e not peace with the other,' Levinas states, 'but suppression 
and possession of the other' (1979, 46). Although the Other 'does 
indeed retain a foreignness with respect to the thinker that 
embraces it', it is 'naturalized as soon as it commits itself 
with knowledge', with the consequence that the Other 'at once 
ceases to strike up against thought' (1986, 345) 
(b) Infinity 
To strike up against thought, to trouble the in-different 
absorption of otherness into sameness -- according to Levinas, 
totality 'breaks up' (1979, 24) with 'the opening of a new 
dimension' (197) constituted by the 'transcendence in the face of 
the Other' (24) Situated on a 'gradient of transcendence' (87) 
over the world founded upon the Same's cognition, the Other is 
Most-High, such that the relation between the Same and the Other 
is 'the face-to-face of the man with bent neck and eyes raised 
toward the God on high' (Derrida, 1978, 107). The Other's height 
is coupled with his radical exteriority to the Same's thinking. 
'He is not wholly in my site' for he 'escapes my grasp by an 
essential dimension, even if I have him at my disposal' (1979, 
3 9) . 18 Moreover the Other appears to the Same as 'the idea of 
infinity' (25, emphasis added). Like infinity, 'overflow[ing] the 
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thought that thinks it' (25), exceeding all definitions which 
would match the infinite state with finite concepts, the Other is 
a 'surplus of being over the thought that claims to contain it' 
(27). He 'is infinitely other·because by his essence,' Derrida 
notes, 'no enrichment of his profile can give me the subjective 
face of his experience from his perspective, such as he has lived 
it' (1978, 124). The Other, above all, is a face gleaming through 
a neutralising concept. Not only is the face seen, it sees, it is 
'that which exchanges its glance' (Derrida, 1978, 98) in the 
face-to-face relation. The face is a doubling of immanence ln and 
transcendence of the world -- 'still a thing amongst things, [it] 
breaks through the form that nevertheless delimits it' (Levinas, 
1979, 98) . Crucially, Levinas assert? that 'the face speaks' 
(1979, 66; 1986, 352), and that its dis/appearance 'is already 
discourse' (1979, 66). In the intersubjectivity of their face to 
face encounter, the 'relation between the same and the other 
[both are speakers] ... is primordially enacted as conversation, 
where the same . . . leaves itself' ( 3 9) . 
(c) The Other's question and the Same's guilt 
As the 'unity of glance and speech' the face 'pronounces its 
hunger' (Derrida, 1978, 100). The Other's expression is a 
supplication, an appeal or a solicitation which does not allow me 
to forget my responsibility for his 'wretchedness' (Levinas, 
1986, 352). Indeed, Levinas is not concerned solely with arguing 
the Other's infinition over totality; a corresponding problematic 
examines how the Same is shamed in the Other's upsurge and so 
develops 'moral consciousness' ( 1979, 84) 'Whence comes to me 
this shock when I pass, indifferent, under the gaze of another?' 
he asks -- alterity 'puts me into question, empties me of myself' 
(1986, 350). Under the look of the Other, who surmounts attempts 
by the Same to nullify his reproach, the Same is guiltily aware 
that its freedom -- consisting in 'negating or possessing the 
non-me' (1979, 87), 'the determination of the other by the same' 
(85) lS 'arbitary and violent', 'murderous in its very 
exercise' ( 84) . In fact, the movement towards al terity which 
Levinas espouses, that is, 'the welcoming of the other by the 
same . . . is concretely produced as the calling into question of 
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the same by the other (43). The welcome is 'the 
consciousness of my own injustice -- the shame that freedom feels 
for itself' (86). The Other's expression issues a commandment, 
'you shall not commit murder' (216), ·while it presents a 'total 
question, a distress and denuding' (Derrida, 1978, 96) which 
'arous[es] my goodness' (Levinas, 1979, 200) and thereby undoes 
my ability for power' · (198), precipitating .a salutary 
depotentiation of the Same. In consequence, '[t]he I loses its 
sovereign coincidence with itself' (1986, 353), its self-identity 
posited on its self-confirmatory reduction of alterity at 
swordpoint. 
jg) Pacifism and discourse 
But how is this alterity to appear and pronounce its 
question, given that the violent relation, structured upon the 
weapon, is one in which an Other-as-object is determined by the 
self-immured subject? Levinas argues that the aggressor's 
transport is interrupted by the Other's face, by his gaze and 
speech, which re-situates the aggressor in the intersubjectivity 
of discourse and a relation with the Most-High. It is as if the 
victim's speech brings the aggressor back to 'the ethical 
essence of language' (Levinas, 1979, 200), reminding him of what 
he had forgotten, namely that the Other is absolutely exterior. 
War, as Levinas announces, 'presupposes peace, the antecedent and 
non-allergic presence of the Otheri it does not represent the 
first event of the encounter' (199) In response to war, he 
advocates 'the pacific opposition of discourse' (197) instead of 
forms of resistance in which alterity compromises itself by 
congealing into matter calculable and killable for the Same (197-
201): it does not let itself be drawn into the aggressor's game. 
That is, in the 'moral resistance' (225) Levinas espouses, the 
Other does not resist the Same's exercise of force by opposing a 
counter-force of his own, since in so doing he would become a 
quantifiable and computable element -- precisely an object of 
knowledge -- in the Same's realm. Rather, the Other's resistance 
proceeds from his qualitative difference to, and infinition over, 
the categories into which the Same consigns him. 'He thus opposes 
to me not a greater force . . . but the very transcendence of his 
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being not some superlative of power, but precisely the 
infinity of his transcendence [of the world] ' (Levinas, 1979, 
199). The Other's resistance proceeds, then, from discourse, 
which 'relates with what remains essentially transcendent' (195} ~· 
Putting this differently, what is 'essential' in language is 'the 
interpellation, the vocative' (69}, such that language 
'presupposes interlocutors', and thus 'maintains the other -- to 
whom it is addressed, whom it calls upon or invokes' (73} i given 
this 'essential' dimension of language, conversation is a 
welcoming of the Other in which one's murderous freedom is placed 
in question and in which one consequently becomes conscious of 
the injustice of one's actions towards the Other. Discourse, 
necessarily addressing the Other, is', Levinas says, 'teaching 
received' (197), as he 'teaches me who I am' (Sartre, 1986, 311} 
and makes me shamefully aware of my cruelty. In 'the pacific 
opposition of discourse' (Levinas, 1979, 197), I address the 
Other, and the Other addresses me: my speech 'seems to contain 
the Other' but it is directed at the infinitely Other, who 'has 
quit the theme that encompassed him, and upsurges inevitably 
behind the said' i correlatively the Other's speech to me does not 
delimit him, but is a trace from which he has absented himself, 
a dis/appearance in which he upsurges behind the phenomenal form 
he offers of himself. In discourse, I am emplaced in the 'formal 
structure of language [which] 9nnounces the ethical inviolability 
of the Other' (195, emphasis added) -- an inviolability which 
foregrounds the injustice and futility of my attempts to grasp 
and possess the Other. 
Levinas opposes 
dispute, as Derrida 
carries within it 
(iii) Derrida 
discourse to violence, but he would not 
remarks, 'that every historical language 
a certain violence' (1978, 148). For 
Levinas, it is rhetoric ('propaganda, flattery, diplomacy, etc.') 
which is 'preeminently violence' inasmuch as it 'appl [ies] a 
category' to another freedom (1979, 70). Nonetheless his 
concession 1n this respect does not alter the binarism between 
discourse and violence, since Levinas refers habitually to the 
'essential', 'first' and 'primordial' {passim} pacific functions 
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of language, with the result that language's contamination by 
violence is seen as secondary, aberrant, and an historical 
contingency underlain by an a-temporal foundation. Yet Derrida 
argues that this opposition is ultimately incoherent. Performing 
a reductio ad absurdum, he says that nonviolent language would be 
a language expunged of rhetoric, which 'appl(ies] a category' to 
the Other; such a language would then necessarily lack 
predication, that lS, verbs and common nouns: 'Would such a 
language still deserve its name?' (1979, 147), he wonders. The 
essentially nonviolent language would amount to a nonlanguage. 
I 
Conversely, language is informed in its essence by violence, ; 
since 'there is no phrase which is indeterminate, that is, which' 
does not pass through the violence of the concept' 'speech\ 
produced without the least violence would determine nothing 1 
would say nothing 1 ( 14 7) Derrida consequently claims, 
-Nonviolence would be the telos, -and nbt the essence of 
discourse' (116). According to Levinas, discourse situates 
speakers in the peaceful intersubjectivity fundamental to the 
Same-Other relation, in which the Same apprehends the Other as 
absolutely exterior to itself. But Derrida shows that Levinas's 
theoretical formulations, particularly those concerning the 
Other's absolute exteriority to the Same, thwart his overt 
intentions when strictly understood, for they preclude the very 
alterity Levinas wishes to respect, and hence court 'the worst 
violence . . . which precedes or represses discourse' ( 117) . 
Derrida' s argument is that were the Same and Other to 
encounter one another only on the basis of an absolute 
disrelation, would this not mean -- literally -- that they would 
not encounter each other at all? When the unthinkable Other is 
unrecognized as being other-than, it returns to the placidity of 
the Same. For Derrida, 'the other is absolutely other only if he 
is an ego, that is, if in a certain way he is the same as I' 
(127), if he 'say[s] "ego" as I do' (125). But if alterity is 
defined as non-analogous to the Same and outside violent 
operations making it the same-as-the-Same, it cannot be 
acknowledged by the Same as another-X, as an 'other origin of the 
world' ( 104) , and must be hence be assimilated as an aspect of 
the Same. Correlatively if the Other is not absolutely exterior 
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to the Same, the latter is 'not a totality closed in upon itself' 
(126); since the Same thus bears alterity 'in' it, the 
constitutive dimension of my being is that 'I know myself to be 
other for the other' (126). The·infinitely Other implies the 
infinitely Same, with the result that 'pure nonviolence, the 
nonrelation of the same to the other ... is pure violence' (146). 
Speech is haunted by an archaic residue of an 'absolute violence' 
of 'prelogical silence' ( 13 0) , which is an asymptote to which 
sameness tends as it expands towards infinity: as the Other is 
less and less regarded as another-I, and the Same is less and 
less exposed as another's other, the more monological its speech, 
and the more silenced the Other; the greater the clamour (and 
hence the silence) , the more the Same,' s loss of perspective on 
itself, the closer to absolute becomes the violence. 
Significantly, the infinitely Same's domination of alterity is 
predicated on its ignorance of mortality: were the I 'unable to 
be the other's other, [it] would never be the victim of violence' 
(126), Derrida remarks. 
In Derrida' s hands, Levinas' s description of peace thus 
inverts into a formula for 'pure violence' (Derrida, 1978, 146) 
and a silence in which the Other does not appear as other-than 
and the Same is not the other for another (the Other is entirely 
deadened, while the Same stays ignorant of its mortality) . But 
although Derrida reads Levinas's 'peace' as 'war', he suggests 
that this 'peace', apparently foundational, in fact presupposes 
an anterior violence in which the Other is recognised as another-
I by t_he. Same by being subject to violence making it the same-as-
I, while the Same knows itself as the other's other by realising 
its permanent possibility of being 'the vict-im of violence' 
(126). The anterior violence thus gives way an eirenic condition 
in which the Same apprehends the Other as.other. In particular, 
this violence is ' [v] iolence against violence' ( 117) , that is, 
violence perpetrated against violence tending to the foreclosure 
of al teri ty and to 'prelogical silence' ( 13 0) . Language -as-
violence, Derrida notes, can only indefinitely tend toward 
justice [in other words, toward the telos of nonviolence] by 
practicing the violence within it' (117). As in Brink's case, 
Derrida appears to envisage activist opposition to forms of 
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violence entrenching an 'historical silence' between Same and 
Other opposition which thereby affirms the perpetually 
deferred telos of pure nonviolence. 
IV. Third silence: Yotttopia 
'They are all listening to me . . . . It is an intense 
pleasure, physical, inexpressible, to be at home, 
among friendly people and to have so many things to 
recount: but I cannot help noticing that my listeners 
do not follow. In fact, they are completely indifferent: 
they speak confusedly of other things among themselves, 
as if I was not there .... Why is the pain of every day 
translated so constantly into our dreams, in the ever-
-repeated scene of the unlistened-to story' 
-- Primo Levi 19 
'And perhaps someone will hear us calling out, all these 
voices in the great silence, all of us together, all of 
us forever alone' 
-- Andre Brink20 
'Poems ... are always underway, they are making toward 
something. 
Toward what? Toward something standing open, occupiable, 
perhaps toward a "thou" that can be addressed, an addressable 
reality' 
Paul Celan21 
'In analysis a subject offers himself as being capable of being 
understood ... ' 
Jacques Lacan22 
(i) Deafness: destruction of the agora 
Between the self-alienated silence of a victim who cannot be an 
I and that of an aggressor who lacks a you, is a third silence 
given ln their lack of a common topos. In the tripartite 
configuration of the sword, this hiatus between self and Other is 
constituted by the sword's dis-connecting shaft across which 
their non-encounter is played out as Scarry says, the 
structure of the weapon may be regarded as 'a singular vertical 
line yet so radically different at its two ends that it can in 
the same moment be pictured as connecting the two realms and 
preserving their absolute difference' (1985, 38). To cite a 
metaphor which likewise suggests disrelation within relation, 
aggressor and victim can be said to be clapped in chains. The 
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slave Galant yearns to embark on action in which he can posit his 
autonomous iden_!::ity so that he 'can know for sure: This lS me, L_ 
Galant' (CoV, 292), while Nicolaas, the isolated master, wishes 
he 'could break through to someone; to Galant' (181): although 
the chain binds them it also separates and casts them in a 'chain 
of voices', a clamourous 'talking and talking' (431) without 
reciprocity. Such 'talking' amounts to 'a silence of confusion 
and incomprehension' (ADWS, 305). Counterposed to the 'endless 
chain of voices, all together yet all apart' (CoV, 431), a system 
of slavery aptronymically represented by the farm Houd-den-Bek 
('Shut-your-trap'), is the sunlit agora beyond Plato's cave, on 
'the other side' of slavery where '[t]here will be a sun rising' 
(395). In this clearing (a stable sit~, a zone of interpersonal 
clarity) , Galant says, 'we' 11 really know each other' ( 3 95) , 
while discourse will realize its eirenic 'essence' The agora is 
a space of mutual visibility which supersedes a volatized, 
claustrophobic zone of blindness; it is a mythical site of 
knowledge on 'the other side' of misprision. As Borch-Jacobsen 
writes in a commentary on Lacan's conception of 'the place of the 
Other', 'There is no truth, in the philosophical sense, that does 
not imply and exact an "opening", and "openness" into which it 
can unfold and where ev~rything comes to light' (1991, 131)~ It 
is a settlement: a space of common occupation in which former 
enemies meet, a place of composure after the agitated movements 
of the maelstrom or deluge with which Brink equates violence, a 
forum in which agreement is reached, and a site where identities 
can be reciprocally manifested to each other. Thus, the polis is 
a haven of fellowship -- an amity on 'the other side' of the 
present, which, in An Act of Terror, is prefigured by the 
familial ebullience and comfort of the exiles who, '[l]ike long-
lost relatives', 'talk about our beloved land, laughing, crying, 
laughing again' (56) and sing, 'tomorrow we're going home, 
tomorrow we're back in the land that lS ours' (57) The 
communality of the polis gives the exiles an 'intense pleasure, 
physical, inexpressible'' (Levi, in Felman and Laub, 1992, 68). 
They delight in their welcoming of the Other, who, like a long-
lost relative, discloses to them their unsuspected affiliation to 
a realm beyond their privatised selves; they take pleasure in a 
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euphoric speech and an enthusiastic reception of it. 
It is such a space, Brink argues in 'The dove in the grave', 
which Chris Bani's murder has jeopardised. What makes his 
assasssination so excessively scandalous is a sense that an 
opportunity which was close to realization had been irresponsibly 
wasted by the 'mindless violence' (11) of a right-wing conspiracy 
which sought to deepen racial polarization and ruin the prospects 
for a political settlement at a moment when these were most 
propitious~ 'The assassination's impact is so shattering because 
it happened at a time when, for the first time in many years, ' 
Brink claims, 'South Africans across the political spectrum, from 
far right to extreme left, appeared at last to be emerging from 
a spiral of deepening violenc~ towards negotiation, 
reconciliation and a cautious hope' (11) . Invoking a 
characteristic motif of an irrepressible tidal force seeking to 
erupt and manifest its plenum in the light of day, Brink declares 
that Bani's death has stoppered an 'unstoppable basic groundswell 
towards understanding and the resolution of conflict through 
peaceful means' ( 11) . He is baffled by the 'mindless violence' 
( 11) , the inscrutable Schadenfreude, of those who violate a 
nascent social bond by pitting sectional interests against each 
other and undermining the prospect for widespread mutual 
'understanding'. Bani's assassins obstruct the unfolding of the 
topos of a communal parley and voluptuous convergence; instead, 
they entrench nonreciprocity between an alienated oppressor and 
the dehumanised oppressed, so reinforcing an 'historical silence' 
(11) alien to the rapturous speech and enraptured audition which 
obtains in the agora. 
(ii) Despair: doubting 'the universal witness' 
' [I] t was hard to resist the temptation of despair' ( 11) , 
Brink thus confesses, disabled by the prospect of endemic 
violence, like many of the authorial surrogates found in his 
novels. Yet he guiltily recalls counsel which had sustained him 
during previous national crises. The Great Rabbi of Paris, in 
answer to Brink's despondency, had told him, '"To despair ... is 
an insult to the future'" (11). In the condition of despair, one 
yields to engulfment by the seemingly immutable clamour and 
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dereliction of the 'historical silence', believing that nothing 
can be done to alter what looks like an inescapable fate. Despair 
indicates the atrophy of sensibilities capable of en'visioning 
different relations with others, and a fatigued resignation to an 
enslaving world which holds out no hope of satisfaction. 
Hopelessness: on his way to prison after the rebellion, Achilles 
echoes Alida's assertion of hegemony's unchangeable dominance in 
her way of life -- 'Not even death could make a difference' (CoV, 
287) -- when he claims that since 'the hardest thing to live with 
is hope' (484), its loss finalises his adaptation to the 
strictures of oppression, and to his silencing by Houd-den-Bek, 
the institution of slavery. Despair is the misery of being 
consigned to an interminable dormancy. As Philip declares in 
reaction to the charge, 'Perhaps nobody will ever really know 
you, ' it entails an 'unbearable awareness of my own solitude, the 
feeling of being "stuck" in myself' (States, 55) . Significantly, 
his lovelessness is bound up with his embroilment in a society at 
war -- in war's loveless clamour, he is unrelat~d, unintegra~ed 
and unmanifested. 
But why should despair be an 'insult to the future'? One may 
adduce two reasons. First, it doubts the indubitable -- it is a 
lapse of faith doubting the prospects for a transparent 
commuhity, a 'future' that will manifest itself someday 
irrespective of single person's weakness. Borne forward by 'an 
unstoppable basic groundswell' (Dove, 11, emphasis added) , the 
'future' is the telos of an independent force which will 
inevitably debouch into the nation-space. Second, despair's over-
concern with the unalterable present means that those who can 
turn what is potential into reality stay inactive instead. It is, 
in short, an immersion in sameness, prohibiting one from 
conceiving an outside to an all-dominating present. 
Over and above its moral injunction, however, what is 
striking about the Great Rabbi's formulation is the way it 
personifies the 'future' 'the democratic future' (Dove, 11), 
according to Brink -- as a collective entity capable of taking 
offence; moreover, one is constrained to conduct oneself with 
fidelity towards this Leviathan, dolefully looking back over 
present waywardness from its indeterminate vantage point. That is 
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to say, the ~future' is a sentient Other in relation to whom one 
has to discharge certain ethical obligations. The Great Rabbi's 
apothegm may be read as an enjoinder for one to re-insert, in the 
chasm between the sword's hilt and point, the future topos of the 
assembled citizenry: more specifically, it is a summons for the 
one in despair imaginatively to re-create and invoke an Other 
outside the oppressive sameness in which he is trapped. So where 
the victim, overshadowed by the death-bearing Other, had resigned 
himself to being the object which he is for the Other, and had 
thus internalised the Other's perspectives, the reassertion of 
this topos -- or other-Other -- opens up a luminous site beyond 
the aggressor's frames of reference. Where the aggressor had 
encountered no alterity putting his fre~dom into doubt, the agora 
now appears ln the questioning look of the Other. Where a 
specular doubling or symmetry had applied in the relation between 
self and Other, the dyadic enclosure must be fractured by 
invoking thirdness, as in States of Emergency, which demonstrates 
how the lovers' apparently selfsubsistent sanctuary intersects 
with public space such that each is, for the other, not a limit-
point but a liminal figure opening up onto the aoora. Love ~goes 
beyond the beloved,' Levinas claims, since ~through the face 
filters the obscure light coming from beyond the face, from what 
is not yet (1979, 254). As Levinas explains elsewhere, 
~Everything that takes place here "between us" concerns everyone' 
and occurs ~in the full light of the public order, even if I draw 
back from it to seek with the interlocutor the complicity of a 
private relation ... ' (212). More simply he remarks, ~The third 
party looks at me in the eyes of the Other' (213) . Who is this 
~third party'? The ~third party' is, as Derrida glosses, ~the 
universal witness' (1978, 314); or as Levinas himself says, ~The 
presence of the face, the infinity of the other, is a presence of 
the third party (that is, of the whole of humanity which looks at 
us)' (1979, 213); even more directly, it is ~the whole of 
humanity, in the eyes that look at me' (213) . Like the Great 
Rabbi's ~future' and Brink's ~democratic future', then, Levinas's 
Other is a nontotalizable collectivity, a suffering gaze which 
bears insults, and a being to which one is ethically obligated. 
In short, the Other-as-agora is a witness to one's actions, and 
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a witness to which these ~t actions must in turn bear witness. 
Depairing is, in this sense, a disconfirmation of the 
future/Other, and hence precisely not an instance of bearing 
witness to the latter's 'reality'. Conversely, indeed to bear 
witness to and for a future Other-as-agora is not only to confirm 
though one's actions its nascent reality, however deferredi it is 
.also to project oneself, by an act of faith, beyond an entrapping 
sameness toward a futural site in which the 'intense pleasure' of 
communality can at last be enjoyed. 
(iii) Witnessing as creation of an addressable Other 
According to the psychoanalyst Dori Laub, the re-affirmation 
of such an exterior witness by the analysand is a pivotal moment 
ln his treatment of Holocaust survivors and their children, while 
its absence threatens to precipitate the analysand's re-
experiencing of the traumatic event by re-emplacing him or her in 
an enclosure which prevents access to an outside space in which 
he or she can gain authentic recognition from an·addressee (1992, 
67) . The ghetto and the concentration camp frequently appear ln 
Testimony, Laub's collaborative work with Felman, not solely as 
physical sites of incarceration, but also as paradigms for the 
structures of psychological and semiotic closure in which victims 
are trapped. Thus, the motif of testimony as 'the breakage of a 
framework' (60), a 'breaking out of Auschwitz' (62), or an 
'exploding' of containing conceptual frames ( 223) , features 
prominently in their work. For instance, Laub discusses a 
survivor whose report of a revolt in Auschwitz, he maintains, 
constituted both a statement about an event, and an event in 
itself: the enactment of an escape from Auschwitz's 'deadly 
timelessness' (59) , its. enduring grasp on her life. ' [S] he is 
breaking out of Auschwitz,' he notes, even by her very talking' 
(62). What gives this ek-static speech event its special 
importance in Laub's view is the fact that, while the Holocaust 
created a totally enclosing world in which 'the very imagination 
of the Other was no longer possible' ( 81) , the analysand's 
'breakage of the frame' (63) of Auschwitz implies that she re-
asserts 'an independent frame of reference' (81), an other-world, 
and the world of an Other 'to which [she] could say "Thou" in the 
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hope of being heard' ( 82) . However fleetingly, she succeeds in 
re-imagining an exterior witness to whom she can address herself: 
her act of witnessing presupposes the existence of such an Other. 
For Felman and Laub, this presupposition on the part of a speaker 
is a prerequisite for witnessing to take place -- without it, 
witnessing cannot be said to occur. Hence they can make the 
claim, startling in view of the empirical volume of first-person 
accounts of the Holocaust, that the latter was an event which 
'produced no witnesses' (80) 
brutally literal sense that 
Their claim is intelligible in the 
the Holocaust tried to kill and 
entirely deceive all potential witnesses. Yet above all their 
astonishing argument should be taken in the philosophical sense 
that survivors felt inhibited in test~fying to it -- primarily, 
they say, since the Holocaust effected a foreclosure of the 
Other, such that 'the very imagination of the Other was no longer 
possible' (81) for those locked inside it. As a result, one lacks 
'an other to which one could say "Thou" in the hope of being 
heard, of being recognized as a subject [rather than being 
reified as an it], of being answered' (82). Without one's 
(imaginative or faith-ful) projection of an Other, and therefore 
without one's projection of oneself toward the Other's 
exteriority, and away from an enclosing space of sameness, one is 
immured in the master's definitions of the experience, and so 
cannot bear witness 'to the truth of an event' (80). Without the 
presupposition of 'a universal witness' (Derrida, 1978, 314), one 
lacks a witness -- a 'Thou' by whom one can be heard -- to whom 
one could indeed bear witness. 
Let us proceed through these arguments ln greater detail. 
Felman and Laub claim that the Holocaust 'produced no witnesses' 
(81), by which they mean that the two defining features of a 
witness -- the witness sees, the witness speaks -- were annulled 
by the Holocaust. 
First, the witness is one who has seen at first-hand (207) 
and whose vision is held to imply an authoritative knowledge: she 
'is a witness to the truth of an event' ( 8 0) . But Felman 
indicates, however, that specific elements of the programme of 
genocide notably the systematic deception practised on victims 
-- broke the relationship between seeing and knowing (207-11). In 
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addition, Laub observes that generally trauma 'precludes its 
registration', since the psyche's 'observing and recording 
mechanisms are temporarily knocked out (57) . 23 His strongest 
argument concerning the destruction of witnessing is that no 
historical insider to the Holocaust could have remained 'a lucid, 
unaffected witness 1 to the 'truth of [the] event 1 (80) in the 
face of such a 'contaminating' atrocity (81) In terms 
reminiscent of Brink's metaphor24 of the 'whirlpool that has 
sucked us in' (Act, 230) and plunged aggressors and victims into 
a vortex of misprision and disorientation, Laub says that no-one 
could 'be sufficiently detached from the inside, so as to stay 
entirely outside of the trapping roles ... either of the victim 
or of the executioner' (81). The disaster is without an outside 
' 
a~ its closure is effectuated by an internal doubling in which 
the victim becomes the executioner's double or category, while 
the victim becomes for himself what he is for the aggressor (Laub 
notes that victims were 'convinced' of their inhumanity by the 
Nazis, so that they feel they have 'no right to speak up or 
protest'i 82). The consequence is that both aggressor and victim 
are locked inside sameness, that is, within dominant definitions 
of reality and allocations of identities: a world of despair, in 
which all hope of an 'outside' or a transcendent 'beyond' is 
lost. 
While the witness is presumed to possess knowledge on the 
grounds of her personal experience and the im-mediacy of her 
seeing, the combination of doubling and enclosing which occurs 
between victim and aggressor means that 'her 1 knowledge is 
mediated by the master's discourse. But this lack of an 
independent frame of reference' (Laub, 1992, 81) also relates to 
a second defining feature of the witness -- her performance of a 
speech act called 'witnessing' or 'testifying 1 • 'To testify, 1 
Felman writes, 'to vow to tell, to promise and produce one's own 
speech as material evidence for truth -- 1s to accomplish a 
speech act, rather than to simply formulate a statement' (1992, 
5) . For Felman the importance of witnessing lies not so much in 
the knowledge which it tranmsits as it does in the act of bearing 
witness, that is, in the saying which -- as an address to an 
interlocutor -- posits an Other to whom it is directed. The 
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saying is, in other words, an event taking place in the hearing 
of the Other. More specifically, it is an invocation of the 
Other-who-hears -- a summoning of a witness who, in turn, can 
witness (audit, verify) the witness 1 s speech. And since the 
testimony does not constitute a completed statement' or a 
totalizable account' of events (5), but is part of a process (a 
judicial inquiry, for instance) rather than a final product, it 
is uttered as a contribution to a project larger than the 
testifying agent: that is to say, the Other for whom one labours 
is not a singular being but a liminal figure standing on the 
horizon between the nearness-to-hand of sameness, and the 
exteriority or alterity unfolding beyond the Same's line of sight 
(recalling Levinas, the Other is both singular and universal, an-
other person as well as ~the whole of humanity which looks at us' 
from his or her eyes; 1979, 213). As Felman asserts, ~By virtue 
of the fact that the testimony is addressed to others, the 
witness, from within the solitude of his own stance [a field of 
sameness], is the vehicle of ... a dimension beyond himself' (3). 
And by postulating ~a dimension beyond himself' -- or a project 
greater than himself the witness invokes an Other, who in 
Felman's discourse takes on the civic forms of the polis. Bearing 
witness, she observes, involves offering discourse 'before a 
court of law or before the court of history and of the future ... 
before an audience of readers or spectators' (204). 
Yet the Other for whose benefit the witness utters his 
testimony is at the same time the Other from whom he solicits 
recognition. By seeking ~to impress upon a listener, to appeal 
to a community' (204), the witness ~institutes the other as a 
subject of desire and, as such, a subject of response, of a 
called for answer' (32). Within his testimonial apostrophe to the 
Other in the agora, or -- as in Levinas -- the agora in the 
Other, the witness is a supplicant who desires from a desired 
Other an 'answer', or an intimation of his/her/their reciprocated 
desire for him. Testimony, in short, is more than a statement of 
historical record, more than an act located in an intersubjective 
register: it is a demand animated by desire for recognition from 
an Other-as-agora. ~It is only by being 11 recognised 11 by another, 
by many others, or -- in the extreme -- by all others, that a 
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human being is really human, for himself as well as for others,' 
declared Alexandre Kojeve (1986, 103, emphasis added). 
For the Holocaust survivor, whose consciousness is dominated 
by the doubling sameness of a master's discourse, witnessing is 
thus out of the question. She cannot discharge the witness's duty 
to speak the truth, as she speaks from her enslavement to a 
master's frames of reference, which Laub describes as a 
'delusional ideology' (81) foisted on aggressors and victims 
alike. Correlative to her entrapment i~ this 'delusional' scheme 
is her despairing inability to conceive an Other-as-agora and 
thereby to situate herself in relation to an outside, independent 
space (or opening in sameness) into which 'truth' might unfold. 
Instead, she is constrained to reiterate the terms of the 
master's discourse, and, as such, is unable to satisfy the 
testimonial imperative to speak the 'truth' outside of a 
delusional ideology' (81). Moreover, she cannot pronounce -- or 
even hope to satisfy -- her desire for recognition since she 
remains enclosed in an aggressor's realm in which she lacks 'an 
addressable other, an other who can hear the anguish of [her] 
memories and recognise their realness': the result is that her 
potential testimony is silenced as an 'unlistened-to story' 
(Laub, 1992, 68) devoid of acknowledged realness. Her selfhood is 
thus left to petrify/putrify in the recesses of hegemonic 
discourse. 
As we shall see, Brink's work demonstrates a structural and 
thematic pre-occupation with issues of witnessing, in particular 
with the notions, discussed above, that bearing witness involves 
the invocation of an Other or 'democratic future' (Dove, 11), and 
that the desire by the witness for his story to be heard by the 
Other implies a desire for redemption from a condition of non-
being. Structurally, many of his novels are presented as 
compilations of testimonies. Most notably this is the case in A 
Chain of Voices, but the same is also true of A Dry White Season, 
which is offered as an authorial re-working and improvement of 
fragmentary testimony left in the narrator's care by a 
politically-active friend. Similarly, States of Emergency is a 
record of a period of civil upheaval and its impact on a writer 
struggling to make headway on his planned novel, while An Act of 
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Terror purports to be both Landman's third-person documentation 
of events he underwent (at the narrative's end he announces that 
he will be writing an account of these events, a declaration 
which retroactively defines the preceding narrative as the text 
he himself will have composed) as well as a collage of 
testimonies by indi victuals whose lives have been affected by 
Landman and whose attitudes to the South African problem have 
either been challenged or reinforced by him (in many ways, the 
collage is a sample of the diversity of ideological positions in 
South Africa, a ~poll' gathered for the benefit of posterity). 
Thematically, Brink's work has a recurring fascination with what 
I termed the doubling of the master's discourse, in which a 
master ascribes a category of his own devising to the slave while 
the latter in turn identifies with this ascription (a process 
akin to the dynamics described in Althusser's theory of 
interpellation, which I shall soon discuss). Brink's concern with 
this doubling is shown in his various critiques of the doxa 
instrumental to hegemony -- attacks directed at the way in which 
the doxa appropriates contending voices into terms consonant with 
itself and thereby deprives them of autonomous realness so that 
they are discarded as ~unlistened-to stor[ies]' (Felman and Laub, 
1992, 68). A question arises: Given the doxa's deafness to these 
voices -- an irony as they are subjected to so-called official 
hearings who are they to call upon as the addressable Other 
capable of witnessing their witnessing? The answer Brink 
implicitly advances is that they must affirm their faith in the 
existence an encompassing metanarrative ln which hegemony's 
deafness is a temporary delay in a progression toward an audition 
by ~the future'. This answer in turn points to the function the 
writer must fulfill, that of a conservator bridging present and 
future. A conservator is 'a person who conserves or keeps safe; 
a custodian, guardian, protector' (C. E. D.) and whose labour is 
therefore directed, on the one hand, to preservation, and, on the 
other, to facilitating the use and enjoyment of what he keeps in 
his custodial care. Said plainly, he preserves testimonies from 
their erasure by the doxa for the benefit both of the witnesses 
in question and of 'the future' itself. He does this with a 
double gesture of inscription (recording, citing, fabulating, and 
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retrieving archival documents) and of circulation (launching the 
inscribed sign into the polysemous play of the signifier, a play 
in which the signifier disperses into varying contexts, and 
thereby insinuates itself into the lives of those receiving it) . 
The Text, inaugurating a polyphony or 'stereophony' (Barthes, 
1988, 193), as opposed to the doxa's monologic reduction of 
meanings, hence anticipates the youtopia where no discourse 
dominates or deafens itself to an-other. Simultaneously 
inscribing the witness's text and liberating it into the 
prefigurative openness of the inter-text, the Conservator affirms 
faith in the futural agora (the site of rapturous speech and 
ardent audition) , and ressurects the testimony of unlistened-to 
witnesses into the life of the polyphonic signifier. For the 
witness the Conservator is an emissary of the 'universal 
witness', a witness to his witnessing; for the witness he is a 
liminal being at the threshold between worlds. He is the Other. 
But now let us expand on these claims. 
(iv) Hegemony's deafness and unlistened-to stories 
Brink's A Chain of Voices is composed of a collection of 
affidavits gathered for the scrutiny of a tribunal prosecuting 
the participants of a slave rebellion. Yet the official hearing, 
undertaken by a judiciary that enforces the legality of slavery 
and that thus serves hegemonic sectional interests rather than 
those of social unity, is in a crucial sense deaf to the 
testimonies before it. Nevertheless, the juridical commentaries 
prefacing and concluding the first-person narratives purport to 
be an authoritative interpretation having sole legitimacy to 
deliver a verdict -- or to speak the truth -- on secondary texts 
seen as replete with either outright lies or self-deceptions. 
Galant's complex ratiocinations and ambivalence about resorting 
to violence are ignored by the court, for instance; instead, he 
is demonised as a barbarian proferring spurious justifications 
for having bitten the hand that fed him. 'With respect to the 
other Prisoners,' says the court, summarily dismissing the nexus 
of motivations that led them to rebel, 'we do not need to say 
much' (506). Evidently unable to act upon motives any more 
complex than a wish to vent grievances and seek base 
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gratifications, and void of the wherewithal to think 
independently, the rebels were, states the court, merely 
'seduced' (506) by Galant. The narratives are thus depleted of 
autonomous utterance by a juridical framework which extracts from 
them a single meaning presumed to have been dormant in them from 
the outset. Restating this, the voices are quoted as object-
languages 1n a dominant syntax that asserts its own meaning 
through them, regardless of what they themselves may say. In 
short, the master's discourse utters their death sentence -- a 
penalty of incarceration, execution, and semiotic inscription. 
Case closed, 1825. 
The court's reduction of the narratives into terms congruent 
with an official definition of reality is an example of the logic 
of identity, in which otherness is appropriated by sameness and 
its alterity discarded as an 'unlistened-to story'. As in States 
of Emergency, where the 'invasion' of the text by the literary 
and ideological codes narrows the imaginative possibilities 
available to the writer, the testimonies are converted into 
connotative signifiers necessarily tied (or so the verdict would 
have it) to a repertoire of hegemonic signifieds, or a 
smothering layer of received ideas' (Barthes, in Silverman, 1983, 
31) . For Barthes, these ideas and the semiotic practices 
entrenching them -- constitute the doxa functional to dominant 
sectional interests. As 'the Voice of Nature, the Violence of 
Prejudice' (Barthes, 1977, 47), the doxa assimilates social 
reality in an image of itself 'so that no social arrangement 
different from the present could even be imagined' (Eagleton, 
1991, 157) and no contending voices be heard. Following one of 
the cardinal principles of ideological production identified by 
Al thusser, 'ideology never says, 11 I am ideological 11 ' ( 1971, 4 9) , 
the doxa effaces its social specificity by presenting itself as 
that which is naturally given as a common-sensical dispensation. 
Thanks to its self-certitude, it rules out the spectre of any 
radical alteration of its determining social matrix and so cannot 
be put in question, that is, be called into question by the 
Other, whose silencing is the sacrificial debt on which 
hegemony's in-difference depends. 
The processes by which the doxa supports the Apartheid state 
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and constitutes discourse as the violence of a s/word are key 
pre-occupations in Brink•s work. His concern with these processes 
informs the structure of A Chain of Voices, in which the series 
of testimonies are imaged as links 1n a chain, as subordinate 
components within the master•s doxa, while in States of Emergency 
semiotic emplacement is nothing less than the violence the writer 
undergoes so as to experience his death on his own terms; they 
are present in An Act of Terror in satirical jibes at 'a country 
choking in its own cliches• (132), doxa 'pronounced so many times 
that even the speakers had begun to· believe them• (165). Such 
barbs highlight Brink•s continual assault on a stultifying social 
order (whimsically likened to a cage of 'contented and pampered• 
(160) primates) the ideological insularity of which has evidently 
gone hand in hand with the existential decline of its subjects. 
This order is predicated on the exclusion of otherness: other 
itineraries, other discourses. Indeed, the dramatic tension 
between Thomas Landman and his politically conservative father 
centres upon a historiographical dispute in which their divergent 
positions in this regard are wedded to the broader life-choices 
each has made. Bearing out the claim that hegemony institutes 
itself 'by rewriting history, wiping out memory• (501), Thomas•s 
father chronicles the history of the Landman family in terms of 
the state•s founding myth of a racially and morally pure white 
elect who strove to impress Christian civilization on heathen 
soil. Whatever does not tally with his hagiography, he informs 
his revisionist son, is 'just not thinkable• (222); Thomas•s own 
account, forming the supplement to 'An Act of Terror 1 , is a 
dissident history, not only in the sense that it attempts to 
redress the lacunae in the official version, but also in its 
portrayal of his ancestors as people at variance precisely with 
the 'thinkable•, struggling 'against the confines of their crude 
and unintelligible world 1 and trying 'to reconcile [their] 
passions with the demands of the 11 real 11 world• (692). Once again, 
the doxa of 'the 11 real 11 world 1 is associated with impoverishment, 
and seen as unresponsive to 'passions • not conforming to its 
paradigms. 
(v) The doxa•s nullification of being 
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Even from this brief overview it is evident that limiting 
meaning in accordance with what the doxa conceives as being 
thinkable is more than a question of privileging and excluding 
various modes of knowing the social real. Knowing is tied to 
being. What gives trenchancy to the relationship between the 
alienated oppressor and the dehumanised oppressed is that the 
sword mediating between them assigns being to the oppressor and 
non-being to the oppressed. The oppressor evades consciousness of 
mortality through an identification with the doxa, while the 
oppressed endures on condition that he become for himself what he 
is for the Other, and so accede to the terms of the doxa at the 
expense of his own 'selfhood'. This delimitation for oppressor 
and oppressed alike of what is thinkable is thus not solely an 
epistemological matter, but is linked to the entrenchment or 
rejection of different existential possibilities, to the 
consolidation or exclusion of various identities. As Althusser 
contends in his influential argument, ... Ideology interpellates 
individuals as subjects' (1971, 44), meaning that for ideology to 
pass itself off as common-sensical and obvious, it has to hail 
concrete individuals as self -determining agents who 'freely' 
endorse the ideology's codes and assumptions as verities which 
they have stumbled onto in their own experience, unencumbered by 
any ideological constructs: 'That's right! That's true!' (46) 
exclaim these subjects as they (freely) inhabit the perspectives 
from which ideology makes the real intelligible. Yet Eagleton is 
surely right in suggesting that Althusser shifts from the 
traditional 'cognitive' theory of ideology, in which the latter 
comprises 'distorting representations of reality', to an 
'affective' theory dealing with the way it 'constitute[s] human 
beings as social subjects' who invest in 
crucial part of what it is to. be themselves' 
social forms as a 
(1991, 18-19) . The 
positions of knowledge which ideology makes available are, in 
short, positions of desire to desire to know is to desire to 
be (like) the one who knows (such matters, experiences, 
attitudes), to be a subject for whom the code is intelligible, to 
be an insider to specific meanings. For Althusser, ideological 
interpellation elicits the cry 'That's right!' as well as an 
exclamation of self-recognition, 'Yes, it really is me!' by which 
130 
it obtains from its addressees ~the recognition that they really 
do occupy the place it designates for them as theirs (1971, 
52). In the process of interpellation, the individual pro-jects 
herself into the slot allocated her, and like the powerless 
infant described in Lacan' s account 
vicariously enjoying mastery by 
of the mirror- stage 
identifying with its 
plenitudinous specular counterpart -- she escapes her fragmented 
condition, revelling in a consolingly coherent image of 
[herself] reflected back in the "mirror" of a dominant 
ideological discourse' (Eagleton, 1991, 142) . 
Hence, Thomas Landman's indignation at ~a country choking in 
its own cliches' (Act, 132) , at the doxa espoused by 
representatives of the South African power elite at a braai at 
his brother's house, derives not simply from the perceived 
erroneousness of their views, from their inability to think 
beyond the platitudes of a discourse circulating autonomously of 
speakers (such was the conformity of the guest~s) discourses that 
'after a while they all became interchangeable'; 133), and from 
their ready neutralisation of opposing viewpoints. Landman also 
derides their smug self-assurance and conviction in the military 
and moral strength of the dominant order -- an assurance, he 
points out, which disavows that this order is a ~decaying 
carcass' (136), already marked by mortality. More broadly, the 
narratorial critique in An Act of Terror is directed at an 
hegemonic structure in which its subjects have been alienated by 
their identification with, or, at best, despairing resignation 
to, its impoverishing conceptual framework and the identities it 
makes available. 
Yet conversely Brink's novels reiterate that the cost of 
dissenting from the doubling between oppressor and oppressed is 
a fall into a zone in which one cannot make oneself heard or 
recognise oneself within hegemonic formations. That is to say, 
one's meaning will be misconstrued in the doxa, while one will be 
unable to obtain confirmation of one's identity. To speak the 
doxa is to assume the likeness of the authoritative one who 
knows, and thus to enjoy the social power or, at the very least, 
the provisional safety, of a mode of knowing and being that is 
sanctioned -- recognised -- by the sectional formation. On the 
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other hand, transgression (whether sexual or political) is 
significantly coupled with the transgressor•s sense of having 
been displaced from dominant codes, and of no longer having an 
identity that is intelligible to others in his or her ideological 
bloc. Lacking an ~addressable other• (Laub, 1992, 68), she or he 
consequently founders in non-being, undesired and so unvalidated 
by ~a subject of response• (Felman, 1992, 32). For example, 1n 
the midst of his self-destructive resistance to the patriarchal 
order which decreed him to be a slave-master, Nicolaas finds that 
he cannot make sense of the Bible, whereas it had once been ~so 
clear, so reassuring, so self-evident• (CoV, 181); this 
estrangement from God is accompanied by a loss of identity, as 
his obedience to God•s laws had structured his identity as a 
familiar set of habitual behaviours, now thrown in disarray. The 
illiterate Galant, on the other hand, importuning Nicolaas to 
teach him to read or tearing up a newspaper in frustration, wants 
to be recognised by the symbolic order -- literally to read news 
of the slaves• manumission -- but never is, and so embarks on a 
project of radical transgression. 
In A Dry White Season, Ben du Toit • s investigation into 
Gordon Ngubene•s death at the hands of state security police 
causes him to run afoul of various hegemonic institutions until 
he himself is assassinated. Initially he believes that the 
security police fulfill a legitimate role but that they have 
quite simply detained the wrong man. With Ngubene • s death, 
however, Ben comes into contact with a succession of black South 
;Africans whose suffering brings him to a new consciousness that 
the notions he had accepted about the moral legitimacy and self-
evident given-ness of the apartheid system conceal its brutality 
and provisionality from the ruling class. His perceived treachery 
to this class and his interrogations of the doxa which had 
regulated his identity turns him into an outcast lacking a 
language through which he can address his peers. ~Inside you is 
a manner of knowing which you cannot share with anyone else, • Ben 
writes: although ~ [y] ou can still see the other people 1 and 
~exchange sounds• with them, ~[y]ou•re on the other side• (158), 
on the other side of the doxa• sameness. ~And how, • he asks, can 
I explain it in the words of 11 this side 11 ? 1 (158). The language he 
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seeks is one which will not only convey a different knowledge but 
which will facilitate his recognition, rather than rejection, by 
his former compatriots: by ~explain[ing]' his knowledge to an 
~addressable other' he ~explain (s] ' himself, instead of 
languishing under the misattributions of an order wilfully deaf 
to the bad news he brings. Without such a language he is 
progressively stripped of identity, harried by scandal, 
pressurised from his job as a teacher, separated from his wife, 
renounced as a father by his daughter (she betrays him to the 
police), and finally murdered. It is nevertheless the case that 
his persistence in seeking redress from the the representatives 
of key state apparatuses the church, the Afrikaans Press, 
parliament, the cabinet, chambers of commerce -- underlines a 
wish to elicit recognition precisely from the sectional group 
which founds his identity. That is to say, his desire ~to "clean 
up" Gordon's name' (236), to make the events surrounding Gordon's 
death 'come into the open' (142), to challenge the ruling order, 
and to obtain recognition, are all closely interrelated inasmuch 
as the order's recognition of him as the speaker of a veracious 
discourse (rather than its misrecognition of him as a deviant 
whose personal abberation negates the truth-value of his speech) 
would give to his claims a greater power to shock orthodox views. 
If the bringer of bad tidings is not denounced but acknowledged 
to be acting in good faith, his message is more likely to be 
heard in all its critical force. 
For Ben, it is the courts of law which, above all, have the 
standing to issue a verdict, that is, to pronounce on the truth 
of testimonies and put witnesses' good faith beyond dispute. For 
Ben, what ~come[s] into the open' (142) through the court's 
intercession in a conflict is not the resolution of an enigma or 
the unravelling of a murder mystery. It is ~already' known that 
Gordon has been killed by the Special Branch. The court's 
proceedings are hence, for Ben, not a continuation of an 
investigation, but a public opening in which the truth is 
authoritatively pronounced -- recognised -- to be as such, so 
that the ~world can know what happened' (181). The court is seen 
as a site of attestation and universal visibility, of 
commemoration and contrition: an agora. There is, needless to 
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say, a surprise in store for him. The Special Branch sets about 
defending its claims from refutation by discarding incriminating 
affidavits, and by killing or serving banning orders on witnesses 
for the prosecution; there are hints of collusion between the 
secret police and a judiciary inclined anyway to support the 
state. Amidst the silencing of testimonies inimical to hegemony's 
doxa, and the concomitant non-recognition of witnesses, Ben feels 
that with his efforts stymied they 'amount to nothing' and that 
any 'progress' he has made is illusory (266). He lacks, he says, 
something to 'show for [his] efforts' (270) -- an object capable 
of being seen, and so being acknowledged in its realness, by his 
peers, for whom this nonobject is instead invisible, unregistered 
in their ideological schema. Unable to be seen or audited in a 
legal hearing, his endeavours find no independent ratification, 
with the result that their value seems purely subjective to him, 
a delirium of altruism with no importance to anyone but himself. 
'In weaker moments,' Ben confesses, 'I fear that Susan might have 
been right: am I losing my mind?' (266). Since Ben cannot obtain 
recognition from the forums underwriting hegemony's doxa as 
'truth' and dismissing his charges as well-intended but misplaced 
concern, eccentricity, madness and finally malevolence, he 
wonders whether he is not 'totally alone' (163). Unrecognised, 
the dissident falls into non-being. 
(vi) Faith: projecting a 'universal witness' 
Yet in the logic of the narrative the very fact that his 
self-doubts and sense of isolation are available to a reader in 
a textually preserved form or novelistic record is proof that he 
has not passively succumbed to 'the temptation of despair' (Dove, 
11) and resigned himself to the apparent inevitability of the 
clamorous non-meeting between oppressor and oppressed. Rather 
than surrender to a silence in which he cannot make his identity 
be recognised, Ben builds a false bottom in a cupboard, in which 
he will hide his journal from the Special Branch. The step is 
pivotal, as it signals Ben's shift from reformist criticism of 
the state, to a stance which is self-consciously adversarial: the 
subterfuge is 'a counter move, something positive and decisive, 
a new beginning' (ADWS, 157). Crucially, the 'new beginning', in 
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contrast to the closure the doxa seeks to impose and the 
despairing immersion in sameness it tries to perpetuate, projects 
a narrative trajectory which renews hope for (self-
)manifestation. To use the terms employed in ~The dove in the 
grave', this negation of ~clamour' involves the re-affirmation of 
the ~unstoppable basic groundswell towards understanding' (11). 
That is to say, the ~new beginning' posits a metanarrative in 
which component narratives progress towards a site of a mutual 
~understanding' in which all will be heard. What makes the 
journal an effective ~counter move' (157) is its capacity to 
survive silencing by sectional rulei correlatively, Ben 
presupposes that his writing will find an addressable Other, 
necessarily located beyond the present rule's deafness, which 
entails the additional presupposition that his writing is part of 
a metanarrative progression from sectional domination to a 
general polis. In his first journal entry, Ben ponders racial 
divisions between ~us' and ~them' (162). ~But who are "my people" 
today?' he asks: ~To whom do I owe my loyalty?' (163) -- that is, 
whom do I address through my actions, and from what social body 
do I seek confirmation of my identity? Ben's self-questioning is 
bound up with his attempts to posit a desired desiring subject 
through the very act of writing a journal. Since this addressee 
is equated· with a nascent social collectivity, an Other-as-agora, 
his action of writing acquires a social importance lacking in 
~ordinary' speech which routinely inhabits the doxa. His writing, 
that is, is a testimonial performance, in which he ~take [s] 
responsibility' for events going ~beyond the personal, in having 
general (nonpersonal) validity and consequences' (Felman, 1991, 
204). Yet more pertinently, the act of testifying itself grants 
a valorised status to his writing. ~To testify,' Felman says, ~is 
always, metaphorically, to take the witness stand' (1991, 204): 
to testify is to locate oneself in a configuration of socially 
privileged discursive positions. The importance of Ben's act of 
testifying is that -- situated as he is within the dearth of 
hegemony -- he speaks in advance in the ceremonial and civic 
positions of a polity not yet in existence, constructing a 
witness stand where none had been available to redeem his speech 
with general recognition. 
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Ben's faith that his testimony will come into the open' 
(ADWS, 142) in a transcendent future realm is implicitly 
vindicated by the network of metaphorical correspondences which 
are invoked by the novel's ending. Ben places his notes and 
journals in the care of an old university friend, at present a 
magazine writer, and invites him to transform them into a novel 
once he (Ben) has been assassinated by the security police. The 
narrative which the friend then produces has a cyclical 
structure, opening with his primary diegetic first-person report 
of Ben's recent death, while closing wit4 a diegetically embedded 
excerpt from Ben's final journal entry, made on the eve of his 
death. Is this, as the narrator wonders in an epilogue, a 
'senseless circle' ( 313) ? Evidently not, for his text is a 
transmission of testimony, and thus reduplicates Ben's speech act 
~t 
of testifying, which implies that~nar~ator has himself projected 
an agora beyond an enclosed doubling of sameness between 
oppressor and oppressed. The narrator, initially a cynic whose 
Weltschmerz cripples his writing, is at last moved by a 'feeling 
of responsibility towards something Ben might have believed in: 
something man is capable of being but which he isn't very often 
allow:~to be' (315). This change in attitude is significant, since 
it indicates the effects of his vocation as a witness. Vocation: 
practice, a calling (from vocare, to calli C. E. D.). In the same 
way as Brink is called on by the Great Rabbi of Paris to eschew 
despair and affirm a beneficent future (1993, 11), the narrator 
is called on by the Other to enter a covenant investing him with 
a special office and high purpose as a trustee of the future's 
memory and an emissary bridging present and future: invoked as an 
addressable Other, he discovers his vocation as one who invokes 
the Other-as-agora. According to Laub, in the psychoanlytic 
session the onset of testimonial speech 
different from 'the routine of everyday quabble' 
qualitatively 
(1991, 63) in 
which the analysand speaks from the specular doublings of the 
master's doxa -- is marked by such a moment of annunciation. As 
Brink's annunciation by the Great Rabbi is accomplished by the 
gift of an apothegm -- a divine seal calling him to assume an 
office -- the psychoanalytical annunciation is performed through 
the exchange of a secret password or tessera serving as token of 
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recognition between initiates of a certain order. 25 During the 
session, Laub writes, ~ (a] cue is dropped' by the analysand, 
while he, as the analyst, echoes it in his response, thereby 
~mak[ing] myself known as one who knows' (63). The cue is a 
~secret password' by means of which the patient ~names himself 
and asks ... for a reciprocal identification' from the analyst, 
who in turn identifies himself as one ~who can recognize the 
experience of the trauma' (63-4) and acknowledge it in its 
realness. This exchange of a password effects (or ratifies) a 
pact. Their ~mutual recognition of a shared knowledge' (Laub, 
1991, 64) allows them to make themselves known to each other in 
their capacity as members triangulated in relation to an 
overarching community, a community offering a topos where their 
once-silenced ~humanity' may come to light: their dyadic 
interlocution is re-situated in relation to a ~third party' 
(Levinas, 1979, 213) which constitutes them as members of a 
larger whole. 26 
Thus, in A Dry White Season Ben's transmission of testimony 
to the writer institutes a pact between them which commits them 
to ~something man is capable of being but which he isn't very 
often allowed to be' (315): a condition in which ~humanity' may 
emerge. For Ben, the testimonial action projects an agora for 
whose benefit he laboursi correlatively, it is from this agora 
that he seeks the recognition denied to him. For the narrator, 
Ben's transmission calls him to enter a web of obligations, both 
to the Other {the stranger his friend) and to the agora in the 
Other (what Ben is ~capable of being' in an un-limited openness) . 
As such, the writer is not the singular addressee of Ben's 
testimonyi he is a mediating point within a triangular structure, 
witnessing the witnessing of another on behalf of ~the universal 
witness' (Derrida, 1978, 314) In short, he is the site of a 
textual departure rather than an arrival, a termination, or a 
closing. Ben's final meditation, in which he claims to find 
himself utterly bereft in a drought-stricken landscape, consoled 
by his faith in ~God's infinite grace' (ADWS, 305), anticipates 
precisely such a departure: 
In the beginning there is turmoil. Then it subsides, 
leaving a silence: but it is a silence of confusion and 
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incomprehension, not true stillness but an inability to 
hear properly .... And it is only when one ventures 
much more deeply into suffering, it seems to me, that 
one may learn to accept it as indispensable for the 
attainment of a truly serene silence. I have not 
reached it yet. But I think I am very close now. And 
that hope sustains me (305, emphasis added). 
He is, of course, close to be being murdered. But Brink does not 
trade in heavy irony. Instead, the novel's system of metaphors 
implies that Ben's textual preservation heralds a parousia in 
which he will accede after all to the 'serene silence' (305) of 
a transaudition unimpeded by the clamour of adversarial 
misprision. Chronologically, the meditation occurs shortly before 
the journal is passed on to the writer, and it may thus be read 
as a prefiguration of the testimony's dissemination in an 
unlimited range of signifying contexts unforeseen by its author, 
whose death quite literally is accompanied by the birth of 
textuality. No longer functioning as sign-signals bound to 'the 
regional limits' (Derrida, 1978, 12) 27 of a specific subjectal 
domain, Ben's journal is separated from its authorial guarantor 
and, dispatched beyond its borders into proliferating networks of 
textual scenarios, takes on testimonial efficacy 'in having 
general (nonpersonal) validity and consequences' (Felman, 1991, 
2 04) . Moreover, the 'desert' in which Ben dies reprises the 
novel's titular motif of white rule as a time of drought. The 
deluge which Ben's death foreshadows (as the speaker says in the 
Wally Serote poem cited as an epigraph, seasons come to pass') 
hence points to both the demise of apartheid and the discursive 
plenitude expected in the wake of the writer's block ('a vast 
apathy' in 'this arid present landscape'; ADWS, 11) associated 
with the state's impoverishing doxa. This flood of signification 
is a 'serene silence' (305), for the doxa' s miscognising and 
reductive 'inability to hear properly' (305) is to be superseded 
by a polyphony or signifying excess in which 'everything 
signifies ceaselessly and several times' (Barthes, 1974, 12). 
Similarly in A Chain of Voices, a contemporary narrator re-
opens the case closed by hegemony in 1825 by transcribing its 
testimonies in a text dated 1979-81 (512) and so facilitating 
their disseminatory movement from a univocal meaning to a 
polyvocal overdetermination of meaning. Yet since the context in 
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which they are re-enunciated in 1979-81 is in key respects 
analogous to the oppressive circumstances in which they were 
~originally • enunciated in 1825, their introduction into the 
present is not the advent of their semiotic plurality but merely 
the start of a process expected to realize itself fully only in 
a utopic future. The present, that is, being itself unable 'to 
hear properly' (ADWS, 305), cannot provide Ma-Rose with the 
hearing she solicits when, speaking ~out of the shadow of death', 
she asserts, ~[P]erhaps someone will hear us calling out, all 
these voices in the great silence (CoV, 431) . As in the 
relationship between Ben and his friend the writer, the 
narratorial agency answering Ma-Rose•s call is not himself the 
destination of her testimony but one whose function it is ~to 
take responsibility• for it by submitting it to a hearing ~before 
the court of history and of the future• (Felman, 1991, 204). If 
Ma-Rose calls to an addressable Other beyond the doxa•s 
doublings, the narrator -- like the psychoanalyst in his or her 
role for the analysand -- comes to occupy this place solely as an 
emissary of the agora. To this ~someone• she thus entrusts the 
task of resurrecting her from ~the shadow of death' (431) to the 
luminous site of hearing. 
(vii) Text as prefiguration of Utopia 
The Conservator in turn transcribes the archival records, 
which, no more ~utilized as natural, biological or technical 
information• (Derrida, 1978, 12), enter into the intransitive 
~practice of the symbol' (Barthes, 1988a, 168), 28 subsequently 
~transmigrat[ing] into our life [and] writing fragments of 
our own daily lives • (Barthes, 1971, 7) . 29 Lifting the death 
sentence of the doxa, the narrator affects a return of the dead 
to the life of the signifier and a re-emergence of what the court 
did not hear. His expanded inscription, for instance, includes 
testimony by those who died before and during the revolt. Besides 
such impossible testimony, it contains improved testimony 
expressed with a linguistic and conceptual articulacy 
inconsistent with rural illiteracy, as if the revised document 
were empowering speakers with an intellectual sophistication 
hegemony had sought to stifle. Themes outlawed by the doxa are 
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taken up, in particular that of inter-racial sexuality: for 
Galant, sexual intercourse with white Hester was his greatest 
transgression, yet the court's litany of his evil does not 
mention this diabolism at all, which indicates either that it is 
so unthinkable that its actual occurrence would necessarily be 
met with a baffled non-recognition, or that it is disavowed. 
Moreover, this revision offers the reader a synoptic perspective 
from which he or she can discern the various discrepancies and 
mutual misunderstandings between witnesses. While the speakers 
are compartmentalised and immured ln their deafness to one 
another stoically aware that ... another man's mind remains 
sealed in its own mystery' (CoV, 281) -- the reader has access to 
every character's thoughts and motives, and can appreciate their 
dilemmas as the product of a dis-relating social structure ruling 
out a common meeting-place. By the same token, the reader's all-
hearing position prefigures an era of social transparency arising 
ari~i:r~ once chain and sword are cast away. The Text is for 
Brink, as it is for Barthes, an anticipation of "the openness, 
the open-endedness, the endlessness the silence ["a truly 
serene silence'; ADWS, 305] -- of a country for which the future 
is still possible ... ' (States, 244) . And for Roland Barthes, the 
Text "participates in its own way in a social Utopia: before 
History (supposing the latter does not opt for barbarism), the 
Text achieves, if not the transparence of social relations, that 
at least of language relations: the Text is that space where no 
language has a hold over any other, where languages circulate 
(1977, 164) free of domination. 
* 
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ENDNOTES 
1. In Felman and Laub, 1992, 81. 
2. Cf. Chapter 1, 'IV. The subject and paranoid space· . 
3. Of course, the irony is considerably blunted when one bears 
in mind that, whatever their differences, Sartre and Derrida 
share a pre-occupation with Hegel; who had presented the 
relation between Same and Other as a violent 'struggle for 
recognition· -- as war. 
4. Cf. Chapter 1, 'III. The subject and defective v1s1on". This 
case is also discussed again in 'II. Second silence· of the 
present chapter. 
5. Cf. Chapter 1, 'V. Numb". 
6. Anagnorisis is a 'term used by Aristotle in Poetics to 
describe the moment of recognition (of truth) when ignorance 
gives way to knowledge .... The classic example is in Oedipus 
Rex when Oedipus discovers he himself has killed Laius" 
(Cuddon, 1979, 38). 
7. Shame, Sartre writes, 1s in its primary structure shame 
before somebody. I have just made an awkward or vulgar gesture 
(for example]. This gesture clings to me: I neither judge it 
nor blame it. I simply live it .... But suddenly I raise my 
head. Somebody was there and has seen me. Suddenly I realize 
the vulgarity of my gesture, and I am ashamed .... [T]he Other 
is the indispensable mediator between myself and me [that is, 
between myself as I 'simply live· myself, and myself as a 
determinate object seen by the Other]. I am ashamed of myself 
as I appear to the Other.· (1986, 281). 
8. Cf. Chapter 1, 'VI. Ecstasy (iii) The narrative: 
enantiodromia ·. 
9. Cf. Chapter 1, 'VII. Clamour·. 
10 . 19--, 53. 
11. 1966, 110. 
12. Cf. Chapter 1, 'VI. Ecstasy {v) Death of the author·. 
13. Cf. Chapter 1, 'III. The subject and defective vision·. 
14. Cited in Cock, 1991, 66. 
15. 1988, 43. 
16. Cited in Felman and Laub, 1992, p.80. A partisan in the 
resistance is given the opportunity to take revenge on a 
captured German youth for all she has suffered at the hands of 
the Nazis; instead of killing him, she dresses his wounds. 
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17. '[T]he ticket-collector is only the function of collecting 
tickets; the cafe waiter is nothing but the function of serving 
the patrons· (1958, 381). 
18. 'I can grasp the Other, grab hold of him, knock him down,· 
Sartre says. 'But everything happens as if I wished to get hold 
of a man who runs away and leaves only his coat in my hands. It 
is the coat, it is the outer shell which I possess· {1958, 
393). 
19. Cited in Felman and Laub, 1992, 67-8. Levi is relating a 
recurring dream he had while imprisoned in Auschwitz. 
20. CQY, 431. 
21. Cited in Felman and Laub, 1992, 38. 
22. 1977a, 9. 
23. For an extended discussion of this point, the reader is 
invited to return to Chapter 1, 'II. The subject and sensory 
overload·. 
24. Cf. Chapter 1, 'III. The subject and defective vision: 
(iii) Agora· for a discussion of this image. 
25. 'The tessera, · Lacan's translator explains, 'was used in 
the early mystery religions where fitting together again the 
two halves of a broken piece of pottery was used as a means of 
recognition by the initiates -- and in Greece the the tessera 
was called the sumbolon · (1977a, 107). 
26. An example of the exchange of passwords: Vietnam: A 
Casebook describes a therapist's experience with a war veteran 
who, during imprisonment, had sent secret messages to a fellow 
POW. 'Tom asked what part of the country I was from,· the 
therapist says. 
I had an accent, he said, and obviously wasn't from 
Ohio. He guessed that I probably came from the New 
York area. Later in that session he further described 
the fellow POW who lay close to him during much of 
the period of imprisonment. This man who shared much 
of his value system and with whom Tom first began to 
work through his horror was from Brooklyn (233, 
emphasis added) . 
Tom's comment about the accent, the therapist claims, 
was an unconscious reference to his inherited role in 
the treatment as the fellow POW from Brooklyn. Only 
the fellow POW knew Rbat it was like to go through 
the ordeal, to survive it, and to try to process it 
(233, emphasis added). 
27. Cf. Chapter 1, 'VII. Ecstasy (v) Death of the author·. 
Briefly to gloss this comment again, however, it will be 
remembered that Derrida claims that writing is an ekstasis of 
'signalization·. 'Signalization·. he says, 1s always enveloped 
within the regional limits of nature, life and the soul" (1978, 
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12). Derrida maintains that the inscription of speech frees 
meaning from the constraint of univocality and 'from the 
natural predicament in which everything refers to the 
disposition of a contingent situation· (12}. He says that it is 
'when that which is written is deceased as a sign-signal that 
it is born as language; for then it says what is, thereby 
referring only to itself, a sign without signification ... 
since it ceased to be utilized as patural, biological or 
technical information, or as the transition from ... a 
signifier to a signified" (12}. Similarly, Barthes writes, 'As 
soon as a fact is narrated no longer with a view to acting 
directly on reality but intransitively, that is to say, finally 
outside of any function other than that of the practice of the 
symbol, this disconnection occurs, the voice loses its origin, 
the author enters into his own death, writing begins· (1988a, 
168). 
28. Cf. Chapter 1, 'VII. Ecstasy (v) Death of the author·. 
29. Barthes writes, 'The bliss of the text is often only 
stylistic .... However, at times the pleasure of the Text is 
achieved more deeply (and then is when we can truly say there 
is a Text): whenever the "literary·· text (the Book) 
transmigrates into our lives, whenever another writing (the 
Other·s writing) succeeds in writing fragments of our own daily 
lives, in short, whenever a co-existence occurs· (1971, 7). 
Similarly, Felman argues that the efficacy of testimony is 
to be gauged by it impact on the recipient, particularly the 
way in which it precipitates a crisis in the addressee or 
reader which is analogous to that underwent by the witness 
herself·. 'A "life-testimony", · she says, 'is not simply a 
testimony to a private life, but a point of conflation between 
text and life, a textual testimony which can penetrate us like 
an actual life" (1992, 2}. Conflation, concomitance, contagion: 
Felman makes the point often enough that the addressee of 
testimony may become the medium for that testimony -- he or she 
may sustain it by being possessed by it. 
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3. THREE ECSTASIES 
'And what's left of him, what still remains, is just one rage. 
That everywhere he'd stepped, he'd somehow stepped on someone 
else. _ 
That everything he touched was always tainted by some loss. 
He couldn't help himself; it was desire itself that was at fault' 
-- Stephen Watson1 
I. Silence and shattering 
Too numb to achieve anything in the face of civil discord, the 
subject is dumbfounded by violence. Stuck in himself for fear of 
exposing himself to danger, withdrawn into an impenetrable 
silence after physical and psychic violation, paralysed by the 
death of a friend, and weary and inert at the prospect of an 
unconquerable challenge to the social system defining him, he is 
rendered mute by the approach of hostile otherness. The Other 
holds him at swordpoint where, cognitively and functionally 
disabled, his world disintegrates in its independent subsistence, 
only to be re-integrated in the signifying totality determined by 
the Other. In his brush with the Other-as-death, it is as though 
his dissolution as a subject of knowledge capable of interpreting 
events were metaphorically akin to a condition of visual 
impairment, to the destruction visited on channeling mechanisms 
by an intolerable overload (of data and excitations), and to the 
contraction of a territory, edifice or any other spatial field: 
Yet like the crayfish which forgets it has received the 
death-blow and so obligingly spares the fisherman from the 
by adjusting itself to its role in his 
'get[s] used to' (Act, 371) this 
compunction of remorse 
project, the subject 
apprehension of mortality. 
finitude and endangerment 
What was an overpowering sense of 
is blunted and de-realised the 
subject becomes numb, resigning himself in a self-protective 
stupor to the place he is allocated by the Other, or identify1ng 
himself with a position of mastery from which he may deny his 
subjection to the Other, his being- for-others, and hence his 
mortality as well. Consequently, he re-asserts himself as the 
subject of knowledge. No longer is he blind but clear-sighted; no 
longer is he disrupted by excess. over his assimilatory abilities 
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but cognitively adequate and self-present to what he undergoes; 
and no longer is he finitely delimited, but instead self-
extensive. 
In this state of indifference, the subject repudiates all 
menacing alterity and imagines himself to be innocent, a non-
combatant denying that he is a perpetrator of violence implicated 
in an agon. The indifferent subject, that is, feels himself 
guiltless and hence disavows knowledge both of the Other as other 
and of his own monstrous desire. In the condition of numbness and 
apathy, an inherently ambivalent condition in which the subject 
ranges across an affective spectrum from (on the one hand) an 
acute sense of powerlessness to (on the other) a dullness 
blunting this sense, too great an awareness of mortality shifts 
precariously into too little an awareness of it, with the result 
that the disavowal of alterity and mortality is accompanied by 
the subject's self-mystified lack of morality. It is, in short, 
as though the subject, too terrified to speak through exposure to 
violence, came to occupy not only the silence of the dehumanised 
victim, but the silence of the alienated aggressor as well. 
Again, it is as if the sword's point and hilt, that is, their 
respective registers of subjectivity, were conflated in the 
numbed subject, such that the victim's lack of an autonomous 
voice were coupled with the aggressor's absence of self-
consciousness regarding the destructiveness of his ecstatic 
desire. 
In the numb subject's silence and self-mystification, his 
terror at endangerment from exterior violence and his terror at 
the threat to self-preservation posed by his desire, is 
'internal-or-private and mute' (Kojeve, 1986, 118). By contrast, 
were the subject to make terror external-or-public by speaking 
it, and necessarily invoking an addressable Other capable of 
witnessing (auditing, ratifying) his speech, he would 
autoenunciatively pose himself before himself in the signifiers 
underWritten by the addressable Other and obtain consciousness of 
himself as an object appearing outside himself in the Other. Yet 
it is the case that the benumbed subject's ennui stems from the 
lack of such an addressable Other. Situated within the internal 
doubling of aggressor and victim, or master and slave, that is, 
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in the subject-positions offered by the doxa which defines the 
limit of what is thinkable, the subject cannot make himself heard 
and recognized inside these constraints: his narrative trails off 
as an unlistened-to story, his quiddity goes unrecognised, and he 
is obliged to 'get used to' his entrapment in sameness and the 
absence of a witness to his desire. Thus Philip Malan, analogue 
for the impaired narrator of States of Emergency, stays 
defensively '"stuck" in [himself]' and his customary identity so 
long as he resists 'the terror that lies in exposing oneself 
totally, unreservedly, the readiness to risk everything' -- the 
upshot is that 'nobody will ever really know [him] ' (States, 55) . 
The corollary, however, is that were he to engage the terror of 
exploding his circumscribed identity and to project an Other-as-
agora for whom this sacrificial self-opening could be performed, 
his 'internal-or-private and mute' quiddity would stand to be 
witnessed and recognised. 
One might well say, then, that the numb subject, menaced by 
violence, not only conflates the silence at the sword's point 
(the terrified lack of autonomous voice) and the silence at its 
hilt (the absence of self-consciousness), but that in addition he 
is located in the silence across its shaft (the suspension of 
communality) . To these three silences one can oppose three 
shatterings of silence shatterings in which the violence of 
un-saying is countered by the violence of saying, and in which 
'violence' is transformed from an enervating nemesis to an 
energising resource of literary activity. 
Shocked by violence, the writer is numb and unproductive. 
Yet how is the mutually exclusive opposition between 'violence' 
and 'writing' undone such that 'violence' loses the epithet of 
'non-writing' and instead comes precisely to inform 'writing', 
while 'writing' sheds its characterisation as 'non-violence' to 
become the enactment of 'violence'? More simply, how is writing 
violent? In particular, how does the violence of writing enact 
the three shatterings of the numbed subject's three conflated 
silences? 
I have argued that since Brink's novels frequently commence 
with an account of a narrator's incapacitation by violence, the 
writing which does follow upon this impairment testifies to the 
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existence of a struggle between the violence of unsaying and the 
violence of saying. Moreover,. given that the fictions tend to 
draw attention to their conditions of articulation, they can be 
regarded as writings about writing as writings which reflect 
on the dynamics between violence and counter-violence implicit in 
the act of writing itself. And since the writing which ensues 
from the initial scene of traumatic disempowerment is haunted by 
the danger of lapsing back into aphasia, and indeed (given its 
typically cyclical narrative structure) is inclined compulsively 
to revisit this scene, it constitutes a commentary on the 
processes of surmounting speechlessness: as a result, the said 
can be read as providing insights into the problems of saying, 
and statements about violence (specifically the violence of 
political resistance) can be regarded as elaborations on the 
vicissitudes of utterance. Hence, once we have considered the 
question of how the violence of saying performs three shatterings 
of the subject's three silences, we shall amplify claims made in 
this respect by considering Brink's portrayal of resistance 
violence's alleged capacity to break the 'historical silence' 
(Dove, 11) between the oppressor and oppressed (that is, after 
having combined the sword's three silences in the person of the 
numbed subject, we shall separate them once more and discuss each 
in relative isolation as they are thematised within Brink's 
writing) . 
II. Anagnorisis 
'For this [servile] consciousness has been fearful, 
not of this or that particular thing or just at odd 
moments, but its whole being has been seized with 
dread. In that experience it has been quite unmanned, 
has trembled in every fibre of its being, and 
everything solid and stable has been shaken to its 
foundations. But this pure universal movement, the 
absolute melting-away of everything stable, is the 
simple, essential nature of self-consciousness, 
absolute negativity, pure being-for-self, which 
consequently is implicit in this consciousness' 
-- G. W. F. Hegel 2 
(i) Inwardising exterior disintegrative forces 
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The violence of saying effects three shatterings of silence 
inasmuch as it involves the assertion of an autonomous voice, the 
development of a consciousness-of-self, and the projection of 
communality. In general, one may say that, as much as the 
subject's disablement by dangerous otherness entails the 
disintegration of his world and its re-integration in schemes 
determined by the Other, his re-empowerment through the counter-
violence of saying involves, conversely, his disintegration of 
the form imposed on him by the Other, and, consequently, his 
appropriation to himself of the disintegrative force previously 
exercised by the Other -- where the Other had appeared to the 
subject as an obliterating potency before whom he had 
'shudder[ed]' (Sartre, 1986, 281) or 'trembled' (Hegel, 1978, 
117), it is the subject who claims this power of shaking 
'everything solid and stable to its foundations' (Hegel, 
1978, 117) when he enacts the violence of saying against the 
Other's attempted silencing ( 'dehumanisation') of him. Indeed, 
the metaphoric of sensory overload -- in which subjectal collapse 
is described in terms of intolerable excesses over assimilatory 
functions -- implicitly carries the sense that such traumatic 
overload is caused by an external agency, an Other, which 
'floods' or over-stimulates cognition and leads it to 
malfunction. In other words, the metaphoric appears to be free of 
interpersonal reference as it deals only with the distribution of 
quantitative volumes within a functional apparatus, but in its 
suggestion that these saturating volumes are destructive and 
arise from exteriority, it implies that this transfer of volume 
from outside to inside occurs in the context of conflict between 
two sites, and thus its 'objectivity' is belied by the 
presupposed intersubjectivity of struggle. So if the Other is a 
disruptive force traumatically overloading the subject's 
capacities to take cognitive account of experience, and if the 
subject's attempts at assertion entail his appropriation of the 
Other's obliterating potencies, then it follows that the 
subject's work of assimilating traumatic excess into a cognitive 
order -- of making sense out of the incomprehensible and shocking 
-- engages him in the project of incarnating in himself the same 
disruptive tendencies formerly located 'over there' in the Other. 
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Earlier I argued (following Blanchot and Derrida) that 
paradoxically the disaster is an experience in which no 
experience occurs/ meaning that/ although it is an event through 
which one suffers/ its disablement of one's cognitive faculties 
erases one as a subject of knowledge capable of registering and 
receiving it 1 so that 1 in a certain sense/ one can say that no 
experience of it takes place after all. 3 Given the disjunction 
between the cognising subject and the one-who-undergoes/ the 
experience in which the subject is confronted by violence and its 
message of mortality constitutes a 'missed encounter' (Lacan 1 
1977b 1 55) -- an encounter which the subject belatedly tries to 
experience through the psychic operations of deferred action. As 
such/ the subject comprehends the disaster's full import and 
horror 'only after the event' (Freud/ in Derrida 1 1978 1 214) 1 
when/ like the crayfish/ he has already received the death-blow. 
And like the crayfish which keeps active after death yet moves 
toward a belated knowledge of its death 1 the subject stays alive 
in his acts of saying (in defiance of the violence of unsaying) 1 
but moves to a consciousness of death through these very acts: as 
Derrida observes/ it is through deferral/ that is 1 through 'the 
agency of signs' (1973 1 62) supplementary to an antecedent event 1 
that the event is 'lived in its meaning' (1978 1 214). In saying 1 
then/ what is 'lived in its meaning' is nothing less than the 
death and trauma which the subject missed; and if saying is 
informed by the principle of enantiodromia 1 such that discourse 
at first maintains itself in opposition to death yet comes to 
inwardise and replicate it in its own structures 1 then it is as 
though the subject of the saying recognised something of himself 
in the other of exterior violence as if he appropriated 
aspects of the Other-as-death 1 and made of the Other's 
obliterating appearance a mirror in which he can recognise the 
violence of his own desire. 
An illustrative example of this process of self-recognition 
is found in Rumours of Rain 1 where Mynhardt' s retrospective 
narrative 1 informed by a wish to 'clear. . . up whatever lies 
behind in order to catch up with [him] self' (12) 1 is thematised 
as a car-trip in which his journey back in time is mirrored by 
what he imagines to be a sinister force correspondingly advancing 
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from past into the present: this force, apparently exterior, is 
no less than himself, or at least the displaced and 
unacknowledged image of his desire, a projection which must be 
introjected. One may extrapolate, hence, that the subject's wish 
to be on time for traumatic experience (rather than to miss it) 
is a desire for co-incidence between the experiencing and 
cognising subject, a desire for self-presence in which he catches 
up with himself. In short, he seeks, as a self-reflexive 
Cartesian subject looking for certainty of self (that is to say, 
in his capacity as a ~self-knowing-itself'; Heidegger, in Taylor, 
1987, 38), to pose himself before ·himself as the disruptive and 
ek-static dis-integrative force which he is. 
If commencing to write in the midst of confusing turbulence 
involves more than the activity of ~making sense' of events and 
changing them into coherent objects of knowledge, but involves 
additionally the re-assertion of subjecthood through an agon 
between the violence of saying and that of unsaying, then this 
re-constitution can be described in terms of the very metaphorics 
which represented the subject's impairment. Thus, in relation to 
the metaphoric of sensory overload, the violence of saying is 
situated in the process of deferred action by which the subject 
takes to himself a disinteg·rative power initially wielded by an 
external foe; with regard to the metaphoric of defective vision, 
violent saying entails the transition from a state of blindness 
(or of a numbed unawareness of one's desire) to a condition of 
self-consciousness of desire. 
(ii) Spatial transgression 
Yet it is to the metaphorics of spatial limitation and 
transgression that Brink turns most insistently in his account of 
the violence of saying, violence which seeks to shatter the 
Other's heteronomous impositions on the ~ubject. One will recall 
that in ~An act of violence: thoughts on the functions of 
literature', 4 Brink emphasises that in his characterisation of 
literary activity as ~a subtle and complex set of responses to, 
inter alia, the violence of "the world"' (34), ~what is important 
is not only the articulation of violence but the violence of 
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articulation' (37). The reader or writer's engagement with a text 
or constellation of pre-existing semiotic codes is a violent 
'action directed in the first instance against the very notion of 
"authority" ' and as this authority is the Platonic 'idea of 
authority' (39), a 'deity' (36), the violence occurs in an 
interpersonal order, between a master and a slave. Crucially, the 
existence of the masterful Other implies 'a body, an entity, g 
space I something whole and intact I established and set apart 
through the will and wish of this authority' ( 3 6, emphasis 
added) . Hence, violence directed against the Other's imposed 
forms is 'an action through which this body or space is broken 
into, opened up, defiled, profaned ... its integrity invaded, its 
freedom challenged' (36). In this agon between reader/writer and 
code, subject and Other, the latter attempts to delimit the 
former/ while the former dis-places the latter's definitions. 
What is significant is that the subject of the saying, by 
entering the ggQU 1 puts himself at risk of being 'opened up' or 
'invaded' (36) by the Other -- of being called into question, 
plunged into crisis, and having his customory self-conception 
disintegrated. By engaging in the agon as a combatant who 
obliterates and exceeds the statutory frontiers of his being, the 
subject of saying suffers anguish at his desire, which impels him 
to violate the enclosure he would otherwise have safely 
inhabited. Where he could remain silently '"stuck" in himself' 
(States, 55), he instead breaks through his encapsulated identity 
into alterity and opens himself to terror. Anguish/ that is to 
say, stems not only from the external danger which the subject 
countenances, but from his own obliterative tendencies, which, 
disrupting his compact self-identity, threaten to obliterate 
himself as well. Terror is inspired both by adverse otherness and 
the ek-static desire responding to it -- by eros 1 which 'propels 
one towards the transgression of frontiers' (States, 231) . As 
Bataille remarks in Eroticism, '[T]here subsists in man a 
movement which always exceeds the bounds' such that erotic or 
libidinal 'exuberance of life ... is not alien to death' (1962, 
40; 11), a point he makes repeatedly in relation to various kinds 
of erotic transgression. To respect a prohibition, Bataille 
suggests, is to maintain oneself within a juridically decreed 
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enclosure; to discard it is to dispose of the grounds needed for 
one to grasp transgression's psychic tenor. But to violate the 
taboo while simultaneously investing in it is to be torn between 
the wish to preserve life by adhering to a sanctioned form, and 
desire which takes one heedlessly and ek-statically outside of 
oneself. In this agon between closure and transgression, in 
short, the subject of saying apprehends his life-endangering 
desire through a species of vertigo. As Bataille claims, 'The 
inner experience of eroticism [intrinsically transgressive] 
demands from the subject a sensitiveness to the anguish at the 
heart of the taboo no less great than the desire which leads him 
to infringe it' (1962, 39). Should the subject know too much 
about death, that is, be too fearful and thus cling to life, he 
will exempt himself from the agon and acquiesce to the 
delimitede& forms specified for him by the masterful Other; but 
in so doing he will know too little about his mortality -- about 
his displacing and (self-) obliterating desire which intimates 
itself to him when he puts himself in crisis. Again: he will be 
numb. 
After traumatic impairment, the subject re-asserts himself 
by way of an agon between the violence of saying and unsaying. In 
this struggle, he shatters his heteronomous spatial 
determination; since this determination guarantees his self-
preservation (the victim surrenders to an aggressor's terms under 
pain of death) , his ecstatic shattering of it leads him to an 
awareness of his mortality in two senses: he realizes that he is 
killable and that his world can be disintegrated, flung into 
Sartrean nothingness, both by the Other with whom he is embroiled 
in a struggle of saying, and by his own, definitionally 
transgressive desire. Through this shattering saying and the 
self-shattering danger into which it impels him, he thus 
incarnates in himself the obliterating force initially opposed to 
him in exteriority, in the Other-as-death: he lives the death he 
missed. 
{III) Writing as struggle 
'The desire to go keeling helplessly over, that 
152 
.. 
I j 
assails the innermost depths of every human being 
is nevertheless differ~nt from the desire to die 
in that it is ambiguous. It may well be a desire to 
die, but it is at the same time a desire to live to 
the limits of the possible and the impossible with 
ever-increasing intensity. It is the desire to live 
while ceasing to live, or to die without ceasing to 
live' 
-- Georges Bataille5 
'If my son's death could be a turning point in the 
history of South Africa ... then I'll thank God for 
it' 
Father of Richard Okill, victim 
of the St James Church massacre 6 
(i) Overview 
How are these processes evinced in Brink's fictions? How, 
that is to say, do his fictions enact the struggle to write, the 
agon between saying and unsaying, between violence which 
liberates writing and violence which inhibits it? I argued that 
both A Dry White Season and A Chain of Voices, for instance, 
represent the enantiodromia of deferred action, inasmuch as in 
each case an intrusive narrator or an archivist, faced with a 
friend's death or an insurrection, reconstructs the events and 
motivations leading up to the death of these others, and, by 
writing himself into their lives through empathetic re-invention 
of their subjectivities, tries to undergo their deaths from the 
inside rather than look on from the outside. In the case in 
particular of the narrator of A Dry White Season, this act grants 
narratable form to his obscure feeling of deadness and permits 
him to re-experience the death he at first failed to encounter. 
Moreover, he writes himself out of deadened numbness by 
conserving Ben du Toit's testimony -- by struggling against the 
pressures to silence imposed by hegemony, which seeks to negate 
that testimony and re-formulate it in accordance with the 
master's doxa. As in the instance of the archivist-narrator of A 
Chain of Voices, who broaches the doxa' s silencing of and 
deafness to the range of depositions presented to it, the 
narrator replicates Ben's transgressive saying in which he (Ben) 
keeps a journal documenting what the state tries to censor: as 
such the narrator's discourse is 'a counter move, something 
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positive and decisive, and a new beginning' (157), a ~counter 
move' ln an agon of saying and unsaying between the hegemonic 
master and a slave. Yet by writing himself out of numbed deadness 
-- in which an oppressive sense that he is ~no longer immortal' 
(11) is, however, derealized by apathetic detachment and by 
writing himself into Ben's life and death through an act of 
transgression against the doxa, he becomes conscious of 
mortality. That is, on having received Ben's documents in the 
mail, he is aware that he, too, is under surveillance by Ben's 
assassins and that a similar fate awaits him as befell his friend 
(315). By writing himself out of deadness and following his 
transgressive, agonistic desire, he writes himself into death --
the death which strikes him from outside forces, the death which 
desire, the ~exuberance of life' (Bataille, 1962, 11), leads him 
towards. 
(ii)Risk and desire 
But it is the overtly self-reflexive States of Emergency 
which best exemplifies the ways in which ~the violence of 
articulation' (AVTFL, 37) effects a re-assertion of narratorial 
subjecthood and shatters the three silences determined by the 
sword, the emblem of the violence of unsaying. To recapitulate an 
earlier exposition, one may begin by attending to its narrator's 
important insight' that language and art ~are directed towards 
countering, 
ending'] 
has set out 
that which 
themselves. 
or negating, or rebelling against [the ~sense of an 
[e]ven if each of them ends up by confirming what it 
to deny' (17-18): they are ap~antic presencings of 
they have to suppress in order to constitute 
As such, ~masterful images', held up to the light, 
disclose ~the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart'; notes and 
sketches of a planned novel, although signalling an increasing 
textual productivity, attest in their deferral of production to 
a present inability to write. These multiple beginnings 
convulsive endeavours to write which rapidly meet their aporetic 
limits -- send a message: I can't go on, I must go on. Discourse, 
in short, is dialogically implicated with its aphasic other, with 
the result that its commodified availability to a reader and 
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listener, its existence in factuality, is belied by the latent 
menace of unsaying with which saying is always-already grappling. 
So like Scheherazade, the narrator of States is engaged in a 
struggle in which he 'negates' or 'rebels against' forces tending 
to end -- to close, enclose, to contract spatially and limit --
his self-extending, diastolic writing. In this rebellious, 
conflictual saying he ek-statically claims his space of writing 
in defiance of the Emergency's threatened constriction of it: 
this is the first shattering of silence. 
If art and language confirm what they deny by alluding to a 
tension within them between saying and unsaying, there is an 
additional nuance to their apophantic qualities, namely that 
saying, antagonistically entwined with unsaying, replicates 
within itself the very ending it denies. As the narrator's notes 
accumulate (a volume suggesting incremental supersession of 
unsaying), the novel he plans to write slowly takes shape, and 
thus no longer exists as a plenum of unrestricted imaginative 
possibilities: that is, as he formulates it, the intended novel 
loses its utopian openness, to assume recognisable lineaments and 
conventional literary features that it shares with other texts. 
It is not fresh and unique, but assimilated into a system of 
cultural knowledge and customary interpretations, which makes it 
interchangeable with other texts, and so part of what 'has always 
been already read, seen, done' (Barthes, 1974, 20). As the 
narrator's rhetoric of invasion emphasises, it is as if an 
ecstatic space had been subjugated by codes or formulae which, by 
assigning habitual meanings to signifiers, seal its expansive 
potential under 'a smothering layer of received ideas' (Barthes, 
in Silverman, 1983, 31). His prospective world is vitiated and 
re-formulated according to the Other's codes; in a more dramatic 
phrase, he suffers death in the signifier, in the heteronomous 
encapsulation. To paraphrase Lacan, 7 in the narrator's saying, he 
appears in the signifier only to disappear there since he is 
taken out of himself to be dispersed ,.,.the Other's chains of 
signification. Given the novel's self-reflexivity, the narrator 
foregrounds this disappearance -- he heightens his awareness of 
dying by posing it before him, and thus lives through the death 
or the maximum violence which he could not properly encounter in 
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the Emergency. Within the foregrounded performance of his saying, 
he simulates a violent engagement between his diastolic ekstasis 
and systolic otherness, an agon which he missed in the Emergency. 
His is an art of dying: a commandeering of his own fate through 
an artistic practice which seeks to reproduce the experience of 
death. 
Importantly, this movement towards dying is informed by 
desire. While the narrator at first opposes the desire to write 
a love story divorced from worldly violence with the duty to 
address the adverse and antagonistic, he redefines desire so that 
the 'exuberance of life is not alien to death' (Bataille, 
1962, 11). His ek-static desire impels him into the agon between 
expansive and constrictive forces such that his 
dying/disappearance in the Other's signifiers is not simply a 
contingency which happens to befall him, but precisely an 
eventuality to which desire drives him -- desire drives him to 
self-obliteration. To paraphrase Lacan again, the subject's 
disappearance in the signifier is also an appearance of himself 
before himself. Self-reflexively posing his implication in the 
agon before him, he 'stands back' from his ecstatic utterances 
the better to 'see' them, and sees himself there as one who is 
prepared to go beyond every delimited form of himself, even if 
this spells death for his world, even if his world (the 
utopically open-ended novel he envisaged) would be erased and 
reintegrated by the Other; the narrator beholds himself as one 
who is willing to risk his life, to risk the Other's averaging-
out and smothering of his sublime inner imaginative space, for 
the sake of an ecstatic self-assertion against forces confining 
him to silence. As such, by posing before himself the 
disappearance of his world in the signifiers of the Other, he 
sees the extremes to which his desire for self-assertion propels 
him, when he could, alternatively, have kept his life and 'novel' 
silently and protectively '"stuck" in himself' (States, 55); what 
he sees is the (self)obliterating force of his desire for 
recognition. So, if the ekstasis of reified form is the first 
counter-violence which shatters the sword's unsaying, this 
violence, autoenunciatively placed in front of the subject of the 
saying, makes him aware of mortal desire (the desire of a mortal 
156 - --
born to being-for-others, the desire bringing death) and effects 
a second shattering, that of the subject's alienation from his 
desire. 
(iii) Agon and agora 
(a) Towards something Other 
There is a third dimension to the subject's depressive 
numbing which 1s also shattered in the commencement of an 
ecstatic struggle against his silencing by violence. This is the 
dimension of his ennui and his despair at the absence of a 
communal agora for the sake of which he could labour, and in 
which, welcomed by the Other, whom he likewise welcomes, he could 
speak and be heard; lacking such a youtopia which he could 
celebrate with his sacrificial gifts, and which would in turn 
invest his endeavours with significance and special purpose, the 
task of writing seems to be a study in futility. Like the 
narrator of A Dry White Season, an 'old hack' (11) who cynically 
deprecates .what he regards as the inconsequentiality of the 
romantic fiction he writes and the public role he is called on to 
play (a guest speaker at literary clubs, a producer of 
commodities abiding by the doxa' s stipulations), the subject 
languishes in a moribund social regime, a regime which, by 
defining the limits of the thinkable and by assigning the 
identities it considers alone worthy of recognition, is deaf to 
other cognitive and existential possibilities. The regime, then, 
does not prize the numbed subject's unorthodox speech, nor, 
indifferent to his quiddity, does it constitute a desirable site 
desirous of his opening up of himself and his self-manifestation. 
For the subject, this social formation is not a subject of 
desire' (Felman, 1992, 32) whom he cathects with sublimated 
libidinal investment, and is thus not a 'subject' for whom he 
labours and from whom he solicits a desiring response. 
Nevertheless, he is trapped in the estranging formation, and so 
consigned to dormancy in short, he is immersed in a 
circumscribed zone of sameness which excludes an Other whom he 
could address and by whom he could be heard and recognised. 
Yet though the subject is confined in the specular doublings 
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between a master and a slave (the master constructs the slave in 
his image, while the slave identifies with this interpellation), 
in the ecstatic speech by which he shatters these_determinations, 
his movement away from a specific encapsulation of himself and 
against a constraining force, is necessarily a movement outside 
of sameness, and towards something other. Breaking out of a 
silencing-by-encapsulation in which he is not heard by the doxa, 
the subject desires to make himself heard, so that -- beyond 
present deafness -- his speech presupposes and actively projects 
the existence of one-who-hears. The violence of this self-
assertive saying thus has a negative and a positive aspect: it 
negates a contraction while positing an addressable Other beyond 
the underworld of 'the foul rag-and-bone-shop of the heart', and 
on 'the other side' (CoV, 395) of present entrapment. As Landman 
says in his appeal to victims of the bomb blast, 'It was to get 
us out of [the centripetal tug of a 'whirlpool' of violence] that 
we have done it' (Act, 230); his violence, by contrast, 
supposedly unleashes a reverse tendency of centrifugal movement 
towards the safety of the shore, or agora. 
Brink likewise describes 'the violence of articulation' as 
a continuous act of transgression and transcendence' which 
involves 'the neverending crossing of boundaries (of meaning, of 
spaces, of fields of action)' (AVTFL, 42). The text, he claims, 
quoting Robert Boyers, is a 'movement toward a world not yet 
made' (40). Given Brink's prominent use of metaphors of extension 
and movement in relation to textual dissemination, it would seem 
that the subject's ecstatic utterance against silence, utterance 
in which he risks death in the signifier (that is, the 
finalisation or determination of his meanings), resonates beyond 
his limited being into an intertextual realm: the violence of his 
saying inaugurates a diastolic passage to a youtopia where 'no 
language has a hold over any other' (Barthes, 1977, 164), where 
no language subjugates, impoverishes, and deafens itself to, the 
polysemy of signifying possibilities in an-other language. One 
will recall from an earlier discussion8 that, according to the 
idea of intertextuality, every text is always-already a text-
between-texts, a text interpreted py way of the other texts into 
which it is contingently 'plugged' (Barthes, 1988b, 194); 
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conversely, texts do not signify as self-contained entities, but 
do so inasmuch as their boundaries overlap with other texts. 
Their meanings, Brink notes, are thus never "here", never 
"present", never "final"' but dispersed across intertextuality 
and perpetually in process of becoming, which is why textuality 
involves 'the neverending crossing of boundaries' (AVTFL, 42). 
Since meaning is 'never "final"' that is, finalised by a 
dominant language having priority over an-other -- textuality 
prefigures the utopia of 'a world not yet made', a world 'n~~yet 
~ 
made' both in the sense that it is not in existence and that it 
is a permanently undefined site of open possibilities. (The 
narrator of States of Emergency 
function of intertextuality when 
stresses the prefigurative 
he uses the vocabulary of 
textual openness to describe the ideal national, public space: 
what he hopes for is 'the openness, the open-endedness, the 
endlessness of a country for which the future is still 
possible', and which has therefore not had its future potential 
foreclosed and predetermined by contemporary strifei 244.) 
To summarise, then, through the violence of his saying, the 
subject locates himself in an indefinite metanarrative 
progression from a coercively enclosed interiority into 
polymorphous exteriority, and from a state of affairs reducing 
signification, to one increasingly allowing all signifying 
possibilities to manifest themselves as the text circulates in 
'the speech of the People' (Barthes, 1977, 3). 'Writing,' Brink 
observes, 'does not cease at the end of a story it is 
inscribed as traces in the mind of the reader, where it continues 
to pursue its meanings in the world' (AVTFL, 42) . Since the 
pursuit 'involves the neverending crossing of boundaries' and 
mutual interpenetration of texts and readers, it is as though 
this transgressive crossing, while accentuating separation from 
a previous condition, instituted a proliferating network of 
bindings among language-users, a network which in principle tends 
asymptotically to take in all speakers (its crossing and binding 
is 'neverending'). As such, the text's articulation presupposes 
aside from empirical contingencies -- its transmission into 
generality, and over and against the dereliction of the 
context of enunciation -- bears witness to a futural community. 
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Significantly the narrator of A Dry White Season breaks his 
numbness not only by entering an ecstatic agon against hegemony's 
silencing and by becoming conscious of his mortality and desire, 
but by affirming faith in 'something man is capable of being but 
which he isn't very often allowed to be' (316). That is to say, 
he writes in the name of this other destiny prohibited by 
sameness. His writing is an invocation of 'a world not yet made' 
(AVTFL, 40), and it is hence an act of faith in the possibility 
of such a world coming into being. His writing, in short, is an 
action which bears witness to the (potential) reality of the 
agora surmounting present estrangement. By taking the witness 
stand and offering his saying 'before the court of history and of 
the future ... before an audience of readers and spectators', the 
narrator so becomes 'the vehicle of a dimension beyond 
himself' (Felman, 1992, 204i 3). Addressing the future and taking 
responsibility for preservation of past affairs, he is a 
conservator who assumes custody over the latter for the benefit 
of the former. Thus, the conservator is the 'vehicle' for 
relating narratives which the past wants to tell, the present 
order wishes to suppress, and which the future wants to hear. 
Describing his feeling of loss at the death of Grandpa 
Ntshenge, Landman regrets the disappearance of the unrecorded 
oral archive which he had at his disposal: '[I]t seems to me a 
whole dimension of the country's memory has vanished' (Act, 242). 
While the phrase 'a country's memory' is commonplace enough, it 
is worthwhile examining its various assumptions in closer detail, 
for it suggests, first, that a collectivity has attributes of a 
sentient person, namely a 'memory', and second, that this 
collective subject seeks consciousness-of-self by reflecting on 
itself, by 'looking back' at itself, and by re-membering itself 
as a coherent totality posed before itself: the 'country' 
assimilates matters as component narratives in the metanarrative 
of its development, consolidation, and attainment of fully-
fledged self-conscious existence. By re-membering itself out of 
its previous dis-memberment, it pleasures itself in reading the 
narrative of its coming-into-being, in seeing itself constitute 
itself from an initial fragmentation and dormancy, and, as such, 
it converts death, conflict and suffering into interrruptions or 
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edifying, instructive moments within the ~unstoppable groundswell 
towards understanding' (Dove, 11) through which it emerges as a 
unified entity. 9 It is for this reason that one can claim that 
the future wants to receive the testimonies of the past, and that 
it invests the conservator's office and labours with special 
importance. The futural country is ~a subject of desire' 
1992, 32) -- a subject desired by the conservator, 
desiring (itself) in the narratives he conserves. 
(Felman, 
a subject 
Dovetailing into this configuration of desires is the desire 
of the past to tell itself, to make itself heard, and to be 
recognised in spite of circumstances mishearing and nullifying 
its realness. The conservator, whose ek-static summoning of the 
Other-as-agora simultaneously vests him with an office and hence 
with a set of duties towards the Other, is thus pledged as well 
to facilitate the past's desire for recognition from the Other-
as-agora. One will recall that the narrator of A Dry White Season 
and Ben du Toit are bound in a pact to advance ~something man is 
capable of being but which he isn't very often allowed to be' 
(316). Through the pact, however, the narrator is called on not 
only to bear witness to the prospective post-apartheid agora, to 
the deluge expected to follow after the dry season (of white rule 
and a writer's block) , but to be a witness to Ben's acts of 
witnessing, to ~reconstruct intricate events' from what is 
~illegible or missing' (33) in Ben's notes (elisions metonymic of 
the doxa's censorship), and to '(r]eport [him] and [his] cause 
aright' (33). The novel is arranged as a chain of transmission 
in which testimonies are sent from one witness to the next ~like 
those flames carried by runners' (States, 195), messages which 
(it is hoped) will ultimately arrive at the imperial capitol: 
first, Gordon investigates his son's death in detention but is 
himself killed by agents of the state; second, Ben is possessed 
by Gordon's desire to make known ~the full story of what had 
happened' (51), and is killed; third, shortly before his death, 
Ben entrusts the project to the narrator, who is aware that he, 
too, is at risk from the security police. In each case, there is 
an ek-static desire to shatter an imposed 
intimate's death; in each case, the 
circumstances of that death gives the 
silence 
desire 
subject 
surrounding an 
to know the 
knowledge of 
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mortality, of his life-endangering desire; in each case, the 
subject risks his life so as to make ~the full story' known, and, 
inasmuch as this is achieved, to obtain from the agora a 
recognition of the validity (rather than the aberrancy or 
delusional nature) of his exertions. 
To gain recognition of ~the full story' , and to assert 
himself as an ek-static being who cannot be delimited by the 
social position into which the hegemony tries to fix him, Ben 
must expend himself to the limits of his resources. As he says, 
~There would be no sense in it unless I'm prepared to pay the 
full price' (297). By not paying ~the full price', that is, by 
choosing life for fear of the dangerous consequences of his ek-
stasis, he accorri'odates himself to the place allotted him by 
' hegemony and thus does not broach his silencing or that of Gordon 
and the latter's son. Conversely, by being prepared ~to pay the 
full price' (297), and risk dying for the sake of self-assertion, 
Ben underlines the seriousness of his resolve, and substantiates, 
through a self-sacrificial act, his conviction in the value and 
the attainability of his social ideals: without such a readiness, 
he suggests, the goals he professes would be ~senseless', merely 
rhetorical affirmations which lack his ultimate endorsement (he 
would simply be ~bluffing himself' about his faith in his 
aspirations, and, shown to be ~bluffs', these would lose the 
over-riding significance he had believed they held for him) . 
Nonetheless, this risk of life courts the obvious danger that 
his enterprise -- along with his life -- will soak without trace 
into the indifferent texture of things. ~As long as it doesn't 
end here,' Ben cautions the narrator, and emphasises how crucial 
it is that ~someone knows' about his endeavours: ~If they get 
that [if his journal is suppressed by the security police] there 
would have been no sense in it at all' (13). In short, by seeking 
a witness to his witnessing, Ben wants his negativity to be 
conserved. 
(b) Dialectical conservation 
What this means is as follows: by entering into a struggle 
with a constricting and silencing nemesis, the subject incarnates 
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in himself the obliterating force initially given in the Other 1 s 
upsurge by ecstatically dis-placing, trans-gressing, ex-ploding, 
and negating the heteronomous form which this nemesis offers him 
in exchange for his life. This power of the subject to negate 
self and Other, to negate every given form of himself, defines 
his negativity, 'the capacity of mind to de-pose what actually 
is, or what it has itself judged 11 to be the caserr, in order to 
posit instead what is not (the possible, the future, the 
desirable) r (Descombes, 1980, 24). But if the power of negativity 
drives the subject to risk his life in a struggle against his 
negation by an enemy, '[t]o rush headlong into death pure and 
simple, r Derrida remarks, 'is thus to risk the absolute loss of 
meaning 1 : Hegel, Derrida further remarks, 'called this mute and 
nonproductive death abstract negativity, in opposition to 
11 the negation characteristic of [self-]consciousness, which 
cancels in such a way that it preserves and maintains what is 
sublated 11 r (1979, 255) 
The reference is, of course, to Hegel 1 s famous dialectic, or 
Aufhebung, and the distinction Derrida makes is between abstract 
and dialectical negativity, between that risk of life which is 
'mute and nonproductive,, and that producing a meaning shareable 
between the rivals inasmuch as each acquires self-consciousness 
by way of the agon. In the course of dialectical negation, a 
totality is challenged by its antithesis and loses its sole 
validity; however (and this is where the crux of the distinction 
_lies) , the negation it suffers is tempered in so far as it 
retains a limited validity by being conserved within the new 
synthesis as a component element participating in its 
constitution (Laing and Cooper, 1964, 102). That is, the 
dialectic comprises a double process of negation and negation of 
that negation such that it 'maintains what it suppressesr (Borch-
Jacobsen, 1991, 208). According to Taylor, the result is that 
'every loss is turned to profit for that which is negated is also 
preserved as a necessary moment in the self-realization of the 
totality of which it is an integral memberr (1986, 9). 
An example of the Aufhebung is found in biological 
reproduction, as Barthes notes. '(T]he particular dies for the 
satisfaction of the universal 1 , he says, which in this case is 
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'the superior Life Force (the race, the species) '· 'after having 
been reproduced as other than himself [in his offspring] , the 
individual dies, having thereby denied and transcended himself' 
(1982, 72), having negated himself as an in-dividual, but also 
having negated this negation by being preserved in the child and 
integrated into the 'species' as a 'necessary moment in [its] 
self-realization' (Taylor, 1986, 9). Yet Barthes himself, 
childless, in mourning for his mother, without a lineage through 
which he universalise his particularity, delivers the words: 
'From now on I could no more than await my total, undialectical 
death' (1982, 72). This death, 'mute and nonproductive' in 
relation to the 'Life Force', is a 'pure and simple' negation and 
an issueless expenditure which is not compensated by any profit. 
In the case of dialectical negation, the negation of death is 
converted into a sacrificial expenditure, such that the person 
negated is preserved as a 'necessary moment' in the development 
of that for which he is sacrificed. But in the case of abstract 
negation, death is 'total': it is 'the coldest and meanest of all 
deaths, with no more significance than cutting off a head of 
cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water' (Hegel, 1978, 360). 
The dialectic, in short, puts death to work in the production of 
meaning. This is hardly surprising when one bears in mind that 
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is, as Borch-Jacobsen points out, 
a 'speculative version of the Passion' (1991, 12). In other 
words, the triadic structure of the dialectic replicates the 
course followed by the trinitarian Spirit in its progression from 
self-subsistence to incarnation (and crucifixion) and finally to 
resurrection. Originally existing as an unmediated, simple self-
identity, Spirit negates itself (it separates itself from itself 
by experiencing death on the cross), but negates the negation (it 
ressurects itself), and by 'becoming an other to itself, i.e., 
becoming an object to itself' (Hegel, 1986, 79), puts death to a 
productive use as a 'necessary moment' in its attainment of self-
consciousness. 
So, when Ben solicits the narrator to conserve the 
negativity of his risk of life, he is motivated by dread of a 
'total, undialectical death' . 'It seems as if a sacrifice is 
impossible to avoid, ' Ben remarks: 'But at least one has the 
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choice between a wholly futile sacrifice and one that might, in 
the long run, open up a possibility ... of something better ... 
for our children' (ADWS, 305) .. The ~choice', that is, is between 
abstract or dialectical negativity, and the demand he makes on 
the narrator is for the latter to share his faith in the reality 
of a metanarrative movement towards a futural agora, a 
metanarrative in which the negativity of Ben's self-sacrificial 
expenditure is conserved as a necessary moment' in the 
evolvement of the agora. ~Once in one's life,' Ben says, one 
should have enough faith in something to risk everything for it' 
(272). He faithfully projects a metanarrative teleology in which 
his self-negation will itself be negated, and his lethal 
expenditure will be gmortized. In other words, he risks death in 
order to break silence -- to continue Gordon's mission to have 
~the full story' (51) heard and to assert himself as an ecstatic, 
unsilenceable being -- and he has faith that these ambitions will 
finally be realised. 
Given Ben's death, however, it falls upon the conservator to 
facilitate their attainment by resurrecting Ben in the signifier 
and thus dispatching him towards the futural agora. As a link 
between the past and future, the writer has three inter-related 
duties, duties informed by and stemming from his violent, 
agonistic desire for ekstasis. He must project a youtopian 
Future, rather than ~insult' it by falling to ~the temptation of 
despair' (Dove, 11), and attempt to gratify its desire for 
remembering itself by conserving the past; in turn he must 
conserve the past in order to satisfy its desire to be heard and 
recognised by the agora; lastly, as a corollary to the latter, he 
must resist forces of unsaying which erase, repress, forget or 
consign past voices to a ~territory of oblivion' (Act, 659) and 
so ensure their ~total, undialectical death'. Surveying ruins of 
his childhood home, Landman declares, ~X must survive. Because X 
remember what was here before. And now the vanished house and 
garden ... depend on me, on my ability not to forget' (Act, 426). 
If this combination of duty and dependency is presented in 
A Dry White Season as a testimonial chain, elsewhere in Brink's 
writings the bequeathing of historical legacies is imaged through 
the relationships between fathers and sons, ancestors and 
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descendants. Thomas Landman, for example, speaks of a curious 
symbiosis' between himself and his forebears, who are 'still 
alive inside me' (Act, 659). In their mutually supportive co-
existence, his ancestors constitute him while, long after their 
deaths, they retain a dialectically conserved existence through 
him (recall Barthes' comment in this regard) i moreover, it is he 
who, through the bomb attack and his chronicli-ng of the family's 
history, raises.them from death inasmuch as he lifts them into 
the light of self -consciousness. 'Blindly, through fierce or 
furtive copulations in the dark, they invented me,' he says, 'in 
return for this [the chronicle] their conscious if tentative 
reinvention by their offspring' (Act, 659). Since the father --
whether Ben du Toit, or Galant in Chain of Voices -- ecstatically 
negates himself through an act of faith in the attainment of 
'something better ... for our children' (ADWS, 305), since he 
sacrifices himself in political· resistance in order to be an 
inspirational model for others, it is, according to this ethical 
logic, incumbent on the child to commemorate the father through 
an act of transmission (that is to say, by emulating his example 
or by preserving and ceaselessly re-interpreting an archival 
record) , an act which resurrects him and incrementally advances 
his project of obtaining self-consciousness via the recognition 
afforded him by the agora. (The negligent son, by contrast, 
breaks the testimonial chain and consequently relegates ancestral 
endeavour to a 'total' death: perplexed by his father, a history 
teacher, thus a bearer of historical consciousness, Mynhardt 
wonders, given his failure to have comprehended his late father, 
'how accurately I would hand [the history of the tribe] on to 
Louis one day' i RR, 256.) 
Keeping his ancestors alive, Landman also locates their 
desire-driven endeavours as 'necessary moments', whether of 
failure or success, in an epic metanarrative progression from a 
condition of exile and displacement from Africa, to an eventual 
re-integration with it in which one will 'be this continent' 
(Act, 637, emphasis added). Both through his re-writing of the 
Landman chronicle in these terms and in his terror attack (which 
he believes signals resolute commitment to Africa, a veritable 
homecoming) , Landman commemorates and advances in the direction -
166--
taken by his ancestor's desires: he honours and continues their 
projects. 
Crucially/ in the metanarrative he postulates/ his 
ancestors' enterprises are redeemed from their apparent 
insignificance and futility (their state of abstract negativity) r 
such that 'the waster the suffering ... will yet turn out in the 
end to have been worth while' (638). From the perspective of 'the 
end' r that isr 
violence and 
in relation to the 'completed' national narrative/ 
death will have been changed from seemingly 
pointless wastes of life into productive moments contributing to 
the overall evolvement of the self-consciousness national 
colossus. 
Nowhere does Landman make this point with greater emphasis 
than in his anguished reverie at the funeral service for the 
victims of his explosion. In a bid to balance the. scales by 
contextualising the victim's loss in a broader theater of 
conflict/ he describes a funeral procession for activists in the 
liberation movement. At the head of the procession/ the African 
National Congress flag is like 'the columns of fire or smoke 
leading the children of Israel through the desert in search of a 
promised land' i later 1 'everything is transformed into the black 
and green and gold of the flags over the single deep grave into 
which three coffins are lowered' ( 23 0-1) . The suggestion that 
these deaths have been negated through a 'transform[ing]' 
assimilation into the emblems of political liberation/ and have 
been incorporated as sacrifices into the metanarrative quest for 
re-integration with Africa ('a promised land')r extends to 
Landman's victims/ where it is reinforced by biblical quotations 
read at the service. 'Sorrow shall be turned into joy that a 
man is born into the worldr' the mourners are exhorted: '[T]he 
trumpet shall soundr and the dead shall be raised incorruptible' 
(231-2). By thus turning the deaths into 'necessary moments' in 
the nation's 'birth' 1 they apparently lose their scandalous 
senselessness and acquire significancei in addition/ the lives 
which have been negated are conserved within this national 
totality/ since death is dialectically 'swallowed up in victory' 
(232) and the victims are canonised as unwitting martyrs. 
Both in his bomb attack and his family chronicler Landman 
167 
preserves a testimonial chain by discharging a duty to seek the 
fulfillment of his ancestors' desires for integration with Africa 
and, like a runner taking the flame from his predecessor in order 
to dispatch it toward the future, to conserve their expenditures 
of effort for the benefit of the national agora gratifyingly 
looking back on its history of coming-into-being; and by 
discharging this duty, he saves his ancestors' endeavour from 
being a 'wholly futile sacrifice' (ADWS, 305) by situating them 
as narratives or a series of chain-links within a encompassing 
metanarrative passage. 
The chronicle he writes is presented, significantly, as a 
'supplement' to the account of the terror attack, and therefore, 
recalling Derrida' s comments on the ambiguities of the term 
'supplement', the chronicle is, on the one hand, an addition to 
a totality entire unto itself, but on the other, is a 
compensation for an anterior deficiency -- in which case it may 
be seen as a continuation of 'the act of terror' and therefore as 
being in itself the perpetration of violence. Thus, in the 
violent, ek- static act through which the subject breaks his 
silencing, the legacy entrusted to him comes to light and is 
projected toward the future -- the outside, the beyond -- which 
saying presupposes and invokes. Whether or not the subject has 
been the recipient of actual testimony is, for Brink, beside~ the 
point -- as he has Landman say, 'It's not only the dead who enter 
your existence and become part of you: it's every single person 
who travels a part of the journey with you: each one rubs off on 
you (Act, 257). That is, each subject retains the traces of 
the Other. Brink approvingly quotes Wolfe's description of the 
self as 'a transitory composite of materials borrowed from the 
environment', so that it is 'like a cave ... in which the entire 
village dwells' (AVTFL, 42). By risking death and broaching his 
condition of being 'stuck' in himself, it is not only the subject 
who emerges from the cave towards the luminous plain of the 
agora: it is the ~village' as well, the constitutive dimension of 
his historicity, which issues forth. As the narrator of States of 
Emergency notes, 'What assumes the form, at the moment [of 
composition], of an agglomeration of citations [that- is to say,-
of traces and residues of the Other's discourse] will eventually 
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be absorbed by that text to exist only as "mirages 11 ' 
(205). Although having been negated (or ~absorbed'), these traces 
and residues are still conserved as ~mirages', as ghostly forms 
through which the Other and the ~village' continue to live and, 
indeed, to thrive, since they ramify into diverse signifying 
contexts. Through the violence of saying, the subject becomes the 
~vehicle' (Felman, 1992, 3), the oracular mouthpiece, for the 
coming-into-being of an entire world. 
(iv) Analepsis 
Let us briefly survey the path 
suggested, at the outset of the chapter, 
incapacitation 
conceptualised 
caused by the violence 
as a conflation of the 
sword. In this view, numbness arises 
we have followed. I 
that the numbness and 
of unsaying could be 
three silences of the 
from the lack of an 
autonomous voice, the absence of self -consciousness, and the 
collapse of a sense of communality. By contrast! the violence of 
saying shatters the silence through a re-assertion of subjecthood 
against an imposed destiny of objecthood, through a facilitation 
of self-consciousness, and through a positing of a realm beyond 
an enclosing framework of oppression. Thus, I went on to explain 
how these shatterings could be discerned within the violence of 
writing, and argued that, in general terms, the affirmation of 
subjecthood involves appropriating for oneself the world-
obliterating power located in hostile otherness; that is, it 
entails the re-assertion of ek-static, ex-plosive, trans-gressive 
negativity in opposition to the Other's negativity. Through tbis 
re-assertion, the subject is made aware of mortality in spite of 
his self-protective disavowal of the menace the Other holds for 
him. In short, he suffers death in the signifiers of the Other. 
But more crucially, he acquires consciousness of mortality in the 
further sepse that, risking death at the hands of the Other, he 
realises that his desire, his negativity, endangers his life 
in the signifiers before him, he poses himself as one who is 
ready to risk the destruction of his defensively insulated 
interiority for the sake of ek-static self-assertion against a 
masterful __ Other. Moreover, his shattering of a frame implies .. a 
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movement into a beyond and towards a futural world unbound by the 
constraints of present hegemonic orders; as an anticipatory 
appeal to such a future, and as a resurrection of the past from 
its quiescence, the violence of saying inaugurates the emergence 
of a world. Yet in order to lend greater cogency to these 
observations, one can turn again to one of the central themes in 
Brink's writing, namely the distinction between the violence of 
hegemony and that of political resistance. Having conflated the 
sword's silences, that is, we can separate them once more and 
examine how what is said in his writing illuminates the dynamics 
of its saying. 
(IV) Brinkmanship 
~I've never wanted to spare myself because I feel 
there are people around who died for this struggle. 
What right do I have to hold back, to rest, to 
preserve my health, to have time with my family, 
when there are other people who are no longer alive 
-- who have sacrificed what is precious, namely life 
itself? ... Most of our people knew that if they joined 
and became part of the struggle, the likelihood was 
always there to get killed. But we accepted that 
eventuality. We were ready to fight. But we also accepted 
that they would kill us' 
-- Chris Hani 10 
(i) Violence as questioning 
If the writing subject opposes the ecstatic violence of 
articulation to the numbing violence of unsaying, and the former 
violence involves the shattering of heteronomous forms, the 
acquisition of awareness concerning mortality and desire, and the 
projection of a dimension exceeding present oppression, Brink's 
account of the violence of political resistance draws attention-
to similar processes. Where Brink sees one category of violence 
separating ~sword' from ~word' , degrading relations between 
speakers, and entrenching an ~historical silence' (Dove, 11) in 
which a reified victim and a self -alienated aggressor lack a 
shared topos where they could know each other and themselves, he 
points to another category of violence that combines ~sword' and 
~word', promotes relations between the speakers, and breaks the 
~historical silence' by fostering the victim's self-assertion, 
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piercing the aggressor 1 s solipsism, and underscoring the 
possibility of a meeting-place in which they may be reconciled to 
one another. 
Criticising the notion that ~violence is invariably, and 
exclusively, destructive and negative 1 (AVTFL, 36), Landman 
argues for violence 1 s oft-ignored creative potential, observing 
~[h]ow closely related are destruction and creation, how thin the 
membrane that separate our different kinds of violence 1 , and how 
violence which ~spells life 1 can easily be confused with other 
forms of it ~which threaten life 1 (Act, 426). ~What can be more 
violent than a question? 1 he asks: 
She [Lisa] spoke about questions; never stops speaking 
about them. Her very existence is a question mark. Her 
questions about violence -- any question, all questions 
determine our limits, define the periphery of what 
is admissable, of what has so far been thinkable. And 
it is our search for answers to these questions which 
prompt us to transcend limits. This is the core of the 
violence which defines our humanity (426). 
By conceptualising violence as a question, Landman implies that 
violence is an intersubjective exchange, and that ~the core of 
the violence which defines our humanity 1 (426, emphasis added) is 
a dialogue, in contrast to the monological nature of the violence 
which instead corrupts ~humanity 1 • Since violence is a question, 
and a question is violent, Lisa 1 s incessant speech, her 
unrelenting interrogation of Landman 1 s self-understanding, is a 
violent act through which she shows both him to be other than he 
thinks he is, and herself as other-than the notions he entertains 
about her. Her existence, as Landman says, is a question mark 1 
(426) it is a violent questioning in which she calls his 
freedom into question and in which she reveals herself, through 
a violent ek-stasis of his preconceptions, to be permanently 
irreducible to his knowledge of her. In Levinasian terms, she is 
infinitely in excess of his appropriating cognitions. 
Her assertion of alterity is coupled with Landman 1 s 
realization of his delimitation, which in Brink 1 s metaphorics 
features as a trope for mortal finitude. When one is ~confronted 
with the other, 1 says the narrator of States of Emergency, the 
experience ~suddenly and violently 1 ~illuminates both the freedom 
and the boundaries of the self 1 (22); he goes on to quote 
.. 
- - .. ··--- ·- .. 
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Certeau, who claims (during an interview on Levinas's thought), 
'Because they are what I am not, others bring to me the tidings 
of my own frontiers, my inadequacies, 1n the final analysis of my 
death' (165, emphases added). So, in contrast to silence of 
'mindless violence' 'the core' of which is determined by the 
oppressor's nullification of the Other, and his consequent 
'ignorance of his own mortality' (Dove, 11) in the dialogic 
exchange at 'the core of the violence which defines our humanity' 
(Act, 426), the Other negates the Same's reductions, and, by 
affirming herself as another-~ in relation to the Same, brings 
him the mortal knowledge that he is the Other's other and that he 
is thus vulnerable to the freedom of other subjects. Violence 
heralds death, and so provides the Same with consciousness-of-
·self. 
In An Act of Terror, the bomb attack is intended precisely 
to bring hegemony to such an anagnorisis, and thereby to resume 
the dialogue between oppressor and oppressed which had been 
suspended by the former's monologue. Given, as Brink sees it, 
that 'the heart of a totalitarian regime' is 'that the despot 
forgets about, ignores, his own mortality', 'the mere attempt at 
an assault implies a transition from untouchability to 
vulnerability' (18-19) . Thanks to the attack, his 'confrontation 
with this most basic of truths ... signals the beginning of the 
dictator's end' (19). Not only is the violent upsurge of alterity 
linked to awareness of mortality -- it is also supposed to induce 
morality within hegemony. Explaining the premises of the terror 
attack, Landman notes, 'It was ... a matter ... of using as a 
starting-point the situation of the whites in the country, the 
class of owners, of rulers, ensconced in their prosperous and 
secure existence ... and consequently supporting the system that 
offered them their material benefits; the need to sho¢k them out 
of this syndrome of "the good life" and to open their eyes, ' he 
says, 'if not to its injustice, at least to its precariousness' 
(50-1, emphases added). That is, the attack seeks to make 
hegemony sensible of its being-for-others and its guilt -- its 
lack of innocence, harmlessness and 'natural' given-ness, and its 
implication instead in a violent struggle for domination. The 
argument is made clear when Landman, quarreling with his brother 
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about the attack's legitimacy, asks, 
Isn't all this simply a sign of how far things·have 
gone, Frans? Of how close to the abyss we have all 
come? I mean, the very fact that people can be driven 
to something like that -- (111, emphasis added). 
What Landman suggests is nothing short of the claim that it is 
precisely the avartheid hegemony which is ultimately responsible 
for the blast, for its oppression, leaving little recourse to the 
peaceful resolution of the conflict, constitutes the driving 
force behind the explosion. In addition Landman implies that the 
violence hegemony beholds emanating from outside itself in the 
Other's exertions is the outcome of its own violence and so 
represents a Dorian Grey mirror-image in which repressed 
knowledge of its violence rounds back on it with thunderous 
impact: the terrifying nemesis posed before itself is no less 
than the displaced image of its monstrous, negating, and 
obliterating desire. As Levinas declares, in the upsurge bf the 
Other, the Same discovers its freedom of negativity to be 
'arbitrary and violent', 'murderous in its very exercise' (1979, 
84). Violence is an interrogation of the Same by the Other, a 
questioning in which the Same, 'search[ing] for answers to these 
questions' (Act, 426), commences with a moral self-examination --
a point which Brink underscores with the series of confessional 
narratives to which Landman's actions give rise among the various 
relatives and strangers he meets. By inserting 'the unthinkable' 
in 'the framework of the possible' (18), he challenges the self-
evidence of the doxa and opens the way to the imaginative 
anticipation of modes of being lying beyond hegemony's 
ideological horizons. 
(ii) Precautions 
If this salutary violence of political resistance is 
presented as a dialogue in which the oppressed asserts his 
autonomy of the reifications imposed by the oppressor and in 
which the oppressor gains consciousness-of-self, then a number of 
special precautions have to be taken to ensure that such violence 
does not merely re-instate the monologue it strives to undo and 
replace one tyranny with another. Rather than reverse the roles 
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by oppressing the former oppressor (a move which would stunt his 
capacity to attain self-consciousness), the agent of violence 
must -- according to the ethics enounced in Brink's fictions --
scrupulously renounce impulses to instal himself as a new master. 
He must prohibit himself from enjoying the material and ideal 
rewards which flow from the success of his violent acts, and he 
does so by following a policy of temperance, self-sacrifice, 
service, discipline, symbolic mediation, and (finally) self-
negation. One may somewhat cynically object at the outset, 
however, that these policies and precautions are largely 
redundant when one takes into account the sad record of 
innumerable defeats which Brink's portrayal of activism offers. 
In Rumours of Rain Franken, the leader of a militant cell, is 
imprisoned, in A Dry White Season Ben is murdered, in A Chain of 
Voices the revolt is quashed, while in An Act of Terror the State 
President survives the bomb blast and Landman's cell makes it 
across the country's border only with a heavy loss of life. Why 
even bother, then, with precautions about mastery when agents of 
resistance violence are never in a position to eschew it, let 
alone revel in it? 
Brink's response to the futility he evokes is to shift focus 
from an intervention's practical success and to point out instead 
that ~there are situations where doing nothing may be worse than 
exploding a bomb' (Act, 402). It is better to have acted than 
not. ~If I act, I cannot but lose,' Ben du Toit says: ~But if I 
do not act, it is a different kind of defeat' (ADWS, 304). Why is 
this so? One has ~to do what one has to do,' he says, ~because 
you're you, because you're there ... I have to do it because no o~e 
else in the world is Ben du Toit' (161-2) . His thesis becomes 
clear~r~if ~ne reverses it~ terms to read as follows -- I can do 
what I must only if I am someone else, that is, if I transfer 
responsibility to institutions or people who are better empowered 
than I am and if I abdicate agency to others; yet my passivity 
amounts to acquiescence in the intolerable, and an alienation of 
my unique potential. ~Surely, if I were to consider what I might 
"achieve" in a practical sense I couldn't even hope to begin,' he 
remarks (161) . Similarly, Nina is beset with self-doubt on the 
eve of the terror attack. Watching a vagrant rootling in afin, 
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she asks if the blast will ameliorate his lot. If it does not, 
~what would it all have availed, all their sacrifices and 
suffering ... ? 1 (Act, 35) . Or as Galant 1 s warder says to him, 
~With this murder [of Nicolaas] you haven 1 t gained or earned 
anything 1 (CoV, 437). Again Brink 1 s answer to this poser is the 
same: not to have acted is worse than having attempted and 
failed, since by leaving matters to the ~proper 1 authorities (as 
Ben is counselled to do by friend and foe alike), one elects to 
be passive in respect of a master, and thus risks perpetuating an 
oppressive order. 
Yet from Brink 1 s perspective there is an even more 
suspicious aspect to any renunciation of action on the grounds 
that it will inevitably lead to failure. Ben is told that there 
are two kinds of madness: ~One is the belief that we can do 
everything. The other is the belief that we can do nothing 1 
(ADWS, 244). This warning highlights Brink 1 s suspicion about the 
renunciation of activism -- that the subject abdicates in advance 
through fear that his wish for omnipotent mastery in which he 
can do everything 1 and overthrow the existing order at a stroke 
will not be satisfied. Where action is motivated by such a wish 
for the preservation and enrichment of egocentric life, what the 
subject cannot countenance is precisely risk to his narcissistic 
self-attachment. 
Brink elaborates on these ideas nowhere more deftly than in 
the character of Campher, who crystallises tendencies found 
elsewhere in Brink 1 s writing only in dispersed and implicit 
forms. Having traded as a frontier gun-runner and mountebank, 
Campher turns into a demagogue and self-styled revolutionary 
intent on leading the slaves of Houd-den-Bek ever onwards towards 
the apotheosis of revolution. However, true to the contradictory 
implications of his name, which suggests both a fighter (or 
Kampfer) and camphor liniment, he deserts the rebellion. The 
crisis eventuating in his desertion turns about two antithetical 
images. In his minds-eye Campher sees the triumphant 
accomplishment of collective emancipation. Ascending to the 
pinnacle of fame and superhuman power, the army of which he is 
the revered leader receives tribute from the grateful populace: 
~I saw us marching through ~arQhia9 throu9h the streets of Cape 
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Town, cheered by the multitudes, and sweeping up the side of the 
Mountain like an enormous wave that nothing could stop anymore' 
(CoV, 412). But he is troubled by ~another image -- the image of 
failed rebellion', in which ~corpses litter the earth, and maimed 
men crawl like spiders with broken legsi I saw a handful of 
survivors rounded up, wretched and tattered' (412). What makes 
the latter tableau so frightening, is the trenchancy of its 
contrast with the voluptuous narcissistic transport, or the 
glory, of the former. Campher is not prepared to hazard his life 
for the sake of an ek-static self-assertion, and, betraying the 
revolt, opts for inactivity: he decides it is better not to act, 
' lest he forfeit hope (413) of gaining the mastery he desires, or 
worse, that he endanger himself. 
He represents the profiteer, a recurring figure in Brink's 
fictions, who stands in opposition to the martyr. Dan Levinson, 
Ben's attorney who skips the country and dines out on his 
spurious reputation as a dedicated anti-apartheid activist, is 
another incarnation of the profiteer, as is, more pertinently, 
Kat Bester in An Act of Terror. As the police agent in charge of 
the investigation into the bomb blast, Bester is remorseless in 
his exercise of violence. Yet unlike Landman and the members of 
his cell, Bester's violence serves purely sectional interests: in 
the first place, those of hegemony, and in the second, his own, 
since he seeks advancement in his career. By contrast, Landman 
and his fellow saboteurs are said to serve the cause of the 
national collective and to renounce personal gain in their 
practice of violence. This nexus of positions stands in greater 
relief when one uses a contrary set of attitudes as a foil. In 
that case, what is their violence not? 
According to Brink, it is not action committed ~in anger or 
passion' (Act, 64), or 'out of revenge or rage' (297) i nor does 
it follow from ~a personal grudge, a private grief to avenge' 
(438). It is not, apparently, primarily 'about winning or losing, 
about taking our freedom' (CoV, 497), nor is it (and this is an 
approach Galant is quick to repudiate) aimed at 'running free 
through the world, and tak[ing] whatever we want' (418). If the 
violence of resistance is not inspired by hyperaffectivity, it is 
not the case either that- one kills others 'in cold blood' (Act, 
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89). It seems that the problem with rage, vengefulness and anger 
is that they stem from a sense of slighted pride and, as such, . 
motivate attempts to regain one's self-esteem by subjugating the 
rival who has offended one. Yet aside from this chief difficulty 
that vengeance is goaded by an ambition to displace a foe from 
his position of mastery over one and instead to instal oneself in 
his place, there are adjacent difficulties Brink has with it. 
That is, the volatility of rage is a transient efferfvescence 
boiling over from ~a personal grudge' (Act, 438); intrinsically 
self-limited, it represents an expenditure the significance of 
which ends with the coming to term of the individual's life, and 
therefore does not pass beyond these boundaries to acquire 
enduring significance in the affairs of others (it is an instance 
of abstract negativity). Moreover, since perpetrating resistance 
violence that one be ~clear-headed' and know ~exactly what is at 
stake' (Act, 64) , it stands in contrast to the loss of self-
possession occurring in acts of rage. 
But why, then, is self-control so important? If resistance 
violence ~demands reflection, calm, dedication, faith' (Act, 297) 
in short, all the virtues of the monastery -- it does so 
because, unlike anger or other forms of affective transport, 
which (as with Campher) conceal a wish for mastery and self-
aggrandizement 1 it necessitates a lucid apprehension. of the 
prospect of failure and death. To know ~exactly what is at stake' 
is to know the imminent death to which one's actions lead one; 
but enraged, one loses sight of ~what is at stake' and thus one's 
resolve may weaken, as it does with Campher, when one does indeed 
realise precisely what is at issue in one's course of action. 
~Any man who builds himself up into a rage can commit [murder] , ' 
Galant remarks: ~But to choose, with open eyes ... willingly to 
bind oneself to that tomorrow which does not yet exist, but which 
is brought into being by the choice itself: that is perhaps the 
most difficult thing I've ever done in my life' (CoV, 497). 
Needless to say, Brink would not deny that acts of violence 
are informed by rage. As Landman recalls from his military 
training, ~To throw a bomb demands more than [revenge or 
rage]' (Act, 297, emphasis added), that is, it does not preclude 
rage but requires its sublimation into socially constructive--
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goals. Specifically, he claims, throwing a bomb demands ~hard, 
thankless, unremitting work' (297). Work has two broad functions. 
It is a denial, or at least a postponement, of enjoyment, for 
these monastic soldiers labour ~without the presumption of 
expectation' (297). Do not take unto yourself the products of 
your own labour: that is the operative injunction. ~This isn't 
your fight, Thomas, ' he is told: ~It is the people's fight' 
(573) The allusion is to the second function of work, namely 
that it amounts to a sacrificial substantiation of a totality 
which appropriates the fruits of labour. In other words, it is 
the totality -- or ~the Organization' -- which enjoys, while its 
workers faithfully hope to obtain their deferred reward through 
their dialectical conservation in this totality (that is, the 
totality negates their deaths so that they pleasure themselves at 
a remove in the totality's future enjoyment). In addition, by 
sublimating their rage into this totality, the agents of violence 
not only renounce personal mastery but also transfer to it the 
power of authorship over the significance of their activities. In 
this way, the meaning of their deeds extends beyond their 
privatised selves to be determined by the Other-as-agora. It is 
the case, after all, that these agents, having taken their 
sacrificial course towards death, hope to be dialectically 
conserved as signifiers maintained in circulation in the field of 
the Other. Whether it be Ben du Toit striving to survive against 
hegemony to ~prove' (ADWS, 238) to others that such effort is 
possible, or Galant ~think[ing] of my son looking back at me one 
day to see if his father chose to be a.slave or not' (Cov,)they 
wish to be preserved as exemplary models exercising a lasting 
influence on the lives of others. ~It has become imperative 
to keep alive in the minds of the people, through dangerous and 
daring acts, an outrageous thought,' Franken says: ~the idea that 
the system is vulnerable, that freedom exists' (RR, 135). 
(iii) Risk of life 
Although Brink's account of resistance violence typically 
shows how its agents do not immediately succeed in enjoying the 
material and ideal rewards of their actions~ it seems evident 
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that these scenes of apparent futility are to be explained not 
only as representations of the strength of hegemonic rule. 
Indeed, it appears that the flight of these activists headlong 
into calamity is an intrinsic dimension of what Brink considers 
the violence of resistance to be, rather than a result contingent 
on the relative historical strength or weakness of the contending 
forces. To do something about hegemony, as opposed to doing 
nothing, is to wager one's life and run the probable and 
unprofitable risk of non-enjoyment. While Brink situates this 
expenditure-of-self as sacrificial work performed in the service 
of a totality, one should not regard the agent of violence's 
renunciation of life and personal mastery as a confirmation 
instead of a servile abasement before the authority of this 
totality or a willingness to put his life in the hands of master 
who can do with it as he pleases. When Nina says that she is 
sustained by the fact that ~I am not sending, in cold blood, 
others ... to their deaths, but that I am prepared, ·if I must, to 
give up my own life' (Act, 89), her preparedness to die is not a 
pious afterthought to a decision to murder (as though she would 
atone for the enjoyment of ~cold' mastery by a later act of self-
abnegation) but it is, perhaps, the essence of the decision, 
namely the desire ek-statically to transgress and exceed every 
given form of herself, in spite of a self-preservative attachment 
to herself. To do nothing about hegemony is to be weighed down 
beneath its strictures; to do something is to wager death by 
shattering those strictures. 
' 
(iv) Kojeve on desire . 
This risk of life occupies a critical place in Hegel's 
philosophical allegory11 of the struggle for recognition and the 
subsequent dialectic of master and slave. As one will recall, 12 
Hegel's thought operates within a model of self-reflexive 
consciousness in which the subject seeks to pose himself in front 
of his gaze as an independent object. ~The satisfaction of 
Desire,' as he asserts, ~is the reflection of self-consciousness 
into itself', for ~self-consciousness is Desire in general' 
(1978, 110; 105); thus, satisfaction, ~for Hegel, is not the 
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banal fulfillment of pleasure but is the subject's communion with 
itself in the object' (Taylor, 1980, 192). In Sartre's account, 
'the impulse of this consciousness is to ... become conscious of 
itself in all respects by giving itself objectivity' (1986, 285) 
and by so turning subjective certainty into objective truth. 
That is, the subject requires the mediation of an independent 
Other, who teaches him what he is. The desire for self-
consciousness is consequently a desire for recognition from the 
Other, since through acknowledgement by the Other, the subject 
poses him before himself 'over there' in alterity, where he 
receives an independent validation of who he is. 'Man's desire,' 
as Lacan frequently (and equivocally) says, 'is the desire of the 
Other': the desire for self-consciousness 1s a desire for 
recognition, which is a desire for the desire of the Other. In 
his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Kojeve says that 'to 
desire the Desire of another is in the final analysis to desire 
that the value that I am or that I "represent" be the· value 
desired by the other' (1986, 101). Crucially, he adds, 'I want 
him to "recognise" me as an autonomous value' (101). This comment 
is crucial because it emphasises (as Borch-Jacobsen cautions) 
that '"desiring to be desired" does not mean at all [contrary to 
what one may expect] desiring to be the object of the other's 
desire' (1991, 203). 
Let us clarify this important yet puzzling emphasis. The 
subject desires self-consciousness, necessarily through the 
mediation of the Other; his desire for the desire of the Other is 
hence a desire to be recognised -- and pose himself -- as a self-
conscious being, that is, as a subject, rather than an object in 
the Other's cognitions. He desires to dis-close himself to the 
Other, and so to himself, as an other 'origin of the world' 
(Derrida, 1978, 125), as a consciousness autonomous of and 
transcendent over the world constituted by the Other, and as an 
'unrest' (Hegel, 1986, 72) shaking the conceptual latticework in 
which the Other would enclose him. He desires recognition, not as 
a thing defined by the Other, but as a 'melting-away of 
everything stable' (Hegel, 1979, 117) in the Other's field of 
reference, a 'question mark' (Act, 426) ek-statically untethered 
by the Other's attributions. If he desires, then, to be desired 
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as a self-conscious subject, according to Kojeve this means that 
he desires to be desired as (a) Desire. ~It is in and by -- or 
better still, as "his" Desire, ' Koj eve says,· ~that man is 
formed and is revealed -- to himself and to others -- as an I, as 
the I that is essentially different from, and radically opposed 
to, the non-I' (1986, 98-9, emphasis added), opposed, that is, to 
the non-subject which he is for the Other. 
To explain what is at issue, one may begin by noting that 
Kojeve capitalises ~Desire', granting it an eminence and 
singularity irreducible to the contingent plurality of lower-case 
desires: Desire, he suggests, unlike desire(s), is an abiding 
force. It is, in plainer terms, insatiable. And because Desire is 
~essentially different from the desired thing, something other 
than a thing' (99), its insatiability implies that it ceaselessly 
points to the non-adequation between itself and the things which 
purport to satisfy it. Ceaselessly it says, that's not it, being 
in perennial excess of the objects it negates by ~destroying, 
transforming, and "assimilating"' (99) them to itself. Having 
assimilated these objects to itself, it is not bound to them, and 
does not extinguish itself in the merging of them with itself, 
and itself with them. Instead, it posits its difference and 
otherness in relation to the objects, its quality of being more-
than and other-than its apparently contented immersion in objects 
of gratification. The X of (or as) Desire is hence ~the act of 
transcending the given that is given to it and that it itself is 
[that is constituted and supported by its assimilation of 
objects]' (100). As a.perpetual ~act of transcending the given', 
Desire is a process of negating: specifically it is ~negating­
negativity' (100) 
The latter term can be understood more clearly if one 
examines its components separately. First, negation: ~The being 
that eats, for example,' Kojeve remarks, ~creates and, preserves 
its own reality by the overcoming [the negation] of a reality 
other than its own, by the "transformation" of an alien reality·-
[the object's] into its own reality' (99). But Desire asserts a 
further negation of the negation which led to the consolidation 
of this ~own reality': it says, that's not it, and in its 
insatiability, negates this ~reality'. Negating-negativity ought 
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not to be confused with dialectical negation in which a negation 
is n~gated to yield a new synthesis or positivity; instead, it 
gives rise to a spiralling action of negation, an endless 
perturbation. The I as Desire seeks ~not to be what it is (as 
static and given being, as natural being, ... ) and to be (that 
is, to become) what it is not' (100). 
This reference to ~natural being' points to a crucial 
feature of Kojeve's thought -- the distinction between animal and 
human Desire. Animal desire, he observes, is ~in the final 
analysis a function of its desire to preserve its life' (101, 
emphasis added), such that natural being seeks ~to remain the 
same, to preserve identity' (Descombes, 1980, 34). In contrast, 
human Desire -- animated by ~negating-negativity' -- ~consists in 
not remaining the same, in will to difference' (Descombes, 1980, 
35), in will to be ek-statically other-than every delimited form 
of itself, in spite of the situation that these forms safeguard 
life. By implication, Desire intrinsically involves risk of life 
and self-endangerment, such that the ~exuberance of life is 
not alien to death' (Bataille, 1962, 11) Consequently, to be 
desired as a subject -- as Desire -- is to desire recognition as 
an ek-stasis not tied to life and the forms given to it. 
(v) The struggle for prestige 
But, at the start of the struggle for ~pure prestige' 
(Kojeve, 1986, 101), an allegorical tableau in which two equals 
confront each other, it is precisely the case that neither of 
them recognises the other to be as such. Each is for the other a 
mere thing, a ~common object ... submerged in the given-being of 
animal-life' (104). However, each is driven to seek recognition 
from the Other of the reality of his self-conscious existence as 
the supersession of the objectal form manifesting him to the 
Other. As such, they engage in a fight to the death in which each 
seeks to impress on the other the over-riding realness (rather 
than inconsequentiality) of his subjective world. By dint of not 
simply submitting to the categories imposed by the other and 
instead entering into combat, each puts his life at risk, the 
life which he could have protected by refusing the prompting of 
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desire to bring his human realness into view. 'The manifestion of 
the human-individual,' Kojeve says, 'consists in showing itself 
as being the pure negation of its objective-or-thingish mode-of-
being -- or, in other words, in showing that to be for oneself, 
or to be a [hu] man, is not to be bound to any determined 
existence not to be bound to life' (105) 
What, then, seems to be the ~fight of animals', as Hester 
refers to her resistance against her husband's attempts to 
dominate her sexually, hides 'the true struggle: to keep desire 
and the dream alive' (CoV, 133), that is, to assert herself 
against his efforts to negate her world and replace it with one 
of his own devising. The risk to life entailed by an apparent 
'fight of animals' goes in (Kojevian) fact, 'against nature', as 
Mynhardt counters when Franken, tacitly alluding to his plan to 
engage in militant acts, speaks of the readiness 'to risk 
everything one normally associates with the "good life"' (RR, 
163) . Going against animal nature, 'violence, and the courage to 
risk it,' claims a member of the Organization, 'is the only way 
in which one can still affirm oneis humanity' (Act, 438), namely 
one's independence of the 'objective-or-thingish mode-of-being' 
(Kojeve, 1986, 105) which one has from the perspective of 
hegemony. Resisting the latter's heteronomous impositions by 
asserting radical autonomy, Raymond leaves the country to join a 
liberation army: he does this, he says, 'to meet myself' (Act, 
186), rather than passively derive his substance from another. In 
a similar vein, Galant's insurrection is precipitated by the 
question, 'Who are you?' (CoV, 292) '(T]alking and talking, 
telling her [his questioner] about Ma-Rose and Nicolaas and 
everybody' , he remarks at last, 'But those are other people, 
they're not I' (292) He realises that his identity is 
heteronomously defined, an9, 'search[ing] for answers to [this] 
question' , he is prompted to 'transcend [these] limits' (Act, 
426) and assert his independence of given-being by risking death 
in a revolt, so that he and his questioner 'can know for sure: 
This is me. I r Galant I (CoV, 292). 
In the struggle for recognition, the combatants show each 
other that they are not 'bound to life' (Kojeve, 1986, 105). 
Nevertheless, according to Hegel, one of the combatants, 
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terrified by the other's endangerment of his life, and 
(implicitly) anguished by the perilous extremes to which he is 
taken by his desire for recognition, chooses not to 'go all the 
way in risking his life' and 'accept[s] life granted to him by 
another' since he 'prefer[s] slavery to death' (Kojeve, 1986, 
109) . Knowing too much about death and (looking from a different 
angle) the worth of life, he becomes for himself what he is for 
the Other, but having forefeited his ek-static 'selfhood', turns 
into 'a living corpse' (108) -- or, as Melanie puts it in her 
description of servility, into 'something white and maggot-like, 
not really a human being, just a th~ng' (ADWS, 129). On the other 
hand, the victor -- now become master -- enjoys the recognition 
and the labour of his former rival. 
(vi) Reversals 
(a) Exteriorizing terror 
'But at this point,' Jameson notes, 
dialectically ironic reversals take place' 
'two distinct and 
(1991, 101) . Fir~t, 
since 'only the Master is genuinely human, 
this henceforth sub-human form of life 
"recognition", by 
which is the slave, 
evaporates at the moment of its attainment, and can offer.no 
genuine satisfaction' (101). The master is 'recognised', not by 
an independent subject whom he reciprocally acknowledges, but by 
a dependent consciousness, and thus lacks an Other who could 
teach him what he is. This self-mystified state is compounded by 
the fact that while the slave works, the master is (for Hegel) an 
idle consumer who forgets what 'reality and the resistance of 
matter are'; as a result, 'any consciousness of his own concrete 
situation flees like a dream, like a ... nagging doubt which the 
puzzled mind is unable to formulate' (Jameson, 1991, 102) . And 
since 'the truth of the independent consciousness is the 
servile consciousness of the bondsman' (Hegel, 1978, 117), that 
is, since the slave's servility is what underwrites the master's 
independence, this autonomy is, in fact, precisely dependent on 
the slave. 
The second dialectical reversal is that the slave, in the 
servility of labour, asserts his independence, or, what amounts 
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to the same thing, his 'negating-negativity' (Kojeve, 1986, 100). 
At first, 'negating-negativity' stands outside the slave in the 
figure of the master, while he himself a·pparently lacks it, 
having surrendered his desire to negate his 'objective-or-
thingish mode-of-being' (105) for fear of his life. It is in the 
master that he recognises this world-shattering power to go 
beyond given-being: the master has it, the slave, not. Hegel, 
however, undoes this mutually exclusive opposition by arguing 
that in the slave's experience of terror in the agon, during 
which 'everything solid and stable has been shaken to its 
foundations', the slave experiences not so much something 
emanating from the nemesis as he does something related to his 
desire, since the 'absolute melting-away of everything stable, is 
the essential nature of self-consciousness, absolute 
negativity ... , which consequently is implicit in this 
consciousness' (1978, 117). In the slave's labour, the implicit 
becomes explicit, and what was 'internal-or-private and mute' 
(Kojeve, 1986, 118) assumes an objectively shareable -- and hence 
recognisable -- form, since he directs this negativity into a 
transformative labour performed on the givenness of the real. And 
since, moreover, the subject negates and fashions the object into 
his 'own self-image' (Taylor, 1980, 194) in his labour, he poses 
his negativity before himself in an exterior form available for 
the Other's recognition of its realness. 'But in transforming the 
World by this work,' Kojeve says, 'the Slave transforms himself, 
too, and thus creates new objective conditions that permit him to 
take up once more the liberating Fight for recognition that he 
refused in the beginning for fear of death' (1986, 120) . In other· 
words, through his work on the real the slave raises himself from 
servile objecthood as a result of having inwardised outside 
terror as a displaced image of his own desire; by incarnating in 
himself the obliterating power previously located · in the 
masterful Other, he re-creates conditions which allow him to re-
embark on a self-shattering shattering of the reification imposed 
on him. But as Galant makes clear in his revolt against Nicolaas, 
what is primarily at issue is not so much · the master's 
delimitations per se, as it is his (Galant's) acceptance of them, 
an acquiescence based on a surrender of desire and a fearful 
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attachment to life at any price. ~His wall is nothing to me 1 ' 
Galant says of Nicolaas: ~It's my own wall I got to face' (CoV 1 
195). Landman's sister Maria similarly highlights the role of her 
acquiescence in the perpetuation of enslavement when she says 1 ~I 
wasn't just a pitiful sacrificing spouse who'd given up her 
life to be used by others [:] I was 1 I am 1 an accomplice' (Act 1 
175) . 
(b) The Other's assertion and self-recognition 
While the slave surrenders this capacity of negating-
negativity/ the master remains ignorant of it 1 thanks to the 
self-mystification attendant on his disavowal of being-for-others 
and the Other's independence. In the slave's re-engagement of the 
struggle for recognition/ then/ the latter's self-assertion as a 
'question mark' (Act 1 426) troubling all the master's 
attributions simultaneously interrogates the legitimacy of the 
power that he exercises. That is to say 1 the ~slave' calls the 
master into question 1 and 1 calling him to account 1 makes him 
acknowledge the nature of his own desire where before he had 
remained at best peripherally aware of it 1 as a ~nagging doubt 
which the puzzled mind is unable to formulate' (Jameson 1 1991 1 
102). In An Act of Terror 1 Erik 1 a national serviceman deployed 
in the SADF as a medical doctor 1 notes that after prolonged 
exposure to the consequences of violence 1 'I do not really see or 
feel anything anymore: it all happens at arm's length' (Act 1 
535) . Reducing the violated bodies before him to the status 
solely of objects of instrumental manipulation/ violence/ as a 
result/ 'does not involve me' and ~happens outside myself' (535). 
What Erik does not ~really see' in the disorder is himself in his 
capacity as a practitioner of violence indeed ~involve[d]' in 
what seems to stand ~outside' and in opposition to himself. 
Crucially/ this lack of self-recognition hinges upon the fact 
that . ~I · have looked at them [those victims who have . passed 
through my hands] from one side only' (536) 1 from the perspective 
of the Same. Realising that terror 'need not be linked to a 
frontier dividing "this side" from "the other side'' 1 "them" and 
"us"' (536)/. a logic in which terror arrives exclusively.from 
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'the other side 1 , Erik perceives that his surgical penetration 
is, from the patient 1 s view, an act of terror. More generally, 
though, by looking at his patients from 'one side only 1 (536) and 
thereby believing that violence is the preserve solely of the 
enemy, he neglects to take account of his own production of 
terror for the Other; it is, conversely, by apprehending the 
Other in his independence (as a subject rather than an object or 
a 'them 1 different to 'us 1 ) and by considering the enemies 1 
casual ties as being 'their 11 victims of terror 11 1 (53 6) that he 
gains awareness of the horror he is responsible for inflicting. 
Through an apprehension of the Other-as-subject, he gains a 
guilty consciousness of the negating-negativity informing desire, 
which 'consists in negating or possessing the ~on-me 1 (Levinas, 
1979, 87) . Like the detective in certain murder mysteries in 
which the anonymous criminal under pursuit turns out be none 
other than the detective himself, Erik is brought face to face 
with his unwitting complicity as an agent of terror. Landman 1 s 
own itinerary in An Act of Terror, his flight across South 
African space and his temporal journey exploring the historicity 
of these spaces, may be described similarly as a quest of self-
recovery in which a subject of knowledge (a detective) 
investigatively pursues a criminal who is the subject himself. 
Having exploded the bomb, and inadvertently given away Nina 1 s 
identity to the authorities (an error resulting in her murder by 
the police), Landman boards a plane where, like 'a body stored in 
ice 1 (Act, 81) , he is insulated from news of the blast. He is 
thus caught in a 'petrifying moment of not knowing 1 (81) -- a 
frozen, petrified, benumbed moment in which he has not yet 
registered the blast 1 s traumatic reality. And 'as long as he did 
not' know about it he was not yet involved, it had not 
happened yet 1 (81). As such, the explosion constitutes a 'missed 
encounter 1 (Lacan, 1977b, 55) in which the cognizing-subject is 
disjunct from the undergoing-subject, and can 'catch up 1 (RR, 
12) with the latter only through deferred action. For Landman to 
resume 'a real and conscious existence 1 (Act, 81) beyond this 
numbed torpor, he would have to know the event. He would have to 
assimilate it rather than, like Erik, keep it 'at a remove 1 
(535), and in so doing he would have to become conscious of his 
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'involve[ment]' (81) and complicity in it. Later after Nina has 
been shot dead, Landman -- detective, subject of knowledge --
'followed the tracks of the day's events: whence this feeling 
that something was eluding him, something he had to discover, a 
key, a clue, something without which he would never be at peace 
with himself?' (120). This imperative to know, to capture an 
elusive quantity, is not simply an injunction to know for the 
sake of knowing: it is bound up with a wish to resolve a 
troubling state of self-dissonance. In other words, Landman wants 
to know himself in the objects of his knowledge and thereby 
restore 'peace' between himself as a cognizing and an 
experiencing subject. Although he subsequently remembers his 
disclosure of Nina's identity, and thus confronts his culpability 
for her death, the realization does not represent the resolution 
of his state of self-division, but only a first station in his 
progress towards guilty awareness of the destructiveness of his 
desire. 
Having fled to the north, he journeys south again to attend 
the funeral held for his victims and to 'return to the city where 
it had all begun a week before' (234). He seeks to 'round off ... 
what had been left so agonisingly incomplete' (234) in the bomb 
blast and its aftermath. The geographical pattern of his journey 
recalls the cyclical novelistic structure found so frequently in 
Brink's writing, a structure in which initially mutually 
exclusive oppositions -- such as that between violence emanating 
from outside and violence arising from the inside are turned 
into each other; but, in this case, Landman is unable to 
inwardise violence 'happen [ing] outside [him] self' (535) . He 
discovers instead 'that there are circles which cannot be 
completed' , and that, in the absence of circularity and a 
gratifying restoration of self-unity, there are~ only . spirals 
'moving irredeemably onward, inward' (234) If the real cannot 
accomodate the circular re-visitation of an 'original' event and 
a concomitant unification of cognizing and undergoing subjects, 
then perhaps the fictive can provide tentative approximations of 
such an aim. 
This 
springbok 
is the route Landman takes when he slaughters a 
in a later hunting expedition. 'This was what had 
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always eluded me -- even in Cape Town, that wretched day of the 
funeral,' he says of the experience: 'Something of myself was 
restored to me in [the springbok's] dead weight' (583). Through 
a dramatic re-enactment of the event, he obtains deferred 
understanding of it, and undergoes its full resonance in a way 
which was, initially, not available to him; it is through a 
fiction that he is able to experience the event in its reality. 
Specifically, he puts himself in relation to the tangible 
consequences of his actions. Having gutted the animal and hoisted 
it on his shoulders, the bomb blast 'was no longer an 
I 
abstraction, a thought, an idea, dream or nightmare, not an 
ideology, but the reality of a body that slowly became cold 
against my own as it tensed into rigor mortis': Landman feels as 
though he were 'walking back through time', and simultaneously 
'gathering· as I went on all the accumulated blood and 
violence and death' (583). By beholding the consequences of his 
actions, Landman takes responsibility for them -- he acknowledges 
that he is the agent or cause of them, and thus recognises in 
them the effects of his desire: anagnorisis. 
In a crucial meditation, Landman argues indeed that his very 
reason for participating in the terror attack was to assert his 
responsibility, in the sense of positing himself as a self-
determining, independent agent rather than the heteronomous 
object of another's will, and in the related sense of accepting 
responsibility for the actions he performs as an agent affirming 
his autonomy. In other words, he desires to assert his autonomy 
against institutions which attempt to deprive him of it, and, at 
the same time, he wishes to pose his ek-static being before 
himself by recognising himself in the consequences of his deeds. 
Landman says, 
The very organisation of society, of government, makes 
it possible -- inevitable -- that all decisions are 
taken at a remove, that all information is filtered 
through innumerable membranes. No one is ever directly 
involved anymore. No one need feel guilty or 
responsible. In earlier times people had to wage their 
wars through physical combat; the hunter had to gore 
his prey, or cut its throat, with his own hand. Today 
we live in a time of increasing distance, space, 
between the actor and his actions. Even your 
achievements as a hunter, Frans: your rifles and 
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telescopic sights and God knows what else: it is no 
longer a simple, direct relationship between yourself 
and some animal. An entire science has interposed 
itself between you. Everything has becom~ abstract, 
disembodied .... The very finger that presses the red 
button in an ultimate war has been absolved of 
responsibility in advance, as all it does is execute 
some anonymous decision or instruction, unleashing a 
war that takes place at a distance. Which makes 
ever-increasing violence possible, even, ironically, 
indispensable, as a kind of scream against abstraction 
and distancing. No one is present anymore. 
I wonder whether you will ever understand, Frans, 
if you were to find out what I have done? That this was 
the reason for it, the explanation for my involvement? 
I had to be present, I had to be there (122). 
One may isolate two thematic concerns in this passage. The first 
is with the notion of distance, division, and separation between 
the subject and the objects of his manipulation -- between the 
hunter and prey a science has interposed itself. Significantly, 
this schism is depicted not only as one existing between the 
subject and object, but between the subject and himself, between 
'the actor and his actions' (122) As a result, he lacks 
responsibility in the sense of a guilty awareness of his 
accountability for his actions; like Erik, he can hold the 
violence he perpetrates 'at a remove' (535) and thus disavow his 
destructiveness, leaving him self-alienated and without 
consciousness-of-self. 
But the subject is alienated in a further sense, and at this 
point one touches on the second aspect of Landman's meditation, 
namely that the distance intervening between 'the actor and his 
actions' also involves a transfer, or deferral, of agency from 
the subject to another determining site: thus the finger pressing 
the mythical button merely 'executes some anonymous decision or 
instruction' ( 122) . So where violence is a scream against 
abstraction and distancing' (122), it seeks a recovery of voice 
through the commencement of a struggle against distancing's 
attrition of autonomy, and therefore against heteronomous forces. 
The explosion is a privileged manifestation of the subject's 
independence of d~limitation -- indeed, Landman's express desire 
'to be there' (122) at the explosion can be construed as a desire 
to be this ex-plosive, ek-static force. However, his desire 'to 
be there', and thus to reclaim agency from institutions in which 
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it had been alienated, is a desire for self-presence in relation 
to the ek-static self-assertion. That is, Landman desires unity 
between the undergoing-subject and the cognizing-subject; he 
wants, in short, both to be the explosion and to see himself 
being it. 
If resistance against heteronomy entails the subject's 
reclaiming of responsibility formerly alienated to another will, 
it involves as well a 'gathering [of] . . . the accumulated blood 
and violence' (Act, 583) which had been distanced and dispersed 
from the subject. In A Dry White Season, Ben is told that 
Gordon's death 'really has nothing do to with [him]' and that 
matters 'will get sorted out' (56) by the proper authorities in 
good time. Yet not only does Ben refuse to relinquish 
responsibility and adopt a passive stance towards masterful 
authority, which would exercise agency in his place, he also 
refuses to evade knowledge of his own complicity in Gordon's 
death -- he refuses, that is, the gesture of the accomplice, who 
'turn [s] a blind eye just because it was "our people" .. who 
committed the crimes' (ADWS, 291). The accomplice diffuses his 
responsibility within a collectivity such as 'our people', and 
says of its crimes, as Ben admits shamefacedly, they 'didn't seem 
to directly concern me' (96) Protesting his innocence, 
harmlessness, and non-involvement in a field of agonistic forces, 
the accomplice 'turn[s] a blind eye' (291), both to the 'crimes' 
and to his desire, which 'consists in negating or possessing the 
non-me' (Levinas, 1979, 87). 
Nowhere in Brink's work is the motif of the 'blind eye' and 
its correlative self-blindness delineated more emphatically than 
in Rumours of Rain, where (as I have already indicated13 ) the 
opacity on Mynhardt's windscreen represents a·blindspot in his 
theoretical gaze, a blindspot associated with the unacknowledged 
consequences of his desire to negate or possess the Other and 
thereby to construct a world in which he finds only an 
untroubling, narcissistically-gratifying confirmation of his 
mastery. Yet structured around his car journey to and from the 
family farm, the novel is arranged as a progression from self-
blindness to self-recognition, for on the return trip, Mynhardt 
has the 'curious impression of driving in against myself, against 
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my own past', and believes that 'if only I could see more clearly 
. . . I would be able to see myself coming on ahead on my way down 
to the farm' (415). In the novel's set of metaphors, the storm --
the ex-plosion -- into which Mynhardt drives represents both the 
beginning of the Soweto uprisings of 1976, and the fulfillment of 
his expectation that he would soon witness himself 'emerge from 
the obscurity ahead' (415). What he sees, in short, is the return 
of the repressed: the return to ekstatic self-affirmation on the 
part of the oppressed, and the return to theoretical view of (the 
consequences of) his desire, which has driven the oppressed to 
resort to militancy. Rumours of Rain thus reveals in its 
structural movement a progressive 'gathering' around Mynhardt of 
'the accumulated blood and violence and death' (Act, 583) 
associated with his historical insertion as a member of an 
hegemonic order, a 'gathering' which takes place in opposition to 
a tendency to 'distance' this violence from his consciousness and 
keep it 'at a remove' (Act, 535) from himself. Recounting his 
sinister ability to precipitate calamity around him by his mere 
presence, Mynhardt says that, thanks to this demonic 'gift', he 
acts 'as a catalyst for violence which breaks out all around me 
yet leaves me unscarred' (28). He wields, that is, a destructive 
influence in spite of himself and without conscioui knowledge of 
it, such that 'I am surrounded by violence, yet untouched by it' 
(28), unscathed and indifferent. His is a psychical strategy 
disavowing responsibility denying culpable agency and 
maintaining him in opposition to the terror of desire, which 
appears to him (at first) dis-placed as a ne:,mesis looming in 
exteriority. 
(vii) Apocalypse 
Yet the distanced, disavowed violence returns in spectacular 
fashion to Mynhardt at the conclusion of the text in the image of 
the apocalyptic storm. That is to say, the deluge is an 
apocalY};?se both in the sense that it is an event of massive 
destructiveness, and that it discloses what had previously been 
concealed ('apocalypse' derives 'from Greek apokalupsis, from 
apokaluptein, to disclose, from APO + kaluptein to hide'i C. E. 
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~) . Inasmuch as Mynhardt is depicted as more than a private 
individual but as the representative of an entire social order, 
the r~pressed violence that returns to him has implications which 
transcend him alone since it brings news of the occluded 
mortality and cruelty of a whole way of life, in the same way as 
Landman's desire for proximity to the explosion brings him to a 
confrontation with ~the accumulated blood and violence and death' 
(Act, 583) associated with the determining socio-political 
historicity of his identity. Through the violence of the Other, 
then, Mynhardt becomes aware of the violence of the Same, with 
the result that the Other's violence is' nothing less than a 
shattering of the oppressor's self-alienated silence. 
If the oppressed's insurrectionary violence clearly shatters 
the silence to which it had been consigned by the oppressor, in 
Brink's writings this violence has an apocalyptic dimension not 
only in the sense that it shows an oppressing class an 
unacknowledged aspect of itself, but in the sense, too, that it 
brings to light a formerly suppressed world, an alternative realm 
of social possibilities regarded as unthinkable by the hegemony. 
To use the terms laid out in ~The dove in the grave', resistance 
violence -- inasmuch as it deploys the ~sword' in order to affirm 
~the word' and thus projects a future social condition enshrining 
~the nobler achievements of the human spirit' furthers a 
~basic groundswell towards understanding' (11). The violence of 
resistance, in other words, advances an indefinite metanarrative 
progression towards the agora standing on ~the other side' (CoV, 
395) of the ~historical silence' (Dove, 11) which hegemony sets 
up between master and slave. 
In its apocalyptic aspect, resistance violence shatters 
hegemony's enclosing structural framework: hence, the explosion 
in which Landman (in his capacity as a member of an hegemonic 
order) sees his guilt after having been unconscious of it, is 
equally portrayed as a gathering of diverse efforts into a 
metanarrative movement, as ~a single irrepressible sound, a 
timeless shofar resounding over the tumbling walls of Jericho' 
(Act, 31; emphases added). Moreover, resistance vlolence, in its 
apocalyptic dimension, advances a metanarrative which is 
specifically described as the coming-to-consciousness of a 
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nation-space: at the outset of his rebellion, for instance, 
Galant proclaims, 'There's a whole world struggling inside me', 
and says that the range of memories and incidents constituting 
his historical particularity are 'all there growing and 
swelling like a thing wanting to be born' (CoV, 374). As in the 
writer's violence of saying, an entire world seeks to manifest 
itself against the counter-tendencies of repression and 
forgetting. Or as Landman declares in anticipation of an 
apocalyptic apotheosis, 'On that resplendent future day [of the 
explosion] all the history and prehistory of Africa would 
converge, beams of light bent inward through a burning-glass to 
a single searing point where it erupts in fire' (Act, 31). For 
Brink, therefore, the piercing of the master's self-mystified 
solipsism is coupled with the slave's ek-static shattering of his 
. 
objectification by the master, which, in turn, precipitates the 
colossal movement of a nation's emergence into the light of 
consciousness. The sword and its three silences are broken, to 
return as the sword of the Apocalypse. 
* 
~ .. . . 
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ENDNOTES 
1. 'The Old Man·s Protest" 11 11-14; in In This City, 1986. 
2. 1978, 117. 
3. Cf. Chapter 1, 'II. The subject and sensory overload". 3.22 
4. Cf. Chapter 1, 'VI. Ecstasy (iv) The narration: apopha~!~·. 
5. 1962, 239. 
6. Weekly Mail & Guardian, vol 9, no. 30, July 29 to August 5, 
1993; p.l. 
1~ Cf. Chapter 1, 'VI. Ecstasy (iv) The narration: apophasis". 
Cf. also Lacan, 1977b, 207-8. 
8. Cf. Chapter 1 'VI. Ecstasy (v) Death of the author·. 
9. Thus in Imagined Communities Anderson speaks of 'the 
reassurance of fratricide" (1991, 199) in relation to 
nationalism, by which he refers to a key strategy of 
nationalist historiography to re-write past conflicts between 
disparate groups as 'fratricidal" encounters occuring on the 
ground of familial bonds always implicitly in existence and 
serving as the basis for the development of the later 'imagined 
community" which the historiographical practice in question 
seeks to promote. One might add that these 'fratricidal" 
conflicts may then be putatively subsumed as 'episodes· 
profiting the growth of the nation-as-family. 
10. Weekly Mail & Guardian, 16 April 1993, p.7. 
11. As Taylor notes, 'Hegel"s purpose in this context is not to 
describe actual historical events, though history amply 
illustrates the dialectic he identifies. He intends to analyze 
the significance of the generic experience of struggling for 
recognition and of mastery and servitude for the education of 
the self· ( 1980, 194). 
12. Cf. Chapter 2, 'I. Introduction: the death sentence·. 
13. Cf. Chapter 1 'II. The subject and defective vision (i) 
Dark mirrors·. 
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